

QCIC

qcic-group.com

13 Christopher Street
London
EC2A 2BS

Tel: +44 (0) 207 060 7242

REPORT

CLIENT

OD Camden Hotel Ltd

PROJECT NAME

5-17 Haverstock Hill

DOCUMENT TITLE

Security Needs Assessment

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1 DOCUMENT CONTROL

1.1 Document Control Reference

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Signature 	Signature 	Signature 
Name Mark Rowan	Name Anna-Marie Conradie	Name Mark Rowan
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1.2 Document Issue / Revision Record

VERSION	DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT	DATE	NOTES	ORIGINATOR	CHECKED
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B	Amended to Client comments	16/09/20	For Review	MR	MR
C	Plan references removed following GA update. Note added to recommendations	11/11/20	Final Issue	EU	MR
D					
E					
F					
G					

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3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3.1 Introduction

This report presents the findings of the QCIC Security Needs Assessment (SNA) for the 5-17 Haverstock Hill development. The SNA was carried out in accordance with the requirement detailed in 'HEA 06' of the BREEAM UK accreditation scheme New Construction 2018

The purpose of the assessment is to inform stakeholder decision-making and to provide the identification and evaluation of recommendations for security measures.

This SNA has also been carried out in accordance with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles with recommendations within this report given by the SQSS in consultation with project stakeholders.

3.2 Objective

To achieve the security credit needed for the BREEAM accreditation, three criteria need to be fulfilled as defined in the BREEAM UK New Construction 2018.

The criteria are as follows:

Criterion 1 - A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent). The purpose of the SNA will be to identify attributes of the proposal, site and surroundings which may influence the approach to security for the development.

Criterion 2 - The SQSS develops a set of security controls and recommendations for incorporation into the proposals. Those controls and recommendations shall directly relate to the threats and assets identified in the preceding SNA.

Criterion 3 - The recommendations or solutions proposed by the SQSS are implemented. Any deviation from those recommendations or solutions will need to be justified, documented, and agreed in advance with an SQSS.

The first two criteria (ultimately driving the fulfilment of criteria 3) are achieved by including the following information within the SNA:

- A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development.
- Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential use of the building.
- Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential user groups of the building.
- Identify any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community.
- Identifying and developing a set of recommendations and solutions from the information gathered during the assessment.

3.3 Overview

The security risk profile of 5-17 Haverstock Hill is aligned to that of mixed-use hotel and residential scheme within Camden. This assessment did not ascertain any information which suggested that OD Camden Hotel Ltd assets specifically, or the immediate area surrounding 5-17 Haverstock Hill is being specifically targeted by any particular group although the risk profile of the area will ultimately be influenced by future users, occupants and tenants.

The primary threats are assessed as follows

- Anti-Social Behaviour
- Violence and Sexual Behaviour
- Drugs

This report also outlines why these threats will have a detrimental effect on the development and its users. However, a list of security recommendations to mitigate the threats outlined by QCIC is included. It is understood that the detailed security design, along with all other detailed design will be considered post planning.

To meet the criteria of the BREEAM security credit (HEA 06) these recommendations must be included within the upcoming security design. However, as stated in BREEAM HEA 06, any omissions from the recommendations made within this SNA will have to be justified and agreed with the SQSS.

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4 VISUAL AUDIT

4.1 Overview of location and use of the development.




Figure 1: 5-17 Haverstock Ariel View (Source: Google Maps)

5-17 Haverstock Hill is located within the area of Camden. The area is predominantly residential with Chalk Farm Tube located immediately adjacent to the development that will increase footfall around the area. Chalk Farm Road south east are focused on rows of bars, pubs, and restaurants.

During the SNA assessment QCIC noted a potential high level of footfall around the immediate area of the development, however, as well as a perceived negative impact, it also means that there will be greater passive and natural surveillance by people walking through the area.

4.2 Site Survey

The following images were obtained via Google maps to assess the area adjacent to the development.




