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REPORT

CLIENT
Schroders UK Real Estate Fund

PROJECT NAME
North Crescent




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Security Needs Assessment

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1 DOCUMENT CONTROL

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Position Senior Consultant	Position Risk Coordinator	Position Director
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B	Project Name amended	03/07/21		EU	MR
C	Revised to architect comments	16/07/21		EU	MR
D					
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3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3.1 Introduction

This report presents the findings of the QCIC Security Needs Assessment (SNA) for the North Crescent development. The SNA was carried out in accordance with the requirement detailed in 'HEA 06' of the BREEAM UK accreditation scheme New Construction 2018.

The purpose of the assessment is to inform stakeholder decision-making and to provide the identification and evaluation of recommendations for security measures.

This SNA has also been carried out in accordance with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles with recommendations within this report given by the SQSS in consultation with project stakeholders.

3.2 Objective

To achieve the security credit needed for the BREEAM accreditation, three criteria need to be fulfilled as defined in the BREEAM UK New Construction 2018.

The criteria are as follows:

Criterion 1 - A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent). The purpose of the SNA will be to identify attributes of the proposal, site and surroundings which may influence the approach to security for the development.

Criterion 2 - The SQSS develops a set of security controls and recommendations for incorporation into the proposals. Those controls and recommendations shall directly relate to the threats and assets identified in the preceding SNA.

Criterion 3 - The recommendations or solutions proposed by the SQSS are implemented. Any deviation from those recommendations or solutions will need to be justified, documented and agreed in advance with an SQSS.

The first two criteria (ultimately driving the fulfilment of criteria 3) are achieved by including the following information within the SNA:

- A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development.
- Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential use of the building.
- Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential user groups of the building.
- Identify any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community.
- Identifying and developing a set of recommendations and solutions from the information gathered during the assessment.

3.3 Overview

The security risk profile of the North Crescent aligned to that of similar commercial office development within Camden. This assessment did not ascertain any information which suggested that Stanhope assets specifically, or the immediate area surrounding North Crescent is being specifically targeted by any particular group although the risk profile of the area will ultimately be influenced by future users, occupants and tenants.

The primary threats are assessed as follows:

- Other Theft
- Theft from the Person
- Anti-Social Behaviour

This report also outlines why these threats will have a detrimental effect on the development and its users. However, a list of security recommendations to mitigate the threats outlined by QCIC is included.

To meet the criteria of the BREEAM security credit (HEA 06) these recommendations must be included within the security design. However, as stated in BREEAM HEA 06, any omissions from the list of recommendations will have to be justified and agreed with the SQSS.

4 VISUAL AUDIT

4.1 Overview of location and use of the development.




Figure 1: North Crescent Ariel View (Source: Google Maps)

North Crescent is located within the area of Bloomsbury in Camden, London that runs between Tottenham Court Road and Gower Street. It is in proximity of several notable buildings such as the British Museum, the University College London, and University College London Hospital.

The proposed development will be 10 minutes' walk from the start of the Oxford street retail street strip that runs west as far as Marble arch. As well as the popular Tottenham Court Road underground station south of the development there is also Google Street Underground Station which is a 2-minute walk from the building.

During the SNA assessment QCIC noted a rush hour level of footfall around the immediate area of the development, however, as well as a perceived negative impact it also means that there will be periodic passive and natural surveillance by people particularly walking through the area during commercial and office hours.

4.2 Site Survey

The following images were obtained via Google maps to assess the adjacent to the development.




Figure 2: North Crescent North Crescent (Source: Google Maps)



Figure 3: North Crescent (Source: Google Maps)

4.3 Proposed Development

The proposed North Crescent design is for a commercial office scheme consisting of two neighbouring buildings, Minerva House and Telephone Exchange. QCIC have no reason to believe that the development will have any detrimental effects on the surrounding area.

However, a further security review / security risk assessment will need to be conducted once the future tenants have been confirmed that will be occupying the office space. The proposed floors reviewed at the time of this assessment cover 7 levels from Lower ground to roof are below.




Figure 4: Proposed Telephone Exchange-Lower Ground Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)

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


Figure 5: Proposed Telephone Exchange-Ground Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)




Figure 6: Proposed Telephone Exchange-First Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)

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


Figure 7: Proposed Telephone Exchange-Second Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)




Figure 8: Proposed Telephone Exchange -Third Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)




Figure 9: Proposed Minerva House and Telephone Exchange-Fourth Floor plan. (Source: Morris & Company)




Figure 10: Proposed Minerva House and Telephone Exchange-Roof Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)

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


Figure 11: Proposed Minerva House-Lower Ground Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)

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


Figure 12: Proposed Minerva House-Ground Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)

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


Figure 13: Proposed Minerva House-First Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)

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


Figure 14: Proposed Minerva House-Second Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)




Figure 15: Proposed Minerva House-Third Floor Plan. (Source: Morris & Company)

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5 SECURITY THREATS

5.1 Threats to the development

The following local area crime charts displaying crimes per 1,000 residents show realistic crime rates which may not accurately reflect the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime in or around North Crescent.




