



## **GARDEN HALLS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**

**Crime Impact Assessment (Including Secure by Design Response)**

**April 2013**

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## Introduction

This Crime Impact Assessment has been produced to accompany the planning and conservation area applications for redevelopment of the University of London's ("UoL") student accommodation at Cartwright Gardens ("the Gardens Halls").

The proposals comprise the redevelopment of the existing student accommodation to provide a net increase of 187 bed-spaces and associated ancillary uses for the University of London. In doing so, the proposals will rationalise the existing three unconnected buildings on the site into a new coherent built form, comprised of several connected elements.

The redevelopment of the site enables a number of security improvements, through providing active street frontages to the student accommodation, increasing opportunities for natural surveillance and minimising opportunities for anti-social behaviour. In accordance with Camden's Design SPG (CPG1) this Crime Impact Assessment details how any potential impacts of crime and anti-social behaviour resulting from the proposed development have been considered, addressed and where appropriate designed out with regard to Secure by Design principles.

The design has had regard to potential impacts of crime and anti-social behaviour both for potential users of the proposed development and for the surrounding community. These have been identified through analysis of the Police UK Crime Database, pre-application discussions with the London Borough of Camden's Crime Prevention Design Advisor and a series of three public consultation events (held between July 2012 – January 2013) and other ongoing discussions. Full details are of these discussions and the issues identified are set out in Section 2.0.

Section 3.0 sets out the response to the issues raised, including design and other security measures.

During the design evolution, the applicant and their design team have also followed the designing against crime principles set out in Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention. A full assessment of the proposals against the Secure by Design principles are set out in Section 4.0.

Alongside these design based improvements there will be a commitment from the University to an enhanced pastoral care team with clear responsibilities for the welfare and the behaviour of students, supported by increased levels of experienced and trained staff from URSL. Full details of the partnership approach to student management and community liaison is set out within the draft Student Management Plan, submitted as part of the package of application requirements and to be secured in its final form through a Section 106.

## 2.0 Identification of Issues

Home Office statistics indicate that 1 in 3 students are a victim of crime<sup>1</sup> with theft, criminal damage and burglary accounting for seven in ten crimes. Per head, students own more expensive consumer goods than the rest of the population, including computers, laptops and mobile phones, and are consequently a high target for criminals. The University of London recognise the importance of managing student safety and security through student management and design measures.

The design of the proposed replacement Halls has had regard to potential impacts of crime and anti-social behaviour both for potential users of the proposed development and for the surrounding community. This Section details the applicant's approach to identifying crime and anti-social behaviour issues, and the issues identified.

The applicant has undertaken the following assessments to identify crime and anti-social behaviour issues at the site and immediately surrounding area:

- Analysis of existing site - security measures incorporated in existing design that have developed over time as a response to perceived and actual threat of crime (see Drawing A10417 C1001 Rev P1 and accompanying photographs on A10417 C1002 Rev P1);
- Review of the Police UK Crime Database;
- Pre-application discussions with the London Borough of Camden's Crime Prevention Design Advisor and Design Officers; and
- Series of three public consultation events and ongoing community discussions.

### ***Analysis of existing Site Conditions***

An illustration of the existing site conditions is provided in drawing A10417 C1001 Rev P1 (and accompanying photographs on A10417 C1002 Rev P1). This outlines the security features that have been incorporated into the existing site and buildings over time, in response to perceived crime threats.

Key security measures incorporated into the existing sites and buildings include:

- Railings around perimeter of building line (ranging from circa. 1.5 – 2 metres in height);
- Railings around the park fitted with anti-climb paint;
- Barbed / razored wire on the tops of walls and railings at potential points of site entry;
- Bars over lower-ground windows at potential points of entry;
- Visible and highlighted CCTV cameras;

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<sup>1</sup> Barbetet, R, Fisher, B & Taylor, H., 2003. *University Student Safety*. Home Office (Online) Available at: <http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/hofindings/r194.pdf>

- Lighting;
- Controlled access points required swipe card/ code/ call button (audio only) and manned security desks; and
- Secured / gated fire escapes and service routes.

Despite these measures, it is considered that there are number of areas of the site exposed to potential criminal activity which could be improved upon. In particular, the interrupted perimeter and inactive areas such as the service yards along Sandwich Street and hard-standing at the rear of Hughes Parry Tower. The redevelopment of the site enables a number of security improvements to the fabric of the building envelope, as well as, a co-ordinated security staff strategy (see Sections 3.0 and 4.0 for details of applicant's response).

### ***Crime and Anti-social Behaviour Profile for Site***

From the above analysis of safety and security measures at the existing site, it is evident that there is a perceived fear of crime