



SECURITY & RISK ADVISORS

# DELFONT MACKINTOSH THEATRES LIMITED

## SONDHEIM THEATRE (ALSO KNOWN AS THE AMBASSADORS THEATRE)

OCTOBER 2015

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## Section One – Crime Impact Survey

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document presents the results of a Crime Impact Survey of the Sondheim Theatre (also known as the Ambassadors Theatre) located on West Street, London, and which is currently being considered for a major theatre rebuild and development project.

The survey was conducted in October 2015 by IJA Security and Risk Management Consultants on behalf of Delfont Mackintosh Theatres Limited.

The report is based on discussion with Theatre Management, independent crime research, risk factors identified by key stakeholders including theatre staff and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), and risk assumption based on current threats to London premises.

It studies threats and risk attracted by the organisation and its people, assets, activities and image, and by the Theatre's location and assesses security risk without direct reference to current defensive or deterrent measures.

The report identifies that whilst the Theatre and its staff face the same uncertain degree of risk posed by the threat of terrorism and the possibility of fundamentalist action in London, the primary risks posed by opportunist criminals and others remain, the net result being damage injury or trauma to theatre staff, damage to theatre property and possible damage to company reputation rather than severe financial loss.

The major crime threats identified are:

- Theft of theatre equipment / assets by internal or opportunist thieves.
- Petty theft / pick pocketing of audience property by opportunist thieves.
- Vandalism / criminal damage to building exterior.
- Harassment or assault on theatre staff / audience members by vagrants using the Theatre for shelter or by drug users operating in the local area out of hours.
- Assault on staff by aggressive / intoxicated members of public.
- Criminal activity against theatre staff on their way to and from the Theatre.
- Secondary impact following an international / fundamentalist terror action in London.

Defensive measures to incorporate into building design and to mitigate / deter these risks should include both physical security (bars, grilles, doors, shutters, gates, lighting etc.) and technical security measures (Closed Circuit Television, Intruder Alarm Systems, Access Control Systems) as well as associated staff procedures and training.

Although highly unlikely this report does also consider the risk of a siege type style attack taking place at a London theatre in which the impact of such a scenario could be catastrophic. In this regard, the report includes some minor security measures to mitigate the impact and / or deter this threat from taking place at the Sondheim Theatre.



## 1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1. Security and Risk Management Consultants IJA were tasked to conduct a Crime Impact Survey to identify and evaluate security related threats that may impact the Sondheim Theatre (currently known as the Ambassadors Theatre) located on West Street, London.
- 1.2. This document sets out a summary of the nature and intensity (or likelihood) of threats and risks identified, thus dictating ongoing security strategy requirements and, in turn, the level of security design measures that need to be seen to be in place to mitigate those threats identified.
- 1.3. It should be understood that threats can occur from within as well as outside the building or organisation, thus risk has to be managed through a series of mutually supporting and integrated security measures.
- 1.4. The following risk assessment and subsequent threat / crime impact ranking is based on public information, from discussion with key stakeholders and from our own information resources. Information gained from Delfont Mackintosh records and personnel has been incorporated but where no incidents have occurred/no concerns have been raised, extant risk posed to internal activities and, in some cases, assets, is estimated based on risk to similar establishments.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

- 2.1. The crime impact analysis process considers the following terms of reference:
  - Threats: a factor (e.g. motive, condition) that could lead to a source to cause an event.<sup>1</sup> An intent of damage or injury, an indication of something impending that could impact upon the Theatre, its staff, actors, contractors, general public and other visitors, assets and reputation.
  - Probability/likelihood: assessment from historical information, comparison with similar establishments in the United Kingdom and Europe or similar entertainment venues within the immediate area.
  - Impact: assessment of the potential impact should any of the identified threats materialise; this is dealt with in more depth below.
  - Risk: the combination of the probability/likelihood of a threat happening and its consequence, i.e. impact.
  - Vulnerability: the effectiveness of security mitigation measures to address the threat. Effectiveness is normally measured by the degree to which the measures will deter a threat materialising, stop it, or minimise the impact.
- 2.2. The methodology employed in identifying and assessing risk has involved:
  - Identifying the nature of threats that are likely to impact Sondheim Theatre.

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<sup>1</sup> Definition based on the UK government's Office of Government Commerce definition used in *Management of Risk: Guidance for Practitioners* 2010

- Determining the probability or frequency of such threats actually occurring.
- Assessing the level of impact that such a threat would have, and calculating the severity of the resultant effect on commercial operations.

2.3. Threats which may have direct or indirect consequences to Sondheim Theatre are directed at, or attracted by:

- **The Immediate Location and surrounding factors that may Environment**  
pose threats to people, assets or may impact on the  
Theatre even though they are not the primary target.
- **The Building** The equipment and material assets within, the visible  
appearance of the building and any perceived  
deficiency in controls.
- **The People** Staff, visitors and contractors as well as high profile  
actors and media personalities.
- **The Organisation** Public image and any associated commercial, political  
motivated or other controversial issues or activities.
- **Intangible** Staff confidence and morale.

2.4. Risks are ranked against the likelihood or probability of occurrence and their impact, initially without consideration of any mitigation measures that may be in place.

2.5. To ensure that the defensive and deterrent measures continue to be effective, risk assessments should be reviewed and updated as necessary and in response to:

- Actual or perceived change in threats to the UK.
- Actual or perceived local threats.
- Localised incidents which may influence threat levels.
- Incidents elsewhere in the UK or abroad which may influence target or highlight vulnerabilities at entertainment venues.


2.6. Defensive measures should include procedures for increased security during periods of high alert (in London and / or to Delfont Mackintosh) and contingency plans should any threat materialise. Such plans should be regularly reviewed and rehearsed and, in particular, business contingency / recovery elements should be reassessed in the light of any change in threat or business requirement.

2.7. Each identified threat category or group is shown in section 6 by generic or brief description, priority for attention and probable frequency and severity of impact.

### 3. REPORTED CRIME

#### 3.1. Location and Site Description

- 3.1.1. The Sondheim Theatre (currently known as the Ambassadors Theatre) is located on West Street within short walking distance from Shaftesbury Avenue in the very heart of London's West End.



- 3.1.2. Situated opposite the Ivy Restaurant and adjacent to St Martins Theatre, the seven storey theatre is one of the smallest theatres in the West End seating a maximum of 195 people in the Dress Circle and 251 in the stalls.
- 3.1.3. West Street itself is a single lane one way street linking Shaftesbury Avenue with Upper St Martins Lane. To the immediate left of the theatre are offices and a storage facility for a men's clothing firm. To the right and separating the Sondheim Theatre from St Martins Theatre is a pedestrianised walkway (Tower Court) linking West Street with Tower Street. The Stage Door and loading bay is located on Tower Court.
- 3.1.4. **Police Reported Crime**
- 3.1.5. The Sondheim Theatre is located on a 'quiet' side street away from main tourist congregation points and localised 'flashpoints' such as Covent Garden to the south of the area, Leicester Square to the west and Tottenham Court Road on the northern most edge of the policing district where recorded incidences of crime are notably higher.
- 3.1.6. In terms of recorded police statistics the Theatre lies on the border between two neighbouring police districts; the north side of West Street on which the Sondheim Theatre is located falls under the 'Holborn and Covent Garden' Policing District area

and the south side of the road lies under the remit of 'Covent Garden' Policing District.

- 3.1.7. Published statistics for the past year (most recent data released September 2015) highlight only the occasional incident taking place within the vicinity (West Road and surrounding environs). The area has experienced extremely low levels of officially reported crime given its central location:

Crime Statistics (Oct 2014 – Sep 2015)	Burglary	Anti-Social	Theft from Person	Other Theft	Bike / Vehicle Crime	Violent Crime	Other Crime	Total
October 2014				1			2	3
November		2						2
December	2	1		1			1	5
January 2015								
February								
March			1*	1	1			3
April								
May					1			1
June						2		2
July	1		1	1				3
August				1			1	2
September								
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>

- 3.1.8. Other reported crime in this instance includes one incident of each of the following; shoplifting, criminal damage, drugs and public disorder.
- 3.1.9. Official police statistics only report two incidences of minor crime occurring at a 'Theatre or Concert Hall' in the past three years although it has not been possible to ascertain whether this was at St Martins or the Ambassadors Theatre.
- 3.1.10. **Local Crime History**
- 3.1.11. Conversations with the Police Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT) covering the Holborn and Covent Garden area have highlighted that historically the area, especially Tower Court has been targeted by the drug dealing fraternity in the early hours of the morning given its 'quiet', and relatively enclosed space, the lack of council CCTV monitoring in the area and low levels of street lighting.
- 3.1.12. At the moment, the only CCTV camera monitoring public areas is located on a wall monitoring the upper reaches of Tower Court and looking down towards the interchange with Tower Road. This camera however has particularly poor coverage in terms of CCTV monitoring the lower reaches of Tower Court towards West Street.