Figure 2: 5-17 Haverstock Hill view from Adelaide Road




Figure 3: 5-17 Haverstock Hill view from Haverstock Hill

4.3 Proposed Development

The proposed 5-17 Haverstock Hill design is for a mixed-use hotel and residential scheme, 7 storeys comprising of approximately 120 hotel beds and 34 residential units. QCIC have no reason to believe that the development will have any detrimental effects on the surrounding area.

However, a further security review / security risk assessment will need to be conducted once the future occupants of the lettable areas have been confirmed. It is recommended that this is a continuous review process.

5 SECURITY THREATS

5.1 Threats to the development

QCIC has identified that Anti-Social Behaviour is the prevalent threat.

The following local area crime charts displaying crimes per 1,000 residents show realistic crime rates which may not accurately reflect the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime in or around 5-17 Haverstock Hill.



QCIC have used the existing crime statistics for the local areas to determine the types of crimes most likely to affect the development and surrounding areas.

QCIC has assessed that **Anti-Social Behaviour 32.5%** as well as **Violence and Sexual Offences 19.6%** directed towards the development and its occupants are the most prevalent threat as well as the potential for **Drugs 8.1%** and **Other Theft 7.9%**.

5.2 Crime variations

Crime rates within the local area (between the periods of **July 2019** and **June 2020**) present abnormal fluctuation in levels of reported crime. Although the underlying reasoning for the level of variable change are unknown this could be attributed to two possible factors:

- (a) The recent MET Police crime data map outage, and
- (b) The imposed movement restrictions enforced by the UK government during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

A periodic trend pattern has been indicated below:

- Steady decrease in crime levels between **July 2019** and **August 2019**
- Increase in reported crime between **August 2019** and **September 2019**
- Steady decrease in crime between **September 2019** and **March 2020**
- Sudden spike in reported crime since **March 2020** to **June 2020**

However, when estimating the probability of crime in the immediate area of the development using the recorded crime data is unlikely to give a full and accurate representation of the crime issues present. This is due to the following influences:

- The lack of detailed information available for individual crime events.
- The ways in which crimes are recorded as well as issues relating to non-reporting of crime.

As such, the statistical crime data may not be suitable for evaluating the longer-term risk of crime effectively but can be used to identify the recent locations and types of crime currently being committed.



Figure 4: Selected crime map of the immediate area for the month of July 2020

From the crime statistics, it is assessed that the volume of pedestrians is proportional to the number of crimes committed, with many crimes committed in areas where there is a higher footfall.




Figure 5: Number of crimes committed within the Haverstock area

5.2.1 Anti-Social Behaviour

Anti-social behaviour is a broad crime category applied to anti-social and disruptive behaviour such as begging, vandalism and consumption of alcohol in a public space. Although anti-social behaviour has been assessed as not likely to affect people in building directly, the likelihood of it affecting the employees, most noticeably when walking from Chalk Farm Tube is higher as evidenced by the local crime statistics. Furthermore, the adjacency of licensed bars and restaurants increases the risk of drunk and disorderly behaviour having a direct effect on the employees and users of the building. However, it should be noted that the high levels of anti-social behaviour is consistent with most London boroughs, representing the 'low end' of the crime scale but not necessarily reflecting an endemic crime problem in any one area.

5.2.2 Violence and Sexual Behaviour

Violent crime potentially poses a threat to the occupants of 5-17 Haverstock Hill. This crime category is broad and can range from offences such as harassment and common assault to serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievously bodily harm, and murder. Sexual offences are also reported under the "Violence and Sexual Offences" category, therefore it is difficult to differentiate between violent offences and sexual related offences.

Reducing areas of low light or obscured visibility combined with a visible security presence (mechanical, electronic, and human) will help reduce the likelihood of some offences from taking place within or in the vicinity of the building. Good lighting will help promote a safe and secure environment. Where secluded spaces cannot be avoided (such as cycle storage areas) means of raising an alarm via duress buttons or panic alarms should also be considered for the site.

