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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** 29 April 2019 11:17  
**To:** Planning  
**Subject:** Planning Response - 2019/2095/P - 160-161 Drury Lane & 4-6 Parker Street, WC2

**Categories:** CASES

FAO John Diver,

Thank you for allowing me to comment on planning application 2019/2095/P which relates to the extension and refurbishment for 160-161 Drury Lane & 4-6 Parker Street, WC2.

I have no objections to the proposal but have the following comment and recommendations to make in relation to the submitted plans.

**Comments and Recommendations**

- Access & Movement – Ideally all the different possible uses within the building should be kept separate so that there is no conflict or confusion around users being in the correct location within the building. The main entrance from Parker Street leads directly into the main foyer and it appears that the reception area is directly in front of this which will give the staff in this area good unobstructed surveillance looking directly at this entry point and will also naturally make a visitor approach the desk and identify themselves before having to go further into the building. As a result of this I would recommend that the area off the reception area which is proposed to be either A1 or B1 be solely for B1 use. The reason behind this is that all the benefits of having good security within the reception area will be lost if any person can enter this area to use a café/restaurant/shop. It will be difficult for the building management team to identify who is there for legitimate reasons as this kind of ‘use’ encourages people of the street to walk and enter the reception area. If this space is to be used for A1 use then I would advise the doors leading into the reception area be removed and this area has its own separate entrance from Parker Street.
- Access Control – The reception area is the main location for the ‘access control’ system to begin... this would mean encrypted FOB access control on the door leading to the cycle storage area, entering the stairwell and ideally making the lift on a restricted floor access depending on the user. This is certainly the case with the lift opening out on each of the office space floors. The overall benefits of having a ‘controlled’ lift in conjunction with a ‘controlled’ stair core (all doors off this to be access controlled also) is that not only does it restrict access for an intruder but also will future proof the building to account for any clients security needs. Restricting access for staff has its benefits also if the building is to be used as a multiple occupancy. The encrypted FOB if data logging is activated allows easy monitoring if inappropriate use is identified, cannot be copied, easily cancelled if either lost or stolen and gives the building management team complete control over who can access the building and to what parts.
- Security Rated Products – All external doors which allow direct entry into the building should be rated to either LPS 1175 SR2, PAS24:2016, STS 201 Issue 4 2012, STS 202 Issue 3 Burglary Rating 2 or LPS 2081 Issue 1 2015.
- Encrypted FOB access control will be required on the single door on Parker Street which will be used for entry to the cycle storage area... I would recommend that the 2<sup>nd</sup> internal door be also security rated to PAS24:2016 and also be on FOB access control. Ideally magnetic locking system is utilised at these locations, a minimum of two situated two thirds from the top and bottom of the frame to add extra strength and prevent the doors being easily pushed open from the exterior. Self-locking and self-closing mechanisms should be installed.





- Cycle Storage – The cycles should be secured to a structure that will allow for three points of locking (both wheels and the frame) – These anchor points should be certified to 'Sold Secure' Silver or LPS 1175 Issue 7.2 SR1 securely fixed to the concrete foundation and fitted in accordance with the manufactures specifications.
- The front of the building should have recesses reduced to a minimum of 600mm and reduce the risk of any exposed flat surfaces being easily accessible... this is to prevent them being used as a seat or the depositing of rubbish. The building currently has planters directly outside to fill these voids and these are acceptable... but consideration for their potential for concealing weapons or drugs should be given. Certainly the case for the area due to the high capacity late night licenced premises being in close proximity.
- Fire escapes – It appears the rear external fire staircase leads into another building, as is the case with most of the buildings within the area, therefore the building will be counting on another buildings security to protect this area. As this might be quite weak I would recommend that the fire escape doors have alarms installed to alert the management team if they are being misused or left open. Certainly the case if someone goes on the staircase for cigarette and leaves the door open.
- CCTV – It would benefit the building installing CCTV on the vulnerable entry points, cycle storage area and the rear fire escapes.

If the applicant wishes any further help or assistance with regards to the comments I have made then I will be happy for them to contact me.

Kind regards

Jim



  
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