Kabsec Consultancy

Security Risk Management

BREEAM Commercial Site

Security Needs Assessment

Kingsway House

103 Kingsway

WC2B 6QX

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29th April 2016.

Contents of this Report

1. Data.

Crime and Disorder data for the area of Kingsway House, has been obtained from the Police.uk website. This is a fully audited open source site that allows members of the public and professionals alike to review recorded Police statistics in respect of chosen neighbourhoods.

The website allows various data trawls to be performed, thereby allowing for comparison to similar or adjacent areas (control areas). For the purpose of this site assessment, the postcode of the site has been used as the centre point for collation of 2 datasets.
Data trawl 1 uses the standard Police.uk '1-mile radius' search facility.
Data trawl 2 has been chosen to be approximately 150m x 150m, thereby being approximately 10% of the area within trawl 1. The postcode is again central to this data collection.

Both maps are shown in Appendix 1.

The selected area analysis has been chosen to inform this report (trawl 2). Whilst larger areas often provide a better picture of occurrences, it is evident from the data collation in the initial trawl 1, the use of the larger area will excessively skew results, due to huge variances in recorded offences within the extended area. The larger 1-mile radius encompasses significantly higher crime levels from the Soho, Trafalgar Square and Oxford Street areas.

Appendix B attached shows tabulated crime data retrieved from the website pertinent to the selected area. The area is further broken down into 2 separate areas, the east and west sides of Kingsgate. Deeper interrogation of this data reveals that the eastern side of Kingsgate are most likely to suffer offences of anti-social behaviour and opportunistic acquisitive crime. Types of offence that require planning do not feature – the statistics clearly indicate that it is the opportunity that fuels commission of the offences in this locale.

The same table also reveals that crime within the immediate area of the site is about 90% lower than what could realistically be forecast – hence the Kingsway development is categorised as a low risk site for the purposes of this report.

The low risk category is further supported by using other nationally available data from the Office of National Statistics. Using the figures from the Department of

Business Education & Skills national averages as the baseline, I am able to deduce that businesses in this postcode area are 50% less likely to suffer loss when compared to national statistics.

Finally, the main contributor to the incidence of crime in the immediate area of Kingsway House is designated as a Nightclub. With street based offences also weighing heavily on the figures, office based offences are negligible when considered in context to overall crime statistics.

The above statistics would suggest that if appropriate security is designed in to reduce opportunities for potential offenders, then Kingsway House would be deemed a 'low incidence' site both in terms of safety of users and in relation to security of risk targets and property.

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2. Site audit

Information.

The site was visited on 26th April 2016 where a limited access visit was undertaken to assess all aspects of risk to both safety and security.

The visual audit of the site was commissioned by the landlord, GMS Estates. This report seeks to identify both actual and potential vulnerabilities, to futureproof against both current and future crime trends. The proposals intend to address likely risk to the development in an attempt to provide long term cost benefits to both landlord and tenant alike.

The requirements within this report pertain to designing out at the concept stage. Because of the proximity of the Holborn Tube Station within 100m of the site, a site visit was deemed necessary despite consultation being prior to RIBA Stage C.

The proximity of the Holborn Tube Station (c.100metres away) increases risk, particularly in relation to blast. This is a potential risk that needs to be addressed, primarily in relation to glazing specifications. I have made contact with the departmental supervisor for the Metropolitan Police who deal with matters akin to this; I have asked for their comments to be returned to me as soon as possible. Their input will be vital to achieve a successful conclusion to any future application.

Furthermore, it is likely that contact at this early stage will reduce the likelihood of potential future delays in the future, particularly at the full application stage when it is likely that the Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) will be deemed to be a statutory consultee. Incorporating their requirements at the concept design stage has been proven to save both time and money when compared to consultation at a later stage.

Completion of this risk assessment is essential at this time to identify cost commensurate security features to be incorporated. Subject to insurer requirements, incorporation of the below recommendations may provide a case to negotiate a reduction in premiums.

Site Specifics.

The recommendations below are based on both the site visit and plans referred to at the meeting. They also take into account agreed changes as a result of discussions in the meeting.

Given the site has been designated as a low risk site in respect of both safety of visitors and security of building and potential risk targets, it is still important that features are installed that offer users a feeling of safety. This engenders a sense of 'ownership' and that feeling will manifest itself in staff and visitors alike challenging anything that is perceived to be out of the ordinary.

The main area of concern was in relation to access control on the site. The secondary concern was the impact of occurrences in the immediate vicinity. The nearby site that promulgates this concern is the Tube Station.

I am happy to amend any security recommendation as and when required after liaison with other professionals, Fire Engineer, Planner etc.