5.2.3 Drugs

Drug related crime can range from possession of a class A drug to dealing and distribution. These may be from random searches or a starting point of anti-social behaviour leading to a drug discovery. Prevalent in high traffic areas and quieter spots in quieter periods.

5.2.4 Other Theft and Theft from Person

Other theft and theft from person is the most commonly committed crime within the immediate area and covers a broad range of thefts such as pickpocketing, snatch and grab theft, 'table surfing', theft from an automated teller machines (ATM's) as well as theft from dwellings. Theft from persons can be categorised as either mugging or pickpocketing. Mugging is defined as utilising force or threat to take the victims property, usually committed in a quiet or dark area and pickpocketing occurring unbeknown to the victim, usually committed in a busy area.

There is a higher risk of other theft and theft from persons affecting the occupants of 5-17 Haverstock Hill potentially accentuated by high numbers of people as well as the areas with high footfall.

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6 RISK REGISTER

CRITICAL ASSET	IMPACT	MITIGATION
1. Staff Access and Building Availability	Rough sleeping anti-social behaviour and public urination may occur in areas obscured from street view. Leaving an unsafe or unhealthy environment.	Reduce accessible recesses in the building façade capable of concealing a person. Use gates along the service entrance and ensure such areas are well lit and monitored by CCTV.
2. Staff Security and Welfare	High tenant or staff turnover, poor employee relations, stress, company / building reputation. Theft of personal belongings (At Desk) Theft of expensive personal bicycle (In Building Storage)	Controlled Access Incident Management & Control Secure Office Spaces
3. IT System Physical Access	Loss of Service or interference with IT Technical Rooms or Incoming Service Room Security Systems Archives can be destroyed or stolen.	Locked or AACS Controlled
4. Critical Service Utility, Plant Rooms & Safety	Loss of service or use of building due to interference or accidental damage caused by unauthorized access.	Restrict access to BOH circulations leading to service rooms. Controlled and monitored by AACS and CCTV systems.
5. Office Equipment and Business Information Assets	Loss of Personal GDPR or Client information and ongoing company reputation	Secure access to office spaces from public or communal spaces in shared property
6. Cycle Storage	Attempted Access potential staff intimidation	Entrances to bicycle storage should be

	Loss of personal asset	electronically controlled, supplemented with closed circuit video surveillance systems.
7. Covert access to BOH and stair cores.	BOH corridors and internal escape routes give rise to forced entry to private spaces and offices beyond natural surveillance.	External escape doors and those dedicated to emergency access and be operable from the inside only and CCTV monitored. Entry access controlled, or operable with 'fireman's override key'.
8. Staff and visitor safety from attack	Personal injury and possible death plus reputational damage for poor preparation against a marauding weapons attack.	A lockdown capability should be considered to secure the building internal boundaries by auto locking via AACs as well as duress buttons. This must be coordinated with fire and life safety regulations.
9. Display Products in retail	Attraction of criminal activity into the retail and display areas or the ground floor areas. Impact on Staff and reputation or the building with local persons active in the criminal behaviors.	Use exterior signs to declare demonstration equipment as dummy of casings only. Ensure displays are away from the exit doors.

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7 QCIC SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 QCIC Recommendations

Based on the threats identified, this section details the security measures which QCIC recommends for the building. These recommendations are to be implemented into the design to reduce the risk of the threats outlined within this assessment.

To gain the BREEAM accreditation these recommendations will need to be adhered to, and any deviations will need to be justified, documented, and agreed upon with QCIC.

It is noted that a number of these recommendations have already been considered and addressed the latest architectural general arrangement plans

AREA of INTEREST	QCIC SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
Main Entrances and Reception Areas	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure main entrances are highly visible and provide a well-lit area. 2. Provide gates to the main courtyard which will be lockable at night. These will need intercoms to operate effectively. 3. Entrance doors should be intrusion resistant and/or the next secure layer should provide PAS24 as a minimum-security measure. 4. Dedicated employee entrances should be secured with an Automatic Access Control System (AACS) to mitigate the risk of unauthorised people gaining entry to the building. 5. CCTV monitoring of the main entrances and the main reception areas should be provided. 6. Reception area Cafés should include a CCTV general observation camera for observation of Other Theft and Theft from The Person opportunist crime.
Service area	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Use gates to isolate either end of the service road. This will prevent rough sleeping and loitering in the service road. Also help to reduce the risk of bicycle theft. 8. These will need intercoms to operate effectively.
Retail Units	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Recommendation for CCTV monitoring at entrance/exit points at ground floor / street level to discourage potential criminals committed theft and theft from the person.