- 3.1.13. In the past, a targeted police campaign in conjunction with Seven Dials Security, who manage the area to the immediate north, was successful in displacing drug dealing activity from the area. However, it is understood that drug dealing has once again begun to creep back into the area in recent months.
- 3.1.14. Whilst this is unlikely to directly impact audience members who visit the Theatre as this activity happens in the early hours of the morning and after the Theatre has been closed, it does present some level of risk should contractors be working overnight or a lone member of staff be confronted by an individual displaying aggressive behaviour and under the influence.
- 3.1.15. **Delfont Mackintosh Reported Incidents of Crime**
- 3.1.16. In the main the Theatre Group enjoys a very positive and ongoing security and safety record. In terms of reporting specific security incidents, the Theatre chain has reported very low levels of crime over the last ten years.
- 3.1.17. This has included only a handful of 'theft from person' incidents as well as the occasional incident of unruly / disruptive behaviour by a member of the audience, the occasional bag or other item having been left in the cloakroom, and a couple of access breaches including one thief attempting to steal a laptop but having been apprehended before leaving the site.
- 3.1.18. The most significant and reoccurring security risk that some theatres face on a regular basis are homeless persons using recessed doorways and building overhangs as a means of shelter.
- 3.1.19. Whilst currently not an issue at the Ambassadors Theatre, this is a recurring problem at other theatres within the Group including both the Wyndham and Noel Coward Theatres. This has resulted in associated issues for theatre management and police to deal with in the morning such as litter, defecation and dealing with intoxicated people.

### 3.2. **General 'Reporting Crime' Trends within the Theatre Sector**

- 3.2.1. Incidents over the past 20 years have shown that theatres and concert halls are as likely as any other establishment to be targeted by criminals when there is a perceived opportunity to target unsuspecting members of the public.
- 3.2.2. It would also appear that patterns of theatre crime though generally low compared to some other targeted sectors, tend to correlate directly with the size and location of the theatre and to a lesser extent to the type of production in terms of incidents reported.
- 3.2.3. By comparison, a summary of recorded crime for the past year at other major theatres operating in the West End highlighted the following reported crime statistics:





Theatre	Location	Seat Capacity	Crime*
Palace Theatre	Shaftesbury Avenue	1400	91
Dominion Theatre	Tottenham Court Road	2163	67
Theatre Royal	Drury Lane	2196	15
Victoria Palace Theatre	Victoria Street	1517	9

\*According to police records this relates specifically to crimes that have happened either "in or near a Theatre or Concert Hall".

- 3.2.4. Some popular long running shows which may attract large group bookings and a more rowdy clientele may in turn affect the number of incidences of anti-social behaviour reported. Reporting of such occurrences, however is still generally recognised as an occasional issue as opposed to a routine and systemic problem within the Theatre sector.
- 3.2.5. Opportunist theft (discussed further below) is an ongoing threat in London, particularly at major iconic tourist attractions, for the past four years. This category of theft is not simple taking of items left unattended; it is a crime method where the thief fully studies the target area and unsuspecting tourists and other individuals for the purpose of seeking opportunities for theft. Admittedly such incidents are very rare once audience members have moved off the street and into theatre lobby / auditorium areas.
- 3.2.6. It would appear from police records that the relatively 'quiet' neighbourhood and currently small and more intimate venue that the Sondheim Theatre provides compared to other theatres clearly serves as an effective deterrent compared to some of the more visible high profile theatres located near major 'tourist' hot spots in central London.

#### 4. THREATS IN DETAIL

##### 4.1. The Immediate Environment

- 4.1.1. The location of the theatre lends itself to a number of criminal problems of a varied nature specific to this particular area of London.
- 4.1.2. The relatively small number of people moving in and around the side roads late at night in the area, has historically provided a potential attraction to substance abusers and homeless persons. Forms of crime likely to be attracted are:
- 4.1.3. **Trespass**
- 4.1.4. Unauthorised trespass onto theatre property that could potentially lead to violence and harassment of staff.
- 4.1.5. **Vagrancy**
- 4.1.6. With homelessness a problem throughout London, the possibility of trespass to any accessible / unoccupied part of the building is possible. Sheltered doorways,

theatre canopies and other recessed areas are particularly vulnerable in that they provide some level of concealment, shelter from wind and the elements. Physical hardening of the building exterior and removal of potential shelter areas will ensure this particular issue is displaced to other areas.

- 4.1.7. It should be remembered that unless attempts are made to remove such persons from the theatre, an element of duty of care by the company may apply to them should they sustain an accident of injury whilst on the premises, or even in a doorway.
- 4.1.8. **Drug or Alcohol Related Crime**
- 4.1.9. Trespass by drug and alcohol abusers may not necessarily be to seek shelter, as is the case with vagrants, but may be due to agitated mental states and therefore the potential for violence is increased.
- 4.1.10. 'Clean up' initiatives such as Operation Unite are actively working to displace such activities from continuing in the area.
- 4.1.11. **Robbery**
- 4.1.12. Staff transiting to / from work may be vulnerable to robbery particularly in the less well populated side streets in the immediate area.
- 4.1.13. Large areas of public congregation such as main line rail stations and tourists hotspots such as Covent Garden remain potential high-risk areas for robbery due to excessive crowds and ease of escape routes for criminals. Briefcases, lap top computer cases, handbags, and other portable items with potentially high value are at risk of robbery. Drug related issues are assessed to be a serious catalyst for robberies in this area.
- 4.1.14. **Assault on Staff in vicinity of the Theatre**
- 4.1.15. Deliberate assault on staff for purely violent reasons is unlikely, however, aggravated assault in the pursuance of a robbery remains a distinct possibility in this area.
- 4.1.16. The presence of drugs-users using Tower Court in the early hours of the morning and potentially seeking means of funding their illegal habits may lead to an altercation with a member of staff. In most cases, it is probable that assault may only take place where criminals face resistance to their attempts to commit robbery.
- 4.1.17. The preponderance of low level lighting and relatively empty side streets in this area during non-working hours gives criminals the ability to operate in this region with low risk of detection. It also provides a likely setting for sexually motivated attacks and therefore, early and late workers are at greater risk.



#### 4.1.18. **Car and Cycle Crime**

- 4.1.19. Car crime includes armed car-jacking of vehicles, theft of vehicles, theft from vehicles and malicious damage of vehicles in 'envy' attacks.
- 4.1.20. The rise in popularity of cycling as a means of transportation in central London has resulted in a rapidly booming market and associated incidences of bike theft with high end bicycles and associated parts attracting a premium in terms of theft and potential resale value.
- 4.1.21. Whilst no major incidences of car or bicycle crime have been recorded in the immediate area, perpetrators will target areas where they believe that they can carry out such acts without fear of being recognised, interrupted or detained.
- 4.1.22. Clearly Theatre Management has no direct influence in curbing the threat of developing crime trends within the immediate area.
- 4.1.23. Staff training to ensure vigilant monitoring and proactive reporting coupled with regular liaison with local community support and other similar organisations such as Heart of London, Police Safer Neighbourhoods Team etc. will serve to assist in combating any emerging local crime or other social issues before they become a recurring problem.

#### 4.2. **The Building**

- 4.2.1. The term 'building' is applied to all areas of the theatre, including the roof, Front of House areas, balconies, stage, auditorium, back of house areas, delivery / loading bay areas, basements, plant, and exterior pavements.
- 4.2.2. **Theft** **Likelihood: Low – Medium**  
**Impact: Low - Medium**
- 4.2.3. Few instances of actual or suspected theft of theatre property have occurred at the Theatre.
- 4.2.4. Theatres tend to be not as frequently targeted when compared to other commercial and retail establishments unless an intruder perceives there to be items of high and / or quick re-sale value.
- 4.2.5. Theft can be applicable to all theatre property and assets, including information, computer, stage and lighting equipment, electrical items, tools, props and furniture. All removable items are at risk.
- 4.2.6. The risk of theft of theatre property is also likely to be heightened during periods of production changeover or theatre refurbishment when opportunities might present themselves to steal valuable electrical items, stage lighting, or tools and associated equipment.