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3. Security Recommendations

The below security recommendations are based on the available data, liaison with interested parties, agency staff and by personal visit. I have also taken into account what is already proposed on the plans and I stress that the below recommendations are in addition to what is currently proposed.

i) Shell

a. It is anticipated that the replacement windows will be aluminium framed, double glazed units to achieve the required thermal efficiency rating. I understand the window system is likely to be manufactured by Schueco. Given the crime stats, I can advise window security is to achieve the retention qualities as per the Secured by Design Commercial Guide requirements below.

> 51.2 Glazed curtain walling (i & ii above) must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining the glass must include one or more of the following:
>
> - Security glazing tape
> - Dedicated security sealant or gasket
> - A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by an indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

As a reminder, this recommendation could be subject to the pending CTSA response and may need to be amended in light of their recommendations.

I still await a response as to the required involvement of the CTSA in relation to this site. I suspect that a requirement to install blast resistant glazing will be forthcoming. The glazing units will (for Counter Terrorism requirements) be of a toughened outer and laminated inner pane configuration, a minimum thickness of 6mm toughened and 7.5mm laminated. Building Regulations or wind loading calculations may increase this thickness – the above should be costed in as a minimum thickness of glazing.

b. It is assumed that bin collections will be by way of an external stacking area with no access afforded to collection staff.

The Bin Store access point on the ground floor is an area of vulnerability. It is likely that an FB2 locking mechanism will be incorporated.

To reduce likelihood of breach of the shell security in this area, a secondary inner door should be installed where it effectively forms an 'air lock'. The appropriate position appears to be on the corridor between the Goods Lift and BMS room positions.

c. The adjacent staff entry door will also benefit from the air lock door. This door security is likely to be fob controlled for entry with a push bar emergency egress feature. The holding mechanism of this door (the Maglock) should withstand 300Kg of pull resistance before failure.

The panic bar exit facility must meet BSEN 179 or BSEN1125, both 2008.

ii) Internal Features.

Please note the below.

Electronic access control systems, intruder alarms and CCTV must be designed and installed by a company that is accredited under either the NSI or SSAIB accreditation schemes (see Appendix C). Both accreditation schemes have websites that have a postcode search facility to identify companies that operate within a given area.

I am happy to review any of your preferred electronic security systems that you may wish to specify.

d. The access point between the Reception Desk and the lifts needs to be barrier controlled. A turnstile (or similar) system will allow fob operated access control at this point. I would suggest the development team select their preferred system to allow me to comment thereon. The caveat of NSI or SSAIB accredited product would apply here.

e. Reception IT area could be vulnerable, particularly if tenants' business hours requires longer working times. To combat this risk, the IT should be housed in LPS1214 compliant enclosures.

f. The lifts would also benefit from control by way of access fob. The system can again be selected by the development team but I would hope to be able to comment on its effectiveness prior to specifying. The 'common' access control

system should be incorporated into the lift system which also allows access to the building by the Reception area, by the staff entrance and to particular areas of the office space using the same card or fob.

g. A CCTV system is to be installed but yet to be designed. It is anticipated that the system will be a standalone system. The conditions for this system are that;

- Devices are securely stored in a landlord only portion of the building.
- The recording device has a means of export.
- Exports have operating software automatically burnt onto the disc or stick.
- Cameras will be of CIF4 (or equivalent) minimum.
- Complies with BS62676.
- Is registered with the Information Commissioners office if required (www.ico.gov.uk) to check. Your accredited installer will advise.

h. The intention at this time is to allow tenants to install their own intruder alarm system if they deem necessary. As part of the tenancy agreement, any intruder system installed should be by an NSI or SSAIB approved contractor to a minimum of the BSEN 50131 Grade 2 specification and be subject to an annual maintenance contract.
It is recommended that the landlord protects their all their secure points within the building with their own intruder detection system.

All the above are deemed necessary to effectively deal with current risk and likely future crime trends.

This report has been produced based on all information collated at the time of the site visit and the subsequent meeting. As and when amendments to plans/ build specifications are agreed upon, then I should be notified so the security assessment can be modified as necessary.

K. A. Burrows

t/a KABSEC Security Risk Management Consultancy.

29/04/2016.

Appendix A

Data Trawl 1 – 1 Mile Radius of Postcode

Data Trawl 2 – Condensed Area Statistics



Appendix B

Tabulated Crime Statistics. Source www.police.uk

Month	1-mile radius	Chosen Area	Kingsway E	Kingsway W
Feb 16	3583	32	17	15
Jan 16	4083	45	11	34
Dec 15	4338	59	26	33
Nov 15	4217	67	23	44
Oct 15	4069	57	19	38
Sep 15	3541	48	26	22
Aug 15	3565	32	14	18
Jul 15	3582	28	9	19
Jun 15	3591	64	26	38
May 15	4021	58	29	29
April 15	3634	47	24	23
Mar 15	3980	53	21	32
Totals	46204	590	245	345

Conclusion. Eastern side of Kingsway should suffer 2300 crimes if 5% of crime occurs over 5% of the control area.

