

PBT/PHASE 4

Security Measures Meeting

003

Date: Wednesday 10.10.2018
 Location: Bouygues Site Office
 Meeting start time: 2pm

Attendance:

Metropolitan Police	Police Officer Jim Cope (PC JC), Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO)
UCLH	Stuart Keen (SK)
UCLH	Rod Townley (RT)
Aecom	Peter Philpotts (PP)
ByUK	Greg Funge (GF)
STW	Rob McGill (RM)

Agenda: Review of outstanding ALO security recommendations.**Introduction**

The purpose of this meeting was to review the outstanding items from the last meeting (8th December 2017) with the Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO), PC Jim Cope (PC JC), to demonstrate the Stage 4 design security measures meets his recommendations. The objective is to obtain a letter from PC JC to discharge planning condition 34 and the BREEAM requirements (Hea06).

Item	Discussion	Action
1.00	The Proton Beam Therapy Centre Stage 4 design was presented to PC JC as a recap of the last meeting where the project was presented in more depth.	Note
1.01	It was noted the scope of the ALO's recommendations are limited to the external envelope and site boundary as per planning condition 34 (excerpt below) as confirmed by JLL (planning agent) on 8 th October 2018. <i>Prior to the laying of the slab at ground level, drawings and supporting information detailing the security measures for the site shall be submitted to and approved in writing by the council in conjunction with Metropolitan Police. The details agreed shall be installed prior to occupation and maintained thereafter.</i>	Note
1.02	The focus of this meeting was to review the outstanding items from the last meeting to satisfy the ALO his recommendations have been implemented in the Stage 4 design. The two outstanding items being: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Confirmation of the out of hours vehicle drop off access procedure (previous minute item 6.3). · Scope of façade doors to be LPS 1175 SR2 (previous minute item 6.5). Note, internal doors are no longer within the ALO review remit. 	Note
1.03	UCLH explained there will be continual 24hour security staff presence on site (2-4 staff anticipated but subject to change). There is also a dedicated on-site security office with CCTV and security door contact monitoring which is also linked back to a UCLH campus security centre.	Note
2.00	Drop off area OOH access	
2.01	It was confirmed retractable road blockers are raised during OOH to prevent vehicle access.	Note
2.02	The road blockers are lowered via a key punch code pad by OOH ambulances who will have the code. An intercom system is not required.	Note
2.03	PC JC accepted this design proposal for the drop of area OOH.	Note
3.00	Façade doors	
3.01	STW façade doors scope plans were reviewed, and each door discussed regarding security measures as follows:	

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3.02	The fully glazed double doors to the commercial unit on Tottenham Court Road (1500/D1) provides a single point of access to the shell retail space with no through access to the hospital. The future tenant is unknown therefore the commercial shell is designed for optimised kerb appeal by maximising glazing and refined door frame profiling. It was deemed acceptable by PC JC for LPS not to be applied because it is anticipated the future tenants will have their own access security measures, such as internal shuttering, and that the doors are highly visible on TCR. It was recommended, however, that a top and bottom locking mechanism be fitted (façade sub-contractor, Kyotec, to update door information).	KYO
3.03	Architectural fire exit doors to each core at ground floor level (GC911-L0/D1, GC921-L0/D1 and GC941-L0/D1) do not require LPS rating due to the bespoke architectural design. It was confirmed security contacts are fitted to alert security staff if the doors are forced. In the event of an emergency evacuation, these doors are fail open and also include for emergency push pad egress.	Note
3.04	Core service rise access doors (8294/D1 and D2, 8402/D1 and D2, 8404/D1 and D2, and 8590/D1 and D2) consist of bespoke outer glass reinforced concrete panel doors with discrete key lock and an inner metal lined fire rated door which is also key locked (separate key). These doors were deemed not to require LPS due to the bespoke nature, difficulty required to break through both sets of doors and low value of the riser contents.	Note
3.05	The fully glazed double (swing) doors in the drop off area (FM097/D2 and ME110E/D2) are to be LPS 1175 SR2 rated. The door set adjacent to core one (FM097/D2) is used for OOH emergency patient access and is fitted with a card key and a punch code pad either of which can be used for access (ambulance crew will have the access code).	Note
3.06	The two fully glazed sliding doors adjacent to the revolving door in the drop off area (ME 109/D1 and ME109/D3) and the inner lobby doors (ME109/D4 and ME100/D4) do not require LPS. These doors are sensor operated during open hours which is deactivated in OOH mode and key lockable. The inner lobby sliding doors to the main entrance will include card reader access for OOH staff access as an additional security measure to the external card reader access doors (LMG to update security drawing 021407).	LMG
3.07	The two revolving doors (ME109/D2 and ME100/D2) do not require LPS rating as these are bespoke and architectural. The revolving doors are motor operated which is deactivated during OOH and also key lockable.	Note
3.08	The two fully glazed swing doors to the main entrance (ME100/D1 and ME100/D3) and the fully glazed double doors to the PPU entrance (FM103/D1) are to be LPS 175 SR2 rated. These doors have card reader OOH access and also have a disabled push button access (that can work with the OOH card access).	Note
3.09	The bespoke louvred outer double doors to the UKPS high voltage access (PL056/D2) do not require to be LPS rated because these are bespoke louvred doors designed to conceal a second inner doors set by UKPN. The inner door set is steel lined and lockable (to UKPN specification) and the outer louvre doors are also key locked.	Note
3.10	The four bespoke metal louvre doors to the sprinkler valves and gas bottle storage areas (PL059/D1, PL058/D1, PL059C/D1 and PL059C/D2) are not LPS rated due to their bespoke design. They are all backed with a steel frame (heavy duty) and are all key locked. Access to these doors is secondary to access via a secure service yard gate (discussed later).	Note
3.11	The rear staff access doors into the building at ground floor level (FM098/D1, GC942/D1, GCGR5/D1 and FM097/D1) are all LPS 1175 SR2 rated. These doors are steel lined (with vision panels) and have card reader access for staff	Note

