

Project

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Revision

Security & Crime Impact Assessment

Document

1615-ST-XX-XX-RP-A-7120		P03
Author LM / PA		Revision date 09.08.17
Strategy Notes & Supporting Information	Action By	Comments/ Status
ZZ-DR-A-1201 Visual audit carried out by Paul Anstee, date 31/07/17 Additional observations: Vulnerability/accessibility to basement level at front of building via a small fire route gate at street level currently. The new proposal will remove this fire route due to reconfiguration & enable a lockable gate to be installed at this point. Discarded cigarette ends at back of building's fire escape route. The new proposal will remove the current recess at this point. Consideration of hostile vehicle mitigation measures. Please see below. Feedback from consultation with the local ALO/CPDA if applicable: Ensure staff areas are separated from general public building access by appropriate security measures. Hospital Assets should be appropriately secured in rooms etc Security of personal belongings of staff should be catered for. Overview of general location regarding crime given for last 12 months: 28 cases of theft; 11 of assault; 5 motor vehicle crimes; 4public order offences; 1 criminal damage case & 13 cases of harassment. In the ward generally over the last 12 months, the Met's website states there have been: 151 theft from person offences; 111 cases of theft & 33 cases of violence. Feedback from consultation with the CTSA if applicable: Building classified as low risk as a result	ST	Rev A3 submitted as part of the planning submission
	Author LM / PA Strategy Notes & Supporting Information • Refer to existing site plan 1615-ST-Q1-ZZ-DR-A-1152 • Refer to proposed site plan 1615-ST-Q1-ZZ-DR-A-1201 • Visual audit carried out by Paul Anstee, date 31/07/17 • Additional observations: - Vulnerability/accessibility to basement level at front of building via a small fire route gate at street level currently. The new proposal will remove this fire route due to reconfiguration & enable a lockable gate to be installed at this point Discarded cigarette ends at back of building's fire escape route. The new proposal will remove the current recess at this point Consideration of hostile vehicle mitigation measures. Please see below. • Feedback from consultation with the local ALO/CPDA if applicable: - Ensure staff areas are separated from general public building access by appropriate security measures Hospital Assets should be appropriately secured in rooms etc - Security of personal belongings of staff should be catered for. Overview of general location regarding crime given for last 12 months: 28 cases of theft; 11 of assault; 5 motor vehicle crimes; 4 public order offences; 1 criminal damage case & 13 cases of harassment. In the ward generally over the last 12 months, the Met's website states there have been: 151 theft from person offences; 111 cases of theft & 33 cases of violence. • Feedback from consultation with the CTSA if applicable: - Building classified as low risk as a result of CTSA attendance on 7/8/17; hostile vehicle mitigation bollards not considered	Author LM / PA Strategy Notes & Supporting Information • Refer to existing site plan 1615-ST-Q1-ZZ-DR-A-1152 • Refer to proposed site plan 1615-ST-Q1-ZZ-DR-A-1201 • Visual audit carried out by Paul Anstee, date 31/07/17 • Additional observations: - Vulnerability/accessibility to basement level at front of building via a small fire route gate at street level currently. The new proposal will remove this fire route due to reconfiguration & enable a lockable gate to be installed at this point Discarded cigarette ends at back of building's fire escape route. The new proposal will remove the current recess at this point Consideration of hostile vehicle mitigation measures. Please see below. • Feedback from consultation with the local ALO/CPDA if applicable: - Ensure staff areas are separated from general public building access by appropriate security measures Hospital Assets should be appropriately secured in rooms etc Security of personal belongings of staff should be catered for. Overview of general location regarding crime given for last 12 months: 28 cases of theft; 11 of assault; 5 motor vehicle crimes; 4public order offences; 1 criminal damage case & 13 cases of harassment. In the ward generally over the last 12 months, the Met's website states there have been: 151 theft from person offences; 111 cases of theft & 33 cases of violence. • Feedback from consultation with the CTSA if applicable: - Building classified as low risk as a result of CTSA attendance on 7/8/17; hostile