- 4.2.7. Such opportunist thieves will take advantage of any noticed lapse in security measures and procedures e.g. staff or contractors leaving fire exit doors or delivery bays open and unattended allowing unauthorised intruders tailgating into non-public areas.
- 4.2.8. Technical security measures (e.g. CCTV monitoring of public Front of House areas and all egress points, active alarm monitoring of perimeter doors etc.) together with staff awareness training will assist in providing effective deterrent measures to address this threat.
- 4.2.9. **Robbery** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low – Medium**
- 4.2.10. Although there have been very few recorded instances of robbery specifically targeting a theatre, the rising cost of ticket prices and sales taken from the potential merchandise associated with a particularly popular show does mean that the Theatre could potentially have a lot of a lot of cash on site at any one time.
- 4.2.11. Whilst it is recognised that the likelihood is low, the risk cannot be entirely discounted.
- 4.2.12. Security measures to address this risk will include physical security measures such as with regards to the storage of monies (e.g. cash safes in Box Office / Managers Office), technical security measures (restricted access control and CCTV monitoring of cash handling and storage areas and hold-up alarms to minimise impact in event of an incident) and staff training with regards to cash handling procedures.
- 4.2.13. Procedures should also cover protocols with regards to CVIT (Cash and Valuables in Transit) procedures relating to the contracted service of cash delivery and collection.
- 4.2.14. **Burglary** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low**
- 4.2.15. Surreptitious or forcible entry by burglars into the property will result where there are insufficient security deterrents in place.
- 4.2.16. Whilst the likelihood of an intruder deliberately targeting a theatre for theft of items of value compared to an office block for example is considered low, the threat cannot be discounted.
- 4.2.17. Considerations when designing building security measures should also encompass sufficient security controls on building roof tops to mitigate risk of burglary and effective intrusion from above. Whilst building roofs may ordinarily not be easily accessible, many instances of opportunist burglary in London have been instigated as a result of construction work occurring on a neighbouring building and thereby



enabling an intruder climbing up scaffolding as part of construction works to gain access on to roof spaces.

4.2.18. Typical security measures will include CCTV and alarm monitoring of building and associated perimeter doors. Locks on doors should be thief resistant and solid core to deter threat of forced entry. Any accessible windows or skylights should be fitted with laminated glazing and bars or grilles again to deter unauthorised entry.

4.2.19. Any visible lapse in security, particularly observed failure to react to alarm activation, or minimal security control measures and other deterrents on the building exterior will encourage intruders.

4.2.20. **Contractor Theft** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low**

4.2.21. With some support 'services' contracted out, there remains a possibility that the work force may also contain persons with dishonest intent, especially if a contract is short term or where staff may have little site loyalty, be subject to only nominal vetting by their employer or be further sub-contracted.

4.2.22. Although contractors working on Delfont Mackintosh premises are issued with passes there is little or no staff challenge when they pass through into non-public areas.

4.2.23. Whilst a potential risk, staff access to restricted areas such as plant and server rooms is limited to a few individuals and any contractors working in the area are supervised by an attending and authorised member of staff.

4.2.24. Likewise most theatre working staff are long standing employees and therefore generally have personal relationships with most people working on site and would ordinarily raise something if they saw a contractor they did not recognise acting suspiciously or working in an area they should not be in.

4.2.25. The implementation and management of effective operating procedures will ensure this risk is minimised.

4.2.26. **Employee Theft** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low**

4.2.27. Theft conducted by employees remains the largest source of asset loss for UK businesses. This may take the form of opportunistic theft of small items of company property but the possibility of planned theft of more valuable company property has to be considered.

4.2.28. Theft from fellow employees also poses a threat against personal items such as wallets and credit cards. Appropriate staff awareness training will assist in reducing such opportunities from occurring.



- 4.2.29. **Criminal Damage** **Likelihood: High**  
**Impact: Low**
- 4.2.30. There is an ongoing threat of criminal damage in all places open to the public.
- 4.2.31. Such damage ranges from graffiti or glass breakages to intention to cause extreme damage such as arson (detailed below) or fallout from a major incident or terrorist action in the vicinity. It may also be the result of drug / alcohol related criminal damage to the exterior of the building.
- 4.2.32. Motivation is not always clear, sometimes apparently due to some perceived slight or insult, but more often related to peer pressure or 'gang' status, especially when related with alcohol consumption.
- 4.2.33. It should be noted that criminal damage acts in the commercial workplace may also be carried out by disgruntled employees/on-site contract staff.
- 4.2.34. The three major areas of criminal damage to be considered are:
- 4.2.35. **Sabotage** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Medium - High**
- 4.2.36. Deliberate sabotage of theatre equipment and building facilities may occur in an attempt to cause disruption and hinder normal theatre activity. Likely targets for such action would be electric generators/power supply cabling, and IT server units. This would normally occur as 'grudge' action, usually by someone legitimately on site.
- 4.2.37. **Vandalism** **Likelihood: High**  
**Impact: Low**
- 4.2.38. Deliberate vandalism of theatre property may occur on an opportunistic basis by petty criminals or homeless persons seeking somewhere for refuge / shelter. It is likely that the exterior of the building will be more susceptible to vandalism.
- 4.2.39. Damage caused may range from graffiti to damage of windows and / or doors / bars / gates allowing access to light wells, stairwells and other external covered overhangs and potential shelter areas.
- 4.2.40. **Arson** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: High**
- 4.2.41. Deliberate acts of arson are uncommon and usually initiated by an ex-employee or ex-contractor who is harbouring a grudge. In a Theatre environment, where the potential impact of arson could be catastrophic, it is more likely to be started by disturbed individuals.

- 4.2.42. Past case histories of protest marches have also degenerated into acts of wilful violence and have included deliberate attacks of arson with often very little discrimination as to the property.
- 4.2.43. Whilst there appear to be no events of deliberate attacks of Arson on a major Theatre in recent recorded history, the impact of this risk is inevitably high and potentially catastrophic. In this respect, fire safety measures must be considered and should never be treated as 'routine' or 'acceptable' risk.

#### 4.3. Threats To People

- 4.3.1. All staff must be considered when assessing the threats to Delfont Mackintosh and its premises. This includes executives, actors, employees, contractors, and members of the public on the premises, as well as staff / actors off premises and en route to / from local transport hubs.
- 4.3.2. Whilst there are legal implications of duty of care to persons whilst working on site, down-time and inefficient work practices caused by criminal activity can have damaging effects:
- 4.3.3. **Walk-in Theft** **Likelihood: Medium**  
**Impact: Low**
- 4.3.4. Incidences of 'walk in crime' reported in theatres is generally low and uncommon but nevertheless are occasionally reported.
- 4.3.5. Usually this takes the form of opportunists stealing lap top computers, briefcases, handbags, wallets, mobile phones etc. Any visible lack of challenge or vigilance by staff will increase the likelihood of attempts/offences.
- 4.3.6. This nature of crime is also more likely to occur at theatres with larger groups of attending members of the public temporarily congregating in small and confined reception or lobby areas and where the likelihood of committing a crime undetected is potentially increased.
- 4.3.7. Whilst a risk, the threat is significantly lower when compared to surrounding retail premises, with reports of shoplifting and bag, phone, purse and camera thefts that signal opportunist thieves are actively present in the area.
- 4.3.8. The installation of CCTV cameras at key egress points and Front of House areas and vigilant monitoring by theatre staff coupled with staff awareness training will limit the opportunity and 'invitation' for such offences to take place.