Actual figures show that percentage to be less than 0.5%.

Appendix C

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Security Risk Management

Useful Standards

Alarms

BS EN 50131 - 4 grades (to accommodate all EU requirements)
1. Low Risk Site (no response achievable – of little value in UK)
2. Standard Domestic/Low Risk Commercial (e.g. Florist)
3. High Risk Domestic/Standard Commercial (e.g. Newsagent)
4. High Risk Commercial (e.g. Jewellers)

BS 6799 - wire free systems

Don't forget the NSI and SSAIB accreditation schemes

www.nsi.org.uk
www.ssaib.org.uk

Both provide postcode search facility for specific localities.

Buildings

Loss Prevention Standard 1175 (LPS 1175 – 8 security ratings)
Intruder Resistance, strong rooms, security grilles, shutters etc.

The security rating system is loosely based upon: -
Domestic risk 1 and 2 (where 1 is low and 2 is high risk)
Commercial risk 2, 3 and 4 (2, Florist, 3, School, Designer outlet, 4 Chemist)
Higher security risks 5 and 6 (High value Jewellers, Banks, Post Offices)
Extremely high security facilities 7 and 8. (Bullion sites etc.)

BS 8220 - Building security – 3 parts
1. Dwellings

2. Offices and Shops
3. Warehouse and distribution

BS6262 - Glazing for Buildings (curtain walling etc.).

CCTV

(NSI and SSAIB accreditation is also applicable for CCTV)

BS 7958	Code of Practice
BS 8495	Export of Digital Images
BS 8418	Remote Monitoring Stations
BS 62676	CCTV/Video Surveillance in security applications

Doors

PAS24-1	Residential. (Door sets to comply with PAS 23-1)
WCL 1	
STS 202	
LPS1175	Commercial

Fencing

BS1722
Part 1 Chain Link
Part 2 Wire Mesh
Part 10 Anti intruder fences
Part 12 Steel Palisade
LPS 1175
CPNI Perimeter Security & Access Control Guidance

Fire

BS9999 Fire Safety in Buildings
BS476 Part 22 Fire resistance and automatic closing of door sets

Garage

BS8220	Garage doors
LPS 1175	SR 1-2

Lighting

BS5489:2013	Public Amenity Areas.
Other Areas	https://www.theilp.org.uk/documents/**crime/lightingagainstcrime**.pdf

Locks

Standard	Function	Comments
BS 3621:2007 (key egress)	Locked by key from both sides	Provided that the key is removed, this type of lock is secure against operation by intruders reaching through a letter-plate, breaking nearby glazing etc. Best used where emergency escape is not required or where other means of escape exist and where security is paramount.
BS 8621:2007 (keyless egress)	Locked by key from outside only; can always be opened from the inside without a key – e.g. via a thumb turn or lever.	This type of lock offers emergency escape without a key at all times. Best used where there is no danger of the inside handle or thumb-turn being operated from the outside by, for instance, breaking a glazed panel, reaching through a letter plate etc. and where safety is critical (e.g. in flats)
BS 10621:2007 (dual mode)	Locked by key from outside only; can be opened from inside without a key EXCEPT when this function has been disabled by a positive key operation from the outside.	Combines ease of escape in emergency with an additional security feature for use ONLY when leaving the premises unoccupied. Best used where an alternative means of escape exists. BS 10621 offers: • security *and* safety - protection of properties when vacant

TS 007 or SS 312 — Grade 3 Lock cylinders

Padlocks

EN12320 — Standard Padlock Grades 1-6
Regular to extra high security including closed shackle.

Windows

PAS24:2012 — Windows of enhanced security
Applies to Casement and Tilt & Turn windows

Pas 24 windows must also comply with: -

BS 4873 — Aluminium performance standard
BS 7412 — PVCu performance standard
BS 644 — Timber performance standard
BS 6510 — Steel performance standard

BS 8213 — Code of Practice re install of PVCu windows

Glass and glazing (general security requirements)

BS EN 356(2000)	Anti-bandit security glazing.
Domestic	BS EN 356 P1A
Commercial	BS EN 356 P1A

LPS 1270	Security Glazing & Glazing Films.
BS EN 12150	Toughened Glass
BS EN 14179	Heat soaked toughened glass
BS EN 14449	Laminated glass
BS EN 12543	Laminated glass