	10. Where possible limit the number of entrances into a retail unit to one.
Security Information collected by the CCTV system	<p>11. To ensure video evidence cannot be removed from the site by an intruder, CCTV Recording Servers, Network Video Recorders, and Image Archive machines should be protected by a SR2 rated enclosure / cabinet or room.</p> <p>12. Alternatively, images may be recorded to a cloud-based archive.</p>
Residential Entrances	13. Provide lobbies from residential entrances to hinder tailgating
Service, Utility, and Plant Rooms	14. Points of access to BOH circulations leading to basement service, utility and plant room areas should be controlled and monitored by AACS and CCTV systems.
Floor Plate Entrances	<p>15. Doors from lobbies or stairwells giving access to the upper level floors should be secured by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. From Lift Lobby - Manually secured out of hours b. From Lift Lobby - AACS to mitigate the risk of unauthorised persons gaining access to the individual floor. c. From Stairwell - Mechanically secured by a fire exit only door release for egress with MOA ingress released by a fire circuit relay or key if beyond fire lobby.
Final Escape Exits	<p>16. External escape doors and those dedicated to firefighting access should be operable from the inside only, access controlled or be operable with a 'fireman's override key'.</p> <p>17. All final exits should be monitored through the CCTV system.</p>
Cycle Storage	18. Recommendation that entrances to bicycle storage should be electronically controlled and caged, supplemented with closed circuit video surveillance systems.
Incident Management	19. A lockdown capability should be considered for the non-public areas by the AACS as well as duress

	<p>buttons. However, this must be coordinated with fire and life safety regulations.</p> <p>20. Duress buttons to be added to the shower facilities and bicycle store areas</p>
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
7.2 DOCO Recommendations

No further recommendations received from DOCO. Meeting will be arranged if necessary.

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8 APPENDIX A - CRIME STATISTICS FOR HAVERSTOCK


Comparison of crime types in this area between July 2019 and June 2020



Type	Total	Percentage
Anti-social behaviour	511	32.5%
Bicycle theft	33	2.1%
Burglary	91	5.8%
Criminal damage and arson	67	4.3%
Drugs	128	8.1%
Other theft	124	7.9%
Possession of weapons	8	0.5%
Public order	99	6.3%
Robbery	36	2.3%
Theft from the person	63	4%
Vehicle crime	92	5.8%
Violence and sexual offences	309	19.6%
Other crime	7	0.4%
Shoplifting	5	0.3%


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Comparison of outcomes in this area between July 2019 to June 2020



Outcomes	Total	Percentage
Other	511	32.5%
Status update unavailable	411	26.1%
Local resolution	66	4.2%
Court result unavailable	31	2%
Offender given a caution	9	0.6%
Offender given penalty notice	9	0.6%
Investigation complete: no suspect identified	440	28%
Awaiting court outcome	34	2.2%
Offender given a drugs possession warning	4	0.3%
Under investigation	58	3.7%

Crime levels in this area between July 2019 to June 2020



Month	Total	Percentage
Jul 2019	143	9.1%
Aug 2019	113	7.2%
Sep 2019	131	8.3%
Oct 2019	122	7.8%
Nov 2019	114	7.2%
Dec 2019	109	6.9%
Jan 2020	99	6.3%
Feb 2020	96	6.1%
Mar 2020	110	7%
Apr 2020	180	11.4%
May 2020	180	11.4%
Jun 2020	176	11.2%

Source: [Police.uk](https://www.police.uk)

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