- 4.3.9. **Assault on Staff / Contractors in the Work Place** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low - Medium**
- 4.3.10. Assault on both visitors and staff remains a potential threat in any areas that invite free access to the general public and have the potential to attract marginalised / intoxicated persons on to the premises.
- 4.3.11. It is also a potential threat should any thief or other intruder be confronted during or after their action, often associated with trauma due to the increasing possession of knives. This presents particular concerns where any staff member is a lone worker.
- 4.3.12. Apart from any injuries and trauma suffered by the victim(s), the potential impacts include serious effects on staff morale (increased absence, etc.) as well as possible litigation.
- 4.3.13. Assaults on staff by disgruntled members of staff or contractors attempting to gain unauthorised access to senior management and / or non authorised areas is also a possibility, although no cases have been reported to date.
- 4.3.14. Physical hardening of the building perimeter to provide a deterrent to would be intruders and ensure the building is secure out of normal theatre hours / when not in use together with lone working procedures and staff awareness training will serve to address this risk.
- 4.3.15. **Assault on Staff in front of House / Bar Areas** **Likelihood: Low – Medium**  
**Impact: Medium**
- 4.3.16. Assaults on staff in Bar and Front of House areas by those members of public affected by drink or drugs is rare and uncommon but nevertheless a possibility should it be perceived that there is little deterrent to prevent them or minimal staff on-site to intervene.
- 4.3.17. To be effective this level of deterrent should be generated from the first time audience members set foot on site.
- 4.3.18. As mentioned previously with regards to walk in theft, technical security measures coupled with staff procedures and training to monitor public activity in Theatre lobby areas should help to deter and prevent any potential 'volatile' situations from escalating once inside the theatre.
- 4.3.19. **Assault on High Profile Actor** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Medium - High**
- 4.3.20. Theatre productions will on a regular basis attract high paying actors and media personalities which in turn may attract heightened public and media attention.





- 4.3.21. Associated risks arising from the presence of high profile personalities include attempted intrusion or harassment by obsessed fans to congregation and overspill of public out into roads around Stage Door areas and potentially causing vehicle / pedestrian safety issues.
- 4.3.22. Additional company level procedures are already in place for addressing any security risks associated with the personal security of high paying actors and therefore in part reduce this specific risk.
- 4.3.23. CCTV coverage of Stage Door areas will also assist in monitoring any potential escalating crowd situation outside the Theatre.
- 4.3.24. **Theft of Staff Property from the Work Place** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low**
- 4.3.25. The potential for staff theft will always be present. Motivation for staff thefts have varied from straight cash needs to, in the case of personal items or props used by VIP actor / actresses; - desire for personal ownership.
- 4.3.26. In most cases other staff or contractors are responsible for the majority of theft of staff property. Although no cases have been confirmed, unattended personal items are always vulnerable to opportunistic theft.
- 4.3.27. Whilst the majority of staff are unlikely to ever steal, there will be future occasions where their circumstances may change and the employee sees theft as a ready solution to their problem. In the main the departmental groups, have close relationships and it is likely that signs of personality change, most often associated with either stress or illicit actions, will be detected.

#### 4.4. Threats to the Organisation

- 4.4.1. The activities and brand image of the Theatre Group and location of the Sondheim Theatre does not identify it as an immediate primary target for any organised activist or associated union activities.
- 4.4.2. As a major theatre group, Delfont Mackintosh is often accredited by numerous media sources as having played a key role in driving up theatre sales within the capital's West End through acquiring and investing in the much needed modernisation of many of London's historic theatres.
- 4.4.3. The UK registered and limited company has no recorded history of attracting the attention of specific activist groups, nor do any of the four Company Directors appear to have been the subject of targeted hate campaigns for their opinions, views or association with other commercial or political interests.
- 4.4.4. It should be noted however that threat and risk is a constantly changing dynamic and in a world governed by social media, the individual views of a member of staff

or Director caught on camera / mobile phone can immediately and rapidly be disseminated to a wide and far reaching audience.

4.4.5. Such 'unfortunate' incidents may precipitate adverse publicity or worse, attract the specific attention of disaffected individuals or activist groups keen to demonstrate their cause, and therefore can never be entirely discounted.

4.4.6. **Staff Picketing** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low**

4.4.7. Strikes, demonstrations or other 'unionised' activities are generally rare occurrences within the theatre world.

4.4.8. In May of this year, tour guides working for Shakespeare's Globe staged a strike to hit a major London theatre for the first time in twelve years.

4.4.9. Previously, the last formally organised protest event to take place in London against a Theatre's employers took place in 2003 when chorus members at the English National Opera staged a strike in protest of planned redundancies, and prior to that another strike occurred in 1979 at the National Theatre.

4.4.10. Tactics and methods that could be expected from an incident of this nature would typically include:

- Demonstration outside premises.
- Physical obstruction of building entry/exit points.
- Sit-ins.
- Intimidation of staff and audience.

4.4.11. As mentioned above such protests are generally rare, and although the impact can be considerable - mostly from disruption of staff movement and morale, the likelihood of this form of threat having a long and sustained impact on theatre show performances is considered to be very low.

4.4.12. **Activist Pressure Groups / Extreme Protest** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low**

4.4.13. The identity and activities of the Theatre does not identify it as a high profile target for activist demonstrations or protests but may be impacted by pressure group activities targeting other organisations in the area.

4.4.14. Symptomatic of the modern age is the emergence of numerous protest groups usually focusing on single issues, such as immigration, anti-austerity or anti-capitalism and sometimes using violent protest as a means of furthering their causes.

4.4.15. London has experienced increased activities of such groups in recent years notwithstanding the widespread riots that took place in the Capital in 2011.

- 4.4.16. The 'mob-mentality' associated with these demonstrations has increasingly entailed the utilisation of weapons to assist in mass destruction.
- 4.4.17. It is considered that the theatre's location away from the City is likely to reduce the likelihood of any impact as part of a major city action although the proximity of major vehicular thoroughfares such as Shaftesbury Avenue, and Charring Cross Road raise the possibility of some disruption should there be large-scale group protests / marches using these roads.
- 4.4.18. It is also possible albeit considered 'unlikely' that traditional high end establishments that attract an exclusive clientele such as the Ivy restaurant next door may also be targeted by anti-capitalist demonstrators or similar activist groups in the future.
- 4.4.19. Given the current economic uncertainty, issues facing immigration and unemployment / recession fears, extreme protest action is likely to continue as a serious threat for the foreseeable future.
- 4.4.20. **International Terrorism / Fundamentalism** **Likelihood: Medium – High**  
**Impact: Medium - High**
- 4.4.21. The Home Office gives the current threat of terrorism status as "SEVERE" indicating that an attack in the UK is 'highly likely'.
- 4.4.22. Principal protagonists of the current international terrorist threat are attributed to Al Qaida and related networks and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) also referred to in the media as Islamic State.
- 4.4.23. UK Government assessment of the threat can sometimes be confusing but current indications are that some form of attack in London is anticipated probably against buildings or organisations that will be readily associated with 'England' or the government. Targets are most likely to be either high profile (in the public and world image) buildings or major people concentrations, e.g. public transport terminals / trains etc.
- 4.4.24. Such terrorist group have, to date, targeted locations where they can gain maximum publicity through major loss of life or where there is some direct public perception of a connection between the site/organisation attacked and their cause.
- 4.4.25. It is generally considered that the aims of Islamic extremist attacks have been in descending order of importance:
- To produce the maximum number of human casualties.
  - To generate symbolic impact and maximum publicity.
  - To cause economic disruption.

- 4.4.26. No evidence was obtained to indicate that the theatres activities present any direct and specific ongoing attraction to fundamentalist action. However, the risk cannot be entirely discounted.
- 4.4.27. Possible forms of terrorist activity aimed against the Theatre would obviously have a high impact and could include the following:
- Small improvised explosive device left in public areas.
  - Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.
  - Mail bomb
  - Attack upon visiting dignitaries and VIP(s)
  - Internal Siege.
- 4.4.28. **Terrorist Attacks on Theatres** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: High**
- 4.4.29. The ever changing and increasingly complex terrorist threat posed by disaffected and / or radicalised British citizens who are increasingly using the internet and social media as a means to gain information on terrorist atrocities means that the type and target of an attack is also becoming potentially more varied and difficult to predict.
- 4.4.30. Whilst there has been no recent history of a targeted terrorist attack on a British Theatre, there have been numerous recorded incidents of attacks on theatres, concert halls and cinema complexes overseas.
- 4.4.31. Most significantly the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow was seized by forty to fifty Chechens who claimed allegiance to the Islamist militant separatist movement in Chechnya in 2002 and took 850 hostages.
- 4.4.32. The siege was further complicated by the fact that Russian Special Forces were unable to gain any visual insight of activities and numbers of terrorists involved inside the theatre once stormed by the Chechen rebels. In order to overthrow the rebels, special forces would have had to fight through 30 metres (100 feet) of corridor and attack up a well defended staircase, before they could reach the hall in which the hostages were held.
- 4.4.33. The terrorists also had numerous explosives, with the most powerful in the centre of the auditorium, that, if detonated, could have brought down the ceiling and caused in excess of 80 percent casualties.
- 4.4.34. After a two and a half day siege and the execution of two hostages, the Federal Security Service (FSS) pumped an undisclosed chemical agent into the buildings ventilation system resulting in the death of all the hostages and Chechen rebels.
- 4.4.35. Whilst this form of terrorist attack is considered extremely low to occur at a British Theatre, the impact could be potentially very significant and devastating.