Figure 16: Crime survey area (Source : [Police UK](#))

QCIC have used existing crime statistics for Bloomsbury to determine the types of crimes most likely to affect the development and surrounding areas.

QCIC has assessed that **Other Theft 24.8%** as well as **Theft from the Person 19.8%** directed towards the development and its occupants are the most prevalent threat as well as the potential for **Anti-Social Behaviour 17.9%** and **Violence and Sexual Offences 8.6%**.

5.2 Crime variations

Crime rates within the local area between the periods of **October 2019** and **September 2020** present abnormal fluctuation in levels of reported crime. Although the underlying reasoning for the level of variable change are unknown this could be attributed to two possible factors:

- The recent MET Police crime data map outage, and

- The imposed movement restrictions enforced by the UK government during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

However, when estimating the probability of crime in the immediate area of the development using the recorded crime data is unlikely to give a full and accurate representation of the crime issues present. This is due to the following influences:

- The lack of detailed information available for individual crime events.
- The ways in which crimes are recorded as well as issues relating to non-reporting of crime.

As such, the statistical crime data may not be suitable for evaluating the longer-term risk of crime effectively but can be used to identify the recent locations and types of crime currently being committed.



Figure 17: Selected crime map of the immediate area for the month of October 2020

From the crime statistics, it is assessed that the volume of pedestrians is proportional to the number of crimes committed, with many crimes committed in areas where there is a higher.




Figure 18: Number of crimes committed within the Bloomsbury area

5.2.1 Other Theft and Theft from Person

Other theft and theft from person (combined 44.6%) is the most commonly committed crime within the immediate area and covers a broad range of thefts such as pickpocketing, snatch and grab theft, 'table surfing', theft from an automated teller machines (ATM's) as well as theft from dwellings. Theft from persons can be categorised as either mugging or pickpocketing. Mugging is defined as utilising force or threat to take the victims property, usually committed in a quiet or dark area and pickpocketing occurring unbeknown to the victim, usually committed in a busy area.

There is a higher risk of other theft and theft from persons affecting the occupants of North Crescent potentially accentuated by the high numbers of people using the neighbouring retail destinations and transiting between the local stations.

5.2.2 Anti-Social Behaviour

Anti-social behaviour is a broad crime category applied to anti-social and disruptive behaviour such as begging, vandalism and consumption of alcohol in a public space. Although anti-social behaviour has been assessed as not likely to affect people in building directly, there is a likelihood of it affecting the users of the building during their transit through the area to local public transport hubs. Furthermore, the adjacency of licensed bars and restaurants increases the risk of drunk and disorderly behaviour having a direct effect on the employees and users of the building. However, it should be noted that the high levels of anti-social behaviour are consistent with most London boroughs, representing the 'low end' of the crime scale but not necessarily reflecting an endemic crime problem in any one area.

5.2.3 Violence and Sexual Offences

Violent crime potentially poses a threat to the occupants of North Crescent. This crime category is broad and can range from offences such as harassment and common assault to serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievously bodily harm, and murder. Sexual offences are also reported under the "Violence and Sexual Offences" category; therefore, it is difficult to differentiate between violent offences and sexual related offences.

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Reducing areas of low light or obscured visibility combined with a visible security presence (mechanical, electronic, and human) will help reduce the likelihood of some offences from taking place within or in the vicinity of the building. Good lighting will help promote a safe and secure environment. Where secluded spaces cannot be avoided (such as cycle storage areas) means of raising an alarm via duress buttons or panic alarms should also be considered for the site.

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6 RISK REGISTER

CRITICAL ASSET	IMPACT	MITIGATION
1. Staff Access and Building Availability	Rough sleeping anti-social behaviour and public urination may occur in areas obscured from street view. Leaving an unsafe or unhealthy environment.	Reduce accessible recesses in the building façade capable of concealing a person. Ensure such areas are well lit and monitored by CCTV.
2. Staff Security and Welfare	High tenant or staff turnover, poor employee relations, stress, company / building reputation. Theft of personal belongings (At Desk) Theft of expensive personal bicycle (In Building Storage)	Controlled access at entry level Incident Management & Control Secure office spaces Secure cycle storage
3. IT System Physical Access	Loss of Service or interference with IT Technical Rooms or Incoming Service Room Security Systems Archives can be destroyed or stolen.	Locked or AACS controlled equipment rooms
4. Critical Service Utility, Plant Rooms & Safety	Loss of service or use of building due to interference or accidental damage caused by unauthorized access.	Restrict access to BOH circulations leading to service rooms. Controlled and monitored by AACS and CCTV systems.
5. Office Equipment and Business Information Assets	Loss of Personal GDPR or Client information and ongoing company reputation	Secure access to office spaces from public or communal spaces in shared property
6. Cycle Storage	Attempted Access potential staff intimidation Loss of personal asset	Entrances to bicycle storage should be electronically controlled, supplemented with

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		closed circuit video surveillance systems.
7. Covert access to BOH and stair cores.	BOH corridors and internal escape routes give rise to forced entry to private spaces and offices beyond natural surveillance.	External escape doors and those dedicated to emergency access and be operable from the inside only and CCTV monitored. Entry access controlled, or operable with 'fireman's override key'.
8. Staff and visitor safety from attack	Personal injury and possible death plus reputational damage for poor preparation against a marauding weapons attack.	A lockdown capability should be considered to secure the building internal boundaries by auto locking via AACS as well as duress buttons. This must be coordinated with fire and life safety regulations.