Item	Strategy Notes & Supporting Information	Action By	Comments/ Status
Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential use of the building(s).	Risks to the building Risk of individuals walking into the building from the street seeking shelter or to commit criminality; mitigated by reception staff, CCTV & access control.		
Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential user groups of the building(s).	Risks to the user groups Minimal, as open public realm; a safe space. The entrance has an easy positive approach. Increased number of people to the area, but mitigated by the open space in front of Queen Square entrance. This provides a positive contribution to the community natural surveillance to the area etc. GOSH staff & service users are kept up to date regarding local crime risks such as the risk of phone snatches by individuals on mopeds as the current trend (Aug 17)		
Identify any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community.	Any detrimental effects to the community The dropping off & collecting patients at the front of the building could add to vehicle congestion.		
Suitably Qualified Security Specialist	s (SQSS)		
An individual achieving any of the following can be considered to be 'suitably qualified' for the purposes of compliance with BREEAM:	Refer to letter from Paul Anstee dated 03.07.17 stating: • Paul has 31 years police experience and holds the Home Office Crime Prevention Officer Certificate & Home Office Crime Prevention Design Advisor Certificate (CPO / CPDA). • Paul was the Metropolitan Police lead for crime prevention for three years at New Scotland Yard. • Paul has 7 and a half years' experience in security management since leaving the police (6 years at UCLH & 1 and half years to date at GOSH • Paul has a BSc (Hons) in Risk and Security Management, an NHS Local Security Management Specialist and a member of the Security Institute		Letter dated 03.07.17

Strategy Notes & Supporting
Information

Action By

Comments/ Status

Crime Impact Assessment

Item

Boundary Treatment	The existing building creates the	Specification of door lock TBC
Boundary Froutmont	majority of the boundary to the site	openingation of deel look 120
	The existing gate and railings to the	
	lower ground from Boswell Street is to be	
	replaced similar to the existing. The	
	perimeter wall facing Queen Square is to	
	be retained. There is good natural	
	surveillance to the main entrance and	
	front of the building from the	
	pedestrianised area south of Queen	
	Square Gardens.	
	Doors to the lower ground/basement to	
	the north are to be permanently locked	
	· · · · · ·	
	shut with secondary glazing installed on	
	the inner face	
	The proposed screen to the fire escape	
	staircase fills in the existing building	
	recess at the rear of the building and	
	would assist with current problems of	
	rubbish accumulating and sleeping.	
	Vault doors to lower ground facing	
	Queen Square will be replaced with	
	secure louvred doors	
Public Entrances	One public entrance only facing Queen	Specification of metal/ security gate
	Square	lock TBC
	Existing decorative metal gates to be	lock 1BO
	ů ů	
	adapted to provide out of hours security	
	measures	
	Signage to be reinstated to the north	
	elevation facing Queen Square by the	
	main entrance	
Staff Entrance	Existing door to Boswell Street to be	Access control specification TBC with
	replaced and designated as staff / fire	client
	brigade entrance and fire escape exit	Chefft
	·	
	Access control to be included to restrict	
	unauthorised access.	
	 Notices setting rules to be put into place 	
	to signify staff only use/access.	
	 GOSH assets will be property marked to 	
	help 'Reduce the Payoff', for potential	
	thieves.	
	A key consideration is the visibility of	
	assets from the street after daily business -	
	•	
	staff will be encouraged to lock away as	
	applicable	
M Entrance	New double door to Gage Street to be	Access control specification TBC with
	designated for Facilities Management	client
	deliveries and waste collection (internal	
	waste disposal areas)	
	Access control to be included to restrict	
	unauthorised access	
	dilautilonsed access	
Landscaping	Internal courtyard and lower ground	
	lightwell facing Queen Square only	
CCTV Systems	CCTV cameras shall be provided to	
•	monitor entrance points at ground floor	
	level (level 2) and circulation areas linked	
	to GOSHs Security Control Room on the	
	main site.	
	Head-end equipment shall be provided	
	for the new CCTV installation. Camera	
	feeds will be transited off the date network	
	to the level 3 comms room where all data	
	shall be recorded to the 31 days required	
	by police.	
	Additional CCTV monitoring equipment	
	shall be provided at the main reception.	
	Cameras shall comprise building mounted	
	externally and ceiling/wall mounted	
	internally. Static colour units within	
	discrete domes.	

