

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 31 January 2018 14:06
To: Enirayetan, Oluwaseyi
Subject: RE: 124 West End Lane

Afternoon Oluwaseyi,

Apologies for the lateness of the reply but was in meetings all this morning... I have had a look and it appears I was never sent this application to comment on in the first instance. But I have had a look now so please find my comments below.

Planning Application for ATM at 124 West End Lane, NW6 – Planning reference 2017/6580/P

COMMENTS

- ∞ I am objecting to the above planning application.
- ∞ The location chosen for this ATM is inappropriate and will create issues surrounding crime and anti-social behaviour. It is to be situated between the two (2) main transport links of West Hampstead Tube (Jubilee Line) and West Hampstead (Thames Link) which have a large amount of pedestrian traffic during rush hour between the stations flowing in both directions. The footpaths along this stretch of West End Lane are very narrow and frequently become over crowded. This is amplified when local building work creates further narrowing of the pavement and actually makes people walk out into the road. West End Lane itself is a main arterial route into central London and becomes heavily congested and people/vehicles do come into conflict with one another. The risk of a collision is high during these busy times.
- ∞ The proposed location for the ATM will only reduce the pavement width even further if a queue forms and create further issues.
- ∞ ATM's are known for anti-social behaviour and this mainly comes in the form of begging. They are a prime location for this type of behaviour as they will position themselves next to the ATM and use their presence to pressurise a user to give them money. This puts people in an uncomfortable position and actually puts people off using the ATM due to fear.
- ∞ The increased crowds around this area can also lead to 'shoulder surfing' where a suspect will watch the PIN code placed into the machine and then the user is distracted so the card is stolen. Busy locations with increased pedestrian footfall are chosen for this type of offence.
- ∞ Even if the ATM was moved to southern most part of the building the above issues would still occur. Though less foot fall in this area users will still be vulnerable due to it being off the main pavement with no natural surveillance.

If planning application is passed for this ATM then I would assist on the following recommendations.

2.0 Recommended Minimum Standards

2.1 – Natural Surveillance –

Good natural surveillance of the 'ATM/Payphone Pod' from immediately adjacent roads and properties is vitally important. More specifically, the 'ATM/Payphone Pod' should NOT be located in recessed alcoves, on blind corners, quiet side frontages or semi-enclosed shopping parades. Other considerations include - obstructions such as other telephone kiosks, large planters, trees, highway signs and advertising hoardings that compromise natural surveillance. The 'ATM/Payphone Pod' should not be so positioned that it can be watched by potential robbers under the guise of legitimate citizens (e.g., from a nearby bus stop; or surveillance by criminals from first floor public areas overlooking the site).

2.2 – Mirrors –

The use of surrounding mirrors / polished surfaces to improve surveillance for the ATM user is an effective measure in reducing both crime and the fear of crime (e.g., to prevent 'shoulder surfing' and compromising the user's PIN). Mirrors should be placed at an appropriate height so as to avoid reflection of the key pad numbers.

2.3 – CCTV –

The Installation should have both Overt and Covert 24hr CCTV provided with a min 28 day storage facility. This must be dedicated to the installation and be in accordance with the data protection guidelines. Overt coverage should be designed to capture the user and surrounding area (shoulder surfers and offenders tailing victims off etc). The Covert coverage should be designed to capture and identify any ATM user therefore identifying potential offenders interfering with the installation, using stolen cards, cash claws etc.

2.4 - Street Lighting –

Improved levels of street lighting have been shown to both reduce crime and the fear of crime. The area surrounding the installation should conform to BS5489-1 the lighting source can be provided by the installation or surrounding existing light sources.
(http://www.securedbydesign.com/pdfs/110107_LightingAgainstCrime.pdf).

2.5 - Defensible space –

Ground markings (otherwise known as a 'Privacy Zone') should be employed at the front of the ATM, to indicate only one ATM user at a time may enter the space. These will usually be subject to local authority planning consent/condition.

2.6 – Bollards –

In addition to the anchoring system recommended, consideration should be given to the protecting the installation with anti-ram raid bollards, vehicle arresting systems, high-rise kerbing, raised planters, reinforced lamp posts or similar street furniture if the risk of a vehicle borne attack is likely . These will usually be subject to local authority planning authority consent or condition.

2.7 - PIN Shields -

PCI standard pin shields should be installed to prevent physical observation of the users pin code.

2.8 - Design of the 'ATM/Payphone Pod' -

The ATM should be positioned to prevent physical observation of PIN entry from adjoining telephone kiosks or payphones. The ATM and telephone uses of the combined kiosk must be positioned on opposite sides of the booth/pod.

The telephone leads in adjacent telephone kiosks or payphones should be shortened to prevent observation of PIN entry by persons using the payphone.

Where necessary, the door hinges of adjacent telephone kiosks should be reversed in order that payphone customers exit away from the ATM user.

3.0 Best Practice 'ATM Security Working Group' Guidelines

The following guidance should be considered.

3.1 – Anchoring systems –

As outlined in the above document, the ATM Security Working Group 'Best Practice for Physical ATM Security' Guidelines.

3.2 – Alarm Systems –

The 'ATM/Payphone Pod' should be independently alarmed for 'Police Response' (registered with the local police force and allocated a police alarm URN). For other alarm guidance please see the aforementioned document, the ATM Security Working Group 'Best Practice for Physical ATM Security' Guidelines.

3.3 – Fogging Systems -

As outlined in the attached document, the ATM Security Working Group

'Best Practice for Physical ATM Security' Guidelines.

3.4 – Tracking Systems –

As outlined in the attached document, the ATM Security Working Group 'Best Practice for Physical ATM Security' Guidelines.

3.5 – Cash Degradation Systems –

As outlined in the attached document, the ATM Security Working Group 'Best Practice for Physical ATM Security' Guidelines.

3.6 – Gas Attacks –

Consideration should be given as to whether the 'ATM/Payphone Pod' could be vulnerable to a 'Gas Attack'.

3.7 – Other security measures –

Each application should be judged on its own merits and site-specific recommendations should be adopted. Any other security can be recommended as deemed suitable and outlined in the attached document, the ATM Security Working Group 'Best Practice for Physical ATM Security' Guidelines.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 states "It shall be the duty of each Authority to which this section applies to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on and the need to do all it reasonably can to prevent Crime and Disorder in it's area", as clarified by PINS953.

The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) states that "Planning policies and decisions should aim to ensure that developments create:

- ∞ ***Safe and accessible environments where crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine quality of life or community cohesion***

Creating a sense of place where legitimate users are able to go about their daily routine without unduly fearing crime or insecurity is a key element of the Secured by Design initiative.

The services of the Police Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs) are available free of charge and can be contacted via the details shown above.

Kind Regards

Jim

'Crime prevention advice is given freely without the intention of creating a contract. Neither does the Metropolitan Police Service take any legal responsibility for the advice given. You must abide by the fire and safety regulations and if you are in any doubt consult the Fire Prevention



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Metropolitan Police Service
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From: Enirayetan, Oluwaseyi [mailto: [REDACTED]]
Sent: 31 January 2018 10:12
To: Cope Jim - Continuous Policing Improvement Command < [REDACTED] >
Subject: 124 West End Lane
Importance: High

Good morning Jim,

Hope this email meets you well.

I have an urgent request for your comments as this is going to members briefing and need to include your comments on my report. The ref: 2017/6580/P.

Thanking you

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