4.4.36. Whilst it is appreciated that due to copyright infringement and issues of data protection, CCTV cameras are not allowed in Theatre auditoriums, consideration may want to be given to ensuring all fire exits internally are monitored with CCTV and possibly also all entrances to stairwells leading into auditorium areas as a means to enable emergency service staff to assess activity should a hostage / siege incident or similar scenario take place at some point in the future.

4.4.37. **Irish Republican Terrorism** **Likelihood: Low**  
**Impact: Low - Medium**

4.4.38. The murder of a former member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in August 2015 has once again raised political tensions in the region and resurrected possible fears that individuals with historic Irish Republican Army (IRA) connections may seek to cause further factions within political parties once more.

4.4.39. The possibility therefore of action by splinter or other militant groups such as the Continuity IRA cannot be entirely discounted. Whilst such groups are thought to be very small and comprising of a couple of disaffected individuals the threat of them carrying out a terrorist 'spectacular' in order to obtain publicity remains.

4.4.40. In terms of the threat of an IRA related attack on the mainland, the threat is currently considered to be 'Moderate', meaning an attack is possible but not likely.

4.4.41. **Secondary Impacts of Terrorism**

4.4.42. Whilst no immediate threat has been identified against the Sondheim Theatre or other establishments in the near vicinity, the possibility of an attack in London remains high and it is therefore likely that theatre staff may be affected whilst travelling to / from work.

4.4.43. Should any attack target a building or area near the theatre then the secondary affects may well have a serious impact. Apart from any resulting injuries / deaths, this could also render Sondheim Theatre inaccessible for a potentially considerable period of time post incident.

4.4.44. Preparation and practice of theatre emergency evacuation and or internal refuge plans together with appropriate crisis management procedures and emergency / contingency plans will enable Theatre Management to ensure any impact arising from such a scenario is managed as best as can be predicted accordingly.

#### 4.5. Intangibles

4.5.1. Intangible factors are those threats which whilst difficult to quantify can effect employee efficiency or morale. Such threats are really a residue from other forms of risk to the business and its staff, but should not be overlooked:



4.5.2. **Loss/damage of personal property**

4.5.3. The loss or damage of personal property through criminal action causes low morale, particularly if suspicion falls on other members of staff or long-term contract employees.

4.5.4. **Abuse**

4.5.5. Staff receiving abuse from drugs/alcohol users or demonstrators leads to low morale and disruption of working practices.

4.6. **Impact**

4.6.1. Key impacts should be considered against the future of the Theatre and as such:

- Theft of Theatre property and assets, whilst resulting in financial loss, has little impact upon the future success and reputation of the Theatre.
- Incidents that affect the safety, life or wellbeing of staff, contractors, the company or the general public has the potential to have a financial impact on ticket sales and reputation as these may be viewed as a breach of the Theatre's duty of care. This could also affect staff morale resulting in staff leaving to work for rival production companies.
- A major incident involving large numbers of the public audience will result in major reputational damage and could affect future footfall, ticket sales, future funding support and investment as well as impact on relationships with key stakeholders and partners.


4.6.2. **Impact Summary**

Risk	Target	Potential Impact
Terrorism	Audience / Staff	Loss of Building, loss of life, denial of access - major image / financial impact / Litigation.
Arson	Building	Loss of Building, Disruption to operations / major financial impact. Potential litigation / insurance issues.
Crime: Robbery, burglary, theft, criminal damage, assault, etc	Staff	Loss of property, assault and/or injury/trauma leading to loss of staff or high absence rates.
	Audience	Confrontation, assault and/or injury/trauma; reputational loss leading to loss of future ticket sales; potential litigation.
	Assets	Loss of property, business disruption, denial of access to systems resulting in loss of data, temporary closure, replacement costs.

## Section Two – Crime Impact Survey Addendum Pedestrian Security Evaluation

### 1. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 The purpose of this report is to provide independent comment on a 'pedestrian safety' concern raised as part of a planning application submitted to London Borough of Camden relating to the redevelopment of the Ambassadors Theatre (to be renamed the Sondheim Theatre) located on West Street, London.
- 1.2 This concern is in respect to the proposed extension of the Theatre's east wall elevation into Tower Court. Proposed design drawings highlight a 'dog leg' in the wall elevation effectively creating an alcove of just under 3 metres in length which is not part of the existing structure. This also results in narrowing part of the pedestrian walkway along Tower Court from the point where it is proposed the east wall elevation will extend out.



- 1.3 During pre-application discussions, officers queried whether this particular change to the existing layout creates a significant blind spot to pedestrians using the route and therefore puts their personal safety at increased risk from attack by hidden assailants. They further commented on whether the narrowing of part of Tower Court may also increase the propensity for members of the public to be assaulted or raise public perceptions of fear of crime.

- 1.4 In preparing this response, the author has considered police reported crime statistics for the immediate neighbourhood and associated building design security measures in 'designing out' crime.

## 2. ASSESSMENT

- 2.1 It is considered that the proposed extension of the Theatre's east wall elevation does not present a significant hazard to public / pedestrian safety from a security perspective.

- 2.2 This is based primarily on a number of considerations, namely;

- 2.2.1 A review of historical reported crime data highlighted that there is no factual evidence or precedence to suggest there is a higher risk of being assaulted in the area compared to surrounding districts, and that a pedestrian is at greater risk when turning a corner or walking past a concealed entrance on Tower Court than on any other street or pedestrian walkway in central London.

- 2.2.2 Specifically, there is no record of police reported crime concerning assault, theft from person or violent crime as occurring at the Theatre within recent history.

- 2.2.3 There has also been no previous record of a Police campaign specifically targeting Tower Court in response to high violent crime rates or in response to public perceptions / fears that the area is a high risk area.

- 2.2.4 Conversations with the Police Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT) responsible for this location highlight that the area is considered to be a safe neighbourhood, with the risk of assault or violent crime also considered to be low.

- 2.2.5 There is no evidence to suggest that the narrowing of Tower Court, from an approximate average width at present of 6.1 metres to an approximate width at its narrowest point of 3.5 metres, is likely to attract criminal behaviour.

- 2.2.6 Furthermore, although the extension would make Tower Court narrower than at present, the passageway as it runs between Ambassadors Theatre and St Martin's Theatre is straight providing a pedestrian with a direct route from one end to the other. It is considered therefore, that even if narrower than at present this route may still be perceived as "safer" than, for example, Tower Court as it runs between Tower Street and either Earlham Street or Monmouth Street. This particular stretch of Tower Court has a bend in it meaning any pedestrian using the passageway is effectively approaching a "dead end" and has no knowledge of who may be waiting around the bend until they reach that point (see Figure 1 and 2).

- 2.2.7 Again there is no factual evidence to suggest that introducing a 'dog-leg' into a wall is likely to be 'targeted' by opportunist criminals as a perfect location from which to assault pedestrians or carry out other criminal activities, or displace crime from other areas into Tower Court given the number of other existing alcoves and recessed entrance points already occurring along the route.