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7 QCIC SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 QCIC Recommendations

Based on the threats identified this section details the security measures which QCIC recommends for the building. These recommendations are to be implemented into the design to minimise the risk of the threats outlined within this assessment. To gain the BREEAM accreditation these recommendations will need to be adhered to, and any deviations will need to be justified, documented, and agreed upon with QCIC.

This report was created in RIBA Stage 2.

AREA of INTEREST	QCIC SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
Main Entrances and Reception Areas	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure main entrances are highly visible and provide a well-lit area. 2. Entrance doors should be intrusion resistant and/or the next secure layer should provide PAS24 as a minimum-security measure. 3. Dedicated employee entrances should be secured with an Automatic Access Control System (AACS) to mitigate the risk of unauthorised people gaining entry to the building. 4. CCTV monitoring of the main entrances and the main reception areas should be provided. 5. Consideration should be given to providing an accessible WC without breaking the secure line. 6. Recommendation for Access Control System to Office area from reception/amenity area
Security Information collected by the CCTV	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. To ensure video evidence cannot be removed from the site by an intruder, CCTV Recording Servers, Network Video Recorders, and Image Archive machines should be protected by a SR2 rated enclosure / cabinet or room. 8. Alternatively, images may be recorded to a cloud-based archive.
Facade External	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Any recesses in the building façade capable of concealing a person should be avoided unless well-lit and monitored by CCTV. 10. CCTV monitoring should cover the building perimeter Entrances.


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Service, Utility, and Plant Rooms	11. Points of access to BOH circulations leading to service, utility and plant room areas should be controlled and monitored by AACS and CCTV systems.
Floor Plate Entrances	12. Doors from lobbies or stairwells giving access to the upper level floors should be secured by AACS to mitigate the risk of unauthorised persons gaining access to the individual floor. Or wireways provided for future tenant access control.
Terrace	13. Recommendation for landlord terraces to be fitted with CCTV monitoring and AACS for controlled access.
Final Escape Exits	14. External escape doors and those dedicated to firefighting access should be operable from the inside only, access controlled or be operable with a 'fireman's override key.' 15. All final emergency exits should be monitored through the CCTV system.
Cycle Storage	16. Recommendation that entrances to bicycle storage should be electronically controlled and supplemented with closed circuit video surveillance systems. 17. Access routes should provide a minimum of 2 AACS Entrance door layers or achieve a system that creates singularity and 1 to 1 verification in order to store and retrieve cycles.
Incident Management	18. A lockdown capability should be considered for the non-public areas by the AACS as well as duress buttons. However, this must be coordinated with fire and life safety regulations.

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8 APPENDIX A - CRIME STATISTICS FOR BLOOMSBURY


Comparison of crime types in this area between October 2019 and September 2020



Type	Total	Percentage
Anti-social behaviour	1076	17.9%
Bicycle theft	291	4.8%
Burglary	287	4.8%
Criminal damage and arson	102	1.7%
Drugs	169	2.8%
Other theft	1491	24.8%
Possession of weapons	13	0.2%
Public order	223	3.7%
Robbery	251	4.2%
Shoplifting	197	3.3%
Theft from the person	1189	19.8%
Vehicle crime	181	3%
Violence and sexual offences	520	8.6%
Other crime	25	0.4%

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Comparison of outcomes in this area between October 2019 to September 2020



Outcomes	Total	Percentage
Other	1076	17.9%
Status update unavailable	2011	33.4%
Investigation complete; no suspect identified	2367	39.4%
Court result unavailable	57	0.9%
Awaiting court outcome	84	1.4%
Offender given a caution	15	0.2%
Local resolution	125	2.1%
Offender given penalty notice	15	0.2%
Offender given a drugs possession warning	1	0%
Further investigation is not in the public interest	1	0%
Under investigation	262	4.4%
Unable to prosecute suspect	1	0%

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Crime levels in this area between October 2019 to September 2020



Month	Total	Percentage
Oct 2019	830	13.8%
Nov 2019	682	11.3%
Dec 2019	596	9.9%
Jan 2020	709	11.8%
Feb 2020	780	13%
Mar 2020	523	8.7%
Apr 2020	253	4.2%
May 2020	212	3.5%
Jun 2020	246	4.1%
Jul 2020	365	6.1%
Aug 2020	402	6.7%
Sep 2020	417	6.9%

Source: [Police.uk](https://www.police.uk)