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3.12	(at all times). Access to these doors is secondary to card reader access via the service yard secure gates (at all times). All staff access doors above ground floor level are all not LPS rated. This is because of the difficulty for an intruder to access the doors (due to their high level) and also that they are fitted with emergency break glass access from the outside in case of emergency evacuation as per the approved fire strategy. These doors are all fully glazed and have card reader access for staff and are fitted with security contacts which will alert security staff if forced.	Note
3.13	All maintenance doors above ground floor level (walkways and roof level) are not LPS rated due to the bespoke nature and difficulty to access for intruders (too high). All are fitted with key locks.	Note
4.00	General notes	
4.01	CCTV surveillance coverage was accepted by PC JC. Coverage includes all entry points, lobbies, service yard and back of house areas, Courtyard Building terraces (first and third floor), and the atrium roof.	Note
4.02	A red wall detection system is fitted to the top of Paramount Court garden wall (approximately 3m high) on the ground floor and to the 5 th floors where Paramount Court adjoins the PBT Centre.	Note
4.03	All terraces have a 1.8m high glass perimeter panelling for security and fall protection.	Note
4.04	RT has discussed the project with the Met's anti-terrorist contact, Huw Alsop, who confirmed the project did not warrant further action for anti-terrorist measures (below threshold of radioactive material). Previous minute action 6.6.	Note
4.06	Two maglocks (top and bottom) one centrally positioned are to be provided.	Note
4.07	The maintenance access door at the base of the JB Pub lightwell on level B1 was not discussed. This is a metal lined access door which will be very infrequently used. The size of this door is non-standard (more like a hatch) and therefore proposed not to be LPS rated, although it will be relatively heavy duty and key locked with a security contact which will detect any forced entry.	Note
5.00	Actions	
5.01	STW to send PC JC a copy of the meeting minutes along with an updated façade doors schedule and scope drawings to summarise the scope of LPS 1175 SR2 doors.	STW
5.02	In addition, a copy of the security package to discharge planning condition 34 will also be sent to PC JC.	STW
5.03	PC JC to issue a letter (letterheaded) to STW (RM) to confirm the design meets his recommendations.	PC JC

The above façade door LPS scope is summarised in the STW façade door schedule and scope drawings:

- P4PBT-STW-AFA-SL-SCH-A31-191144 (revC) – Façade door schedule
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-GND-SOW-A31-191137 (rev C) – Façade doors scope plans – level 00
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-01-SOW-A31-191138 (rev B) – Façade doors scope plans – level 01
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-02-SOW-A31-191139 (rev B) – Façade doors scope plans – level 02
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-03-SOW-A31-191140 (rev B) – Façade doors scope plans – level 03
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-04-SOW-A31-191141 (rev B) – Façade doors scope plans – level 04
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-05-SOW-A31-191142 (rev B) – Façade doors scope plans – level 05
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-06-SOW-A31-191143 (rev B) – Façade doors scope plans – level 06
- P4PBT-STW-AFA-B1-SOW-A31-191147 (rev B) – Façade doors scope plans – level B1