- 2.2.8 Although less pronounced than the proposed redesign, the existing recessed entrances at both the Ambassadors Theatre and St Martin's Theatre already provide, to some degree, the ability for someone to hide from view from a person walking down Tower Court and not be discovered until the last minute (see Figure 3 and 4).
- 2.2.9 'Blind spots' in the urban landscape can and are frequently created on a day to day basis by parked vehicles, refuse dumpsters, renovation to exterior walls or other business activities and may not necessarily be as a result of building design.
- 2.2.10 By example it has been observed that two large refuse dumpsters are kept on Tower Court (see Figure 5) and one might argue these have a greater impact on a pedestrian's line of sight when walking along the route than the proposed 'dog leg'.
- 2.2.11 It is also considered that the identified 'blind spot' created by the 'dog leg' only affects pedestrians walking down Tower Court from Tower Road as those pedestrians walking from West Street still have a clear field of view.
- 2.3 Finally, there are many simple and cost effective security measures that can be introduced to deter a 'blind spot' or 'tunnel effect' from being exploited for criminal activities as well as mitigate any public perceptions with regards to fear of crime.
- 2.4 This could include the introduction of the following physical and technical security measures;
- Subtle but effective street lighting that enables persons hidden from view to cast shadows on to the main thoroughfare during hours of darkness. Indeed levels of street lighting along Tower Court are already very effective (see Figure 4 and 5).
  - Bright down or spot lights in recessed areas to deter persons from congregating or sheltering in alcoves.
  - 'Softening' of walls with concave corners allowing persons a greater line of sight around the corner when passing by.
  - Street mirrors that enable persons to effectively see around a corner as they approach.
  - CCTV monitoring of blind spot areas together with associated signage to both deter opportunist criminals as well as provide evidence as a post investigation tool.



Figure 1: Entrance to Tower Court from Earlham Street

Bend in Tower Court



Figure 2: Entrance to Tower Court from Monmouth Street



Prominent levels of street lighting under hours of darkness

Location of wall protrusion approx in front of standing man.

Existing recessed areas on theatre wall elevation


Figure 3: Night view (11:45pm) of Tower Court and Ambassadors Theatre from West Street.



Prominent levels of street lighting under hours of darkness

Existing recessed areas on Theatre wall elevation

Figure 4: Night view (11:45pm) of Tower Court and St. Martins Theatre from West Street.



Prominent levels of street lighting under hours of darkness

Refuse creating effective blind spots behind bins to pedestrians walking down route.

Figure 5: Night view (11:45pm) of Tower Court from Tower Street.



## Section Three – Security Needs Assessment

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### 1 BACKGROUND / INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 IJA (Ian Johnson Associates Limited) were commissioned by Delfont Mackintosh Theatres Limited to carry out a Security Needs Assessment to evaluate and assess the level of security measures required to be incorporated in building design proposals for the redevelopment of the Sondheim Theatre (currently known as the Ambassadors Theatre) in West Street, London.
- 1.2 This assessment has been based on observation of proposed building structure drawings of the new Theatre, a visit to the site and briefings from members of the Project team.
- 1.3 Design parameters have also been based on the findings of a crime impact survey / risk assessment of the premises.
- 1.4 **Crime Impact Summary**
- 1.5 The risk assessment identified that Sondheim Theatre faces most of the criminal, terrorist and other socio-activist risks attracted by any major business operating in central London.
- 1.6 It was assessed that the risks the Theatre faces will result in damage to property or injury to people potentially impacting on reputation rather than severe, direct, financial loss.
- 1.7 The major threats associated with the Theatre and its location are summarised as:
- Theft of assets and / or Theatre property by 'walk in' or opportunist thieves.
  - Forced entry and / or burglary of Theatre assets.
  - Violence against staff, either by intruders or members of the public.
  - Petty theft of public property and / or other property by members of the public or contractors.
  - Criminal damage (intentional or alcohol related) by homeless persons, or members of the public passing by the Theatre.
  - Arson.
  - Terrorist siege attack.
- 1.8 Whilst the Theatre can do little to mitigate local area problems as they affect staff moving to and from work, visibly effective security measures and routines within the building and its immediate surrounds will tend to keep the 'problems' at a distance, affording a safe zone for staff and attending public.

## 2 SECURITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

### 2.1 Overview

2.2 To address the identified risks, security strategy and design has to create an environment where any intruder, any uncontrolled visitor or any other person without legitimate reason for entering the building will be:

- Deterred from attempting to enter or, in the case of members of the public, deterred from progressing beyond authorised areas.
- Physically prevented from entering beyond public areas or, where aesthetics prevent full prevention, be delayed and made to highlight their presence through unusual action.
- Detected and intercepted before they can cause harm or loss.

2.3 It should provide a system of checks and monitoring that will deter staff / contractor / legitimate visitor misconduct and will:

- Support rapid detection of problems and permit fast interception, thus reducing the likelihood of loss or damage.
- Highlight any member of staff, contractor or visitor acting out of the ordinary.

2.4 Security controls should be effective but discreet and reflect an open and inviting environment to members of the audience i.e. project the professional, caring but safe environment, applying visible deterrent and controls as appropriate to each part of the building as required by the activities therein.

### 2.5 Security Strategy

2.6 To achieve a security strategy that discreetly controls access to the inner areas of the building, to individual facilities and assets within those areas, but allows the impression of 'free movement to members of the public' when on site, an integrated security system is proposed.

2.7 It is envisaged to achieve this, the component parts of an effective security system will comprise of the following:

- A physically resistant outer shell to the building.
- High profile external surveillance system.
- Restriction of access routes directing persons to control points.

- An enclosed Front of House / Lobby area that allows free movement to theatre goers during performance times but visibly restricts physical access by visitors outside of these times.
  - The ability to close down the building in emergencies or exceptional risk periods as well as quickly open all access points following a performance.
  - A fully managed intruder detection system linked to CCTV and where appropriate additional access control measures.
  - Visual and audible signals to alert staff to unauthorised persons entering restricted areas.
  - Enclosed key internal areas.
  - Discreet CCTV monitoring to aid interception of transgressors.
  - Trained staff to manage, monitor and respond to security system needs.
- 2.8 It is envisaged that all of the electronic security systems will be integrated into a PC or server based system located either at the Stage Door or in the Server Room. The final location will depend on staffing decisions.
- 2.9 The system will be primarily event driven, i.e., the system itself will audibly inform of illicit activity, and will be formatted to instruct staff in response and action, as well as provide an audit trail to enable management to investigate post incident.
- 2.10 **Assessment**
- 2.11 It is considered, following the findings from the Crime Impact Survey, Theatre design considerations need to attain an acceptable level of security against the primary threats of burglary, forced entry, theft, assault, and vandalism / criminal damage.
- 2.12 The following security measures are proposed:
- 2.13 **External Building Security**
- 2.14 A combination of visible physical strength of doors, glazing and fabric supported by high profile CCTV surveillance and visibly alert ground floor staff at public and staff entry points will signal that entry into the building will be detected and intercepted.
- 2.15 Access to the building including the potential access from the roof of neighbouring properties (to deter risk of burglary) will be visibly barred or monitored.
- 2.16 The range of the surveillance will also signal to potential criminals or other offenders that their activities will be detected at a reasonable distance from the building itself, thus increasing the deterrent and protective (or comfort) zone around the Theatre.



- 2.17 CCTV will be installed to provide coverage of all building perimeter doors and a clear field of view along the building perimeter. Opportunities for concealment, shelter or other possible blind spots, such as light wells, recessed doors and / or walls should ideally be removed from design plans so as to provide an uninterrupted field of view when looking down building elevations.
- 2.18 Discreet but visible CCTV signage will also be displayed in accordance with Data Protection Act regulations, providing a further deterrent and reinforcing public security / safety perception levels.
- 2.19 The Theatre may want to consider the ability for linking CCTV monitoring of the exterior of the building with Westminster Council systems.
- 2.20 The Theatre canopy covering the main entrance to the Theatre will be under specific surveillance to deter and detect the introduction of undesirable objects, material or vagrants using the area as shelter. Low level lighting during hours of darkness will be fitted to deter vagrants from sleeping under the canopy.
- 2.21 Windows particularly on the ground floor in the main entrance / Theatre lobby areas need to be fitted with thickened glass (ideally 6mm toughened) capable of withstanding external pressures from vandalism / criminal damage attack as well as to a lesser degree the threat from an explosive force. The Theatre may also want to consider applying anti shatter film to window surfaces. Bars or grilles applied to ground floor and other easy accessible window frames will be fitted with tamper proof screws.
- 2.22 **Access Control**
- 2.23 All external entrance points will be fitted with security grade locking systems and appropriate intrusion detection sensors (including doors providing access on to the roof and balcony spaces).
- 2.24 Only the main entrance doors will be used for public / audience entry. The stage door entrance will be restricted to staff / actor / contractor access. Both doors will be locked and visibly secured out of normal theatre working hours.
- 2.25 All doors on emergency exit routes will remain locked, from the outside, at all times but will permit free exit by members of the public following a performance or in the event of evacuation being necessary. Any such door fitted with access controlled locks will be released on fire or evacuation alarm through a system interface connection.
- 2.26 **Service Delivery Access**
- 2.27 Service delivery entrances located on the ground floor, first floor and fifth floor from Tower Court will, as with all other perimeter doors be fitted with door contacts (intrusion detection sensors) and remain closed unless actually in use, as will the balcony doors on the first floor.