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Lighting	External lighting to be retained and not modified. Additional feature lighting to the main entrance ramp is to be included to assist wayfinding to the main entrance. Due to the fact the building will only be functional 'daytime', current lighting is considered sufficient from a security perspective		
Building Shell Security	 The existing building is Grade II listed, therefore the scope to alter the existing shell is restricted. There are, however, no low flat roofs and no new features being introduced, which would aid scaling or climbing. 		
Windows	Existing sash windows(above ground) to the perimeter are to be retained, repaired and fitted with new ironmongery, including sash stay, bolts and restrictors Ground floor windows to Queens Square and Boswell Street to be re-glazed with laminated glass. Iron bars to be removed Secondary glazing internally to be provided, hinged casements with lever handle New double glazed curtain walling to courtyard side. Secondary glazing to be aluminium framed glazing either double glazed 6.4mm laminated/ 18mm argon/ 4mm toughened low E glass or single glazed 6.4mm laminate low e to courtyard side circulation and high level casement vent.		
Perimeter doors	Main entrance doors - existing doors to be retained, restored and ironmongery replaced. To be altered to be automatic doors with manual override. Existing glazing to be retained. Boswell Street door to be replaced with glazed vision panel Solid core, external grade timber door with double glazed vision panel including min 6.5mm toughened laminated glass vision panes		
	Gage Street doors - solid core, external grade timber doors including min 6.5mm toughened laminated glass vision panes A new fire escape screen and gate is to be provided at the fire escape staircase to be robust and min of 2m in height. This is to have access control from the outside only as fire exit route. To be designed to avoid features that might assist climbing.		Screen and gate specification TBC

ltem	Strategy Notes & Supporting Information	Action By	Comments/ Status
Access Control	The Contractor will supply and install an electronic access control system. The system shall be an extension of GOSHs existing site access control system and will comprise electromagnetic door locks, reading devices for proximity cards and emergency release facilities. The system will be wired in LSF		
	insulated multicore cabling concealed within the building fabric. • The access control system shall be provided with a battery supply to support the system for 8-12 hours in the event of a power failure. All locks shall fail safe open in the event of total power failure. Internal access controlled doors will be interfaced to the Fire Detection and Alarm		
	System, so that all door locking systems will automatically release in the event of an evacuation signal. External access controlled doors will not automatically release in the event of a fire evacuation signal.		
Intruder Detection and Alarm System	The Intruder Detection and Alarm System within the building shall comprise a zoned system and will be designed to generate confirmed alarm conditions. All internal areas of the building perceived to be susceptible to unauthorised entry will be provided with an Intruder Detection and Alarm system. All external fire doors will be provided with door alarms via the Intruder Alarm system. The system shall include a remote monitoring facility and will be wired in LSF insulated multicore cabling. Local sounders will indicate an alarm and the system will be connected to GOSHs Security Control Room. An intruder detection and alarm installation shall be provided to cover all perimeter doors and accessible floor areas on level 1 and 2. The following shall be provided: Magnetic Door Contacts to all external doors. Passive Infrared Detection and Microwave (dual technology) sensors to all accessible rooms with windows Passive Infrared Detection and Microwave to all external access doors Passive Infrared Detection and Microwave sensors to any high value/risk areas as identified. Keypad Zone Set/Unset Control Units Alarm sounder devices internally and externally		
Panic Alarms	Panic alarm facilities will be provided to the main reception desk which will report to GOSHs Security Control Room; no other high risk or sensitive areas have been identified as requiring a specific panic alarms. The panic alarm system in other areas will be a part of the Nurse Call system and comprise panic alarm buttons, resets and audible and visible alarms. Activation of a panic alarm shall activate an audible and visual alert locally and at the systems main control and indication panel(s).		

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Internal Layout	Access control - an access control 'secure line' has been created at ground level between public/clinical areas to control access beyond the waiting/reception/WC areas		
	 Reception desk design - this has been designed to be low (paediatric facility), however computers/monitors will be cable secured to the reception desk to protect GOSH assets. Internally the space will have full time receptionists during opening hours as well as many volunteers The building will be accessed out of hours by FM and cleaning teams 		
	Staff areas, rooms, offices and changing rooms to be secured with access control. I Handbag lockers' to be provided close to the staff members work area for personal possessions. I Hot box' lockers (storing laptops etc), to be of a security standard suitable for easily transportable desirable portable IT however; 24/7 Security Patrols, access control, CCTV and intruder alarms will aide security during the highest 'out of hours' risk periods.		Access control specification TBC with client
	Opticians dispensary - room to have access control with cashier desk		Access control specification TBC with client
	Servery - third party fit out. Store has been provided with access control for securing valuables Clinical rooms - client instruction to		Access control specification TBC with client
	provide doors with thumb turns from the inside		
	 Storage / Cleaners / FM / disposals - to have access control 		Access control specification TBC with client
	Plantrooms / risers - to have key locks		