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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** 11 April 2019 09:02  
**To:** Planning  
**Subject:** Planning Response - 2019/1283/P - 17 Woburn Place, WC1

FAO Matthias Gentet

Thank you for allowing me to comment on planning application 2019/1283/P which relates to the installation of an ATM on the Coram Street elevation belonging to 17 Woburn Place, WC1.

I have reviewed the application and object to this proposal.

The area has already a high number of ATM devices within a short walk from the closest tube station of Russell Square and these currently suffer from crime and anti-social behaviour. Predominately this manifests itself in the form of begging, which can be quite aggressive and intimidating to people just walking by. If the person has positioned themselves close to the device it can be very intimidating and create a fear of crime... preventing people from using the device in in the first place.

Unfortunately the Bloomsbury area is currently suffering from a high number rough sleepers. Though there is help available from either 'Safer Streets Team' and Police engaging with them there is still an issue. Therefore the addition of another location which could be used for anti-social behaviour is a concern. The area has a large number of hotels, famous tourist attractions and student halls of residence. Therefore is populated with many people from around the world who can be taken advantage of due to their naivety of the local crime issues. Other crimes associated with ATM's within the area are distraction thefts on people using the device and bogus police officers following people seen withdrawing large amounts of cash and then pretending to stop them whilst stealing their money.

If the application is approved then I would insist that the following recommendations be made with regards the physical security of the ATM device.

**Recommendations**

1. CCTV coverage of the ATM. (consider colour rendering index min >60Ra)
2. Lighting to the security standard BS5489:2013 from additional or existing lighting. Please see additional information below.
3. Pin guards to the ATM.
4. Privacy Markings on the pavement.
5. The provision of a secure enclosed room behind the machines for maintenance and to provide the ATM replenisher with a private space, separated from the public, where they can reload the cash cassettes at the most vulnerable point of the process. The walls should be able to resist a physical attack i.e. plywood lined with plasterboard and should be a minimum of 2.1M high, but ideally from floor to ceiling depending upon the associated risk as determined by the DOCO. The opening must be sufficient for an operative to enter freely and replenish with the door closed behind them. If the opening comprises of two doors the slave door should be secured with a deadbolt and not with a manual slave bolt/s. The locking system that allows egress in an emergency (i.e. a thumb turn override) must meet BS EN 1125:1997 Building Hardware and BS EN 179:1998 (Emergency) release test standard.



### ATM Lighting

1. 200-300 Lux is recommended for ATM keyboard illumination.
2. 50 Lux is suggested as the minimum ambient illumination at floor level up to a distance of 1 metre from the face of the ATM and extending 75 cm either side of the mid-point of the ATM.
3. This is also the minimum level recommended should a CCTV camera be fitted. 200 Lux ambient illumination at floor level should be considered in areas deemed to pose a higher risk to customers at night. (Consider colour rendering index min>60Ra)

If the applicant wishes any further help or assistance then I will be more than happy to be contacted.

Kind regards



  
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