- 2.28 Doors also to be fitted with security grade internal key locking systems and tamper proof hinge bolts to be fitted to prevent removal.
- 2.29 Camera monitoring of service delivery areas will be installed both externally and internally and relayed back to the stage door reception point to enable staff to monitor activity when the doors are open. This will be both from a security and safety point of view when delivering / unloading large or heavy equipment for installation at Back of House or Stage areas.
- 2.30 Consideration will need to be given when installing CCTV in these areas to ensure that fields of view are not obstructed by the opening of service delivery doors on these levels.
- 2.31 **Front of House / Theatre Lobby Area (Main Public Access)**
- 2.32 The Front of House / Lobby area inside the main entrance Theatre doors is designed as a technically 'uncontrolled zone'.
- 2.33 During Box Office opening times, the main entrance doors will be open to members of the public and access routes from the main lobby area into Theatre / auditorium areas will either be screened off or the doors secured.
- 2.34 Prior to a performance, members of the public entering the lobby area will be invited by layout, signs and staff to display their tickets to a member of staff before being granted further access.
- 2.35 At all other times whilst the Box Office is open, public visitors should be able to freely access the front lobby but thereafter be restricted to escorted (accompanied) movement only.
- 2.36 The area will be monitored by CCTV to provide a deterrent and post investigation tool should there be a disturbance or incident occurring in the area.
- 2.37 Installation of CCTV in Theatre lobby areas will also serve to address the impact from identified risks highlighted in the crime impact survey including assault on member of staff, robbery of cash register from the Box Office and / or impact of a break-in or criminal damage occurring at the front entrance out of hours.
- 2.38 CCTV installed will need to be of day / night capability and able to adjust / autofocus accordingly to changes in environmental conditions including natural light glare from outside.
- 2.39 **Box Office**
- 2.40 The Box Office will be visible from the main entrance and will need to be of solid core construction. Office design should also deter opportunist criminals from 'jumping' over the counter into the office space.

- 2.41 Access into the Box Office will be restricted to authorised members of staff only with doors on restricted access via electronic access control or suited key system to authorised users. Doors will be alarmed and monitored out of opening hours.
- 2.42 Although the risk is deemed low, to minimise the impact of a potential robbery or assault on a member of staff, it is recommended that the Box Office also be fitted with CCTV to monitor transactions occurring and fitted with a hold up alarm (also known as a personal attack button) linked directly back to the Stage Door Manager's office. This will also enable staff working in the Box Office / Theatre lobby area to notify other staff of an emergency alert and initiate a quick response.
- 2.43 The Theatre will need to consider appropriate security arrangements in the Box Office for cash storage from ticket takings and associated purchases. Cash safes installed should reflect 'rating' for commercial cash limits as determined by anticipated daily amounts held in the safe - (insurer stipulations should be confirmed). It should also be noted that security protection afforded by a fire-resistant safe may not be the same as that of a security safe. The safe should also not be in clear visible view of members of the public.
- 2.44 **Stage Door Area (Main Staff / Visitor Entrance)**
- 2.45 During staff working hours, the Stage Door entrance will be unlocked and on free access. At all other times, the doors will be secured (security grade lock and key or access control) and alarmed.
- 2.46 The Stage Door will be the first point of entry and last point of exit following setting of the Theatre's intruder alarm system, the main panel of which will be located by the Staff entrance.
- 2.47 Security access arrangements will allow for Management / Key Holding staff or other authorised members of staff to enable access to the building out of normal working hours.
- 2.48 During normal theatre working hours, all visitors, delivery agents and contractors will be required to register at the Stage Door entrance and processed according to their access requirements. Once the validity of their visit has been established with the relevant member of staff they will be issued with a visitor's badge.
- 2.49 Couriers and delivery agents should be restricted to perimeter access only; all transactions being conducted at the Stage Door entrance.
- 2.50 The interface between visitor reception area inside the Stage Door area and inner Theatre areas will be subject to control.
- 2.51 Moderate profile CCTV cameras will be installed inside the Stage Door entrance area to signal deterrent against misconduct, and appropriate signs will be displayed.

- 2.52 CCTV installed will need to be of day / night capability and able to adjust / autofocus accordingly to changes in environmental conditions including natural light glare from outside.
- 2.53 The Stage Door reception desk will also be fitted with a hold up alarm (personal attack button) to enable the Stage Door Manager to alert other staff in the event of an incident occurring in the area and requiring further assistance.
- 2.54 **Internal Areas**
- 2.55 Access to designated rooms will be achieved through limited access control card authority or restricted key issue and associated lock furniture. All data and communications related equipment rooms will be provided with either access control or security locking systems.
- 2.56 The following rooms have been provisionally identified:
- IT Server / Main Computer Room
  - Box Office
  - Stage Door Reception
  - Theatre Manager's Office
  - Dressing Rooms
  - Technical Rooms
  - Production Control Room
  - Rehearsal Studios
  - Plant areas
- 2.57 Access to communications risers and cupboards will be restricted by appropriate locking systems.
- 2.58 Discrete CCTV will be installed to monitor those areas of specific risk directly (e.g. Main Computer Room) or their approaches as appropriate to risk / need (e.g. Theatre Manager's Office).
- 2.59 It is considered that the Theatre Office located on the fifth floor may require additional safe / overnight secure cash holding facilities to store takings provisionally stored at the Box Office and cash taken from Theatre bars.
- 2.60 **Alarm and Intruder Detection Facilities**
- 2.61 To reduce the risk and associated impact of Burglary, it is recommended an intruder detection system be installed. Where feasible, alarm inputs on access controlled doors will be utilised and alarm signals will be linked to nearby / appropriate CCTV cameras.
- 2.62 The fire detection system will stand separately, but will be cross linked to the security system for overriding emergency exit route access controlled doors where applicable.

- 2.63 As highlighted above, all external doors will be fitted with alarm sensors that will be programmed according to operational movement needs, e.g. emergency exit doors will remain alarmed 24 hours a day and only opened briefly at the end of each performance to enable the audience to quickly and safely exit the building after the show.
- 2.64 The Stage Door and main entrance doors will be activated at the end of normal working hours, etc.
- 2.65 Doors leading into restricted internal areas will be monitored by appropriate sensors when not in use, thus preventing undetected / unauthorised access.
- 2.66 Access points accessible from the roof will be fitted with appropriate intruder detection sensors, backed by internal trap units. Roof lights and opening windows will be fitted with locks and viper or similar detection.
- 2.67 Sensors will be specified according to detection need and the environmental conditions within each location.
- 2.68 Where sensors are visible from the outside of the building they will be of relatively high profile, thus helping the deterrent; internal sensors will be restricted to monitoring key access points and routes in the event of a forced entry and will be of more discreet nature to blend in with the atmosphere / ambiance.
- 2.69 **Monitoring Systems (CCTV)**
- 2.70 The CCTV system will provide:
- Full, high profile, external surveillance of the building and its immediate approaches (including roof and roof terrace spaces).
  - Internal, medium profile monitoring of the Ground Floor Front of House and Stage Door 'public' areas.
  - Discreet internal monitoring of all potential entry points including internal fire exit routes at point of exit. (Also providing an audit trail should fire exit door be left open / unattended and an intruder access the building).
  - Discreet monitoring of entry into 'high risk' restricted areas (e.g. IT Server Room).
- 2.71 Where appropriate, alarm sensors will be linked to the CCTV system programme, thus bringing pictures up on alarm activation. Where feasible, motion detection will be provided for external and internal non alarmed areas.
- 2.72 Local monitoring capability will be provided for the Theatre Manager, Stage Door Manager and Box Office staff. This may be by dedicated monitor or through LAN interface onto desktop computer.

### 3 VULNERABILITY

- 3.1 Any intruder considering entry into a building or any 'insider' considering internal mischief or removal of assets will normally conduct some form of reconnaissance. The first level of deterrent is the level of visible alertness of staff (not just appointed Stage Door and Front of House staff, but of all staff) – who should display an awareness of what is happening around them, challenging persons or activities that seem out of place.
- 3.2 The second level of deterrent is the physical appearance of the building and all possible access points / routes, where intrusion or other illicit action will be perceived to be either delayed or highlighted by unusual actions to a point where the perpetrator is likely to be detected and intercepted.
- 3.3 The higher level of deterrent is the visible response to intrusion or activity. Insiders and intruders will normally test the system before committing malicious or criminal acts, so the speed and effectiveness of the response will either deter or encourage their future actions.
- 3.4 Care should be taken when considering response to acts that could result in violent confrontation as the use of 'ordinary' staff may not be covered by either insurance or may conflict with the Health and Safety at Work Act requirement to 'provide a safe place of work'.
- 3.5 A review of the current building initial design drawings of the proposed new Theatre elevations and sections identified the following specific observations where weaknesses or vulnerabilities are visible and may be exploited:
- 3.6 ***Stage Door Lobby Area***
- 3.7 This entrance is frequently busy and during peak periods of activity, can get very busy for the Stage Door Manager to manage in ensuring visitors / deliveries are appropriately processed and access is controlled.
- 3.8 It is also a point of entry where opportunist criminals may take advantage if it is observed that the Stage Door Manager is distracted or the reception desk temporarily unattended.
- 3.9 From the Lobby, it is possible to access almost all inner areas of the Theatre including direct access to the Theatre auditorium, access via a set of stairs to the lower ground dressing room areas and access via the lift on to all other floors.
- 3.10 Security control points, deterrents and procedures therefore need to be effective to ensure security is not compromised.
- 3.11 Procedures in place will need to ensure that all visitors and contractors are escorted and supervised by a member of staff when accessing the Theatre unless that individual is an approved contractor to work on site and has completed an appropriate site induction before carrying out the works.

- 3.12 Likewise, it is recommended that both doors leading from the main Stage Door Lobby are on some form of access control requiring authorised visitors to be first processed by the Stage Door Manager prior to being issued with a relevant key or card to allow them to gain access.
- 3.13 This would mean that the door leading from the Stage Door Lobby to the Stage Lobby would not be a fire escape route to audience members as otherwise the door would need to have some form of manual override or be on free access. However it would be possible to make the Stage Door entrance also a direct fire escape route.
- 3.14 Also located at the Stage Door Lobby next to the main Stage Door entrance is the lift. It is understood that the lift will not normally be accessible to members of the public save for disabled audience members and visitors. A moderate risk however given its proximity to the staff entrance, consideration may want to be given to installing additional access control measures inside the lift cab.
- 3.15 ***Get-In and Delivery Entrance***
- 3.16 The delivery entrance doors located on Tower Court are made of solid hardwood and once external traffic bollards have been temporarily removed outside, enable a vehicle to drive on to the pedestrian walk way to deliver items.
- 3.17 The entrance doors themselves extend up into the first floor allowing high sided items to be delivered direct into the stage area. A second set of doors located on the fifth floor also allow for large or awkward items to be delivered up the rehearsal area with the use cherry picker or other such equipment.
- 3.18 Once inside the immediate service delivery area, to the right of the entrance doors is a ramp leading on to the stage. To the left is a single leaf door leading through to the Stage Lobby and a set of stairs to dressing room areas on the lower ground floors.
- 3.19 This door is also the main fire escape door for audience members sitting in the front rows and ground floor Box area and leads out through a dedicated fire exit on to Tower Court.
- 3.20 As a designated fire escape route, this door will need to either be on free access or have a manual override push bar or similar to enable audience members to make quick escape.
- 3.21 For this reason, it also presents a moderate risk when the delivery doors are open as a trespasser / intruder would be able to access the lower level dressing room areas.
- 3.22 To mitigate this risk, procedures will need to be in place to ensure access is strictly managed when transporting goods in and out of the service entrance, and that the area is ideally not left unsupervised during such occasions.
- 3.23 As an added deterrent and also to provide a post incident audit trail should someone attempt to gain unauthorised access (or an item be damaged during transit into the

Theatre) CCTV monitoring of the immediate area should also be considered. Siting of the camera will need to consider the ability to provide a clear uninterrupted view of the inside entrance whilst also not being in the direct way or in danger of being knocked by large items being transported into the area.

**3.24 Dressing Rooms, Lower Ground Floor -2**

3.25 It is considered that the stairwell located to the side of the stage and enabling persons on all floors to exit the building via the fire exit on Tower Street is principally used by theatre staff only and not routinely accessible by members of the audience.

3.26 It is also assumed that audience members sitting in the ground floor Box A area would not be able to view actors coming up from lower ground floor levels by some form of curtain or screen obstructing view.

3.27 If members of the audience chose to bypass this curtain / screen however, this would potentially enable them to gain access to lower ground floor levels and specifically to actor dressing room areas.

3.28 This presents a minor vulnerability should a member of the cast be confronted by a member of the public wandering down the corridor or personal effects be stolen from dressing rooms.

3.29 It is also appreciated that actors will require uninhibited and quick access on to the stage and therefore key doors on lower ground levels will ideally need to be kept open and / or on free access during a performance.

3.30 To minimise this risk in terms of both deterrent and impact post investigation, consideration may want to be given to CCTV monitoring of entrance to the corridor area that leads into actor dressing rooms.

**3.31 Staff Areas, Upper Circle Floor**

3.32 It is noted that a door on the third floor close to the male toilets and leading into a stairwell is the main connecting door dividing public audience areas to restricted staff working areas on all upper floors.

3.33 Whilst a minor risk, this door presents some vulnerability if public members were able to 'tailgate' staff into restricted areas, and the Theatre may want to consider providing CCTV monitoring of the door as a post investigation tool.

## APPENDIX A: RISK ASSESSMENT / CRIME IMPACT TABLES

Analysis of each of the threats identified is measured against the following matrix:

**Table 1 - PROBABILITY CATEGORIES**

CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION	LIKELIHOOD
A	Monthly	High
B	Yearly	High
C	At least once every 5 years	Medium
D	Once in last 10 years	Low (Unlikely)
E	Once in last 11 – 50 years	Low (Remotely Possible)

Each threat is allocated a letter indicating the frequency of forecast occurrence or impact which, when matched with the indicator for severity of impact / criticality to Sondheim Theatre (see Table 2 below), gives a ranking or priority for each risk, see Table 3. This then permits the use of resources in the most effective and cost – effective way.

**Table 2 – IMPACT SEVERITY CATEGORIES<sup>2</sup>**

	Consequence	1 Marginal	2 Noticeable	3 Serious	4 Critical	5 Disaster
Key Personnel	Fatalities			1 – 10	10- 15	15 +
	Major Injuries		1 - 5	6 - 20	21 - 50	50 +
	Minor Injuries	1 – 10	11- 20	21 - 50	51 - 200	200 +
Business Disruption	Theatre closure	1 hour – 1 day	1 – 10 days	10 -60 days	60 – 120 days	120+ days
	Loss of Ticket sales	5%	6 – 10%	11 – 60%	60 - 85 %	85% +
Financial Loss	Loss of assets / Information Compromise	Up to £50,000	Up to £500,000	Up to £10,500,000	Up to £250,000,000	Over £250,000,000

<sup>2</sup> Criticality has been estimated but would require Delfont Mackintosh Financial Management data and input to establish exact figures. Loss should include direct, indirect and consequential losses.




**Table 3 - SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX**

Frequency		Impact Severity Categories				
		1 Minor	2 Noticeable	3 Serious	4 Critical	5 Disaster
<b>A</b>	Monthly	R3	R2	R1	R1	R1
<b>B</b>	Yearly	R3	R2	R2	R1	R1
<b>C</b>	At least once every 5 years	R4	R3	R2	R2	R1
<b>D</b>	Once in last 10 years (Unlikely)	R4	R4	R3	R2	R1
<b>E</b>	Once in last 11-50 years (Remote possible)	R4	R4	R4	R3	R2

- R1 – Very High, immediate action required**
- R2 – High, action as soon as resources available.**
- R3 – Tolerable, monitor in case of increase**
- R4 – Acceptable, live with it**

**APPENDIX B: RISK MATRIX**



	Unacceptable Risk / Action immediately
	Severe Risk / Action as Resources available
	Tolerable Risk / Monitor for changes
	Acceptable Risk / No action

\*Note: Risks are ranked against the likelihood or probability of occurrence and their impact without consideration of any mitigation measures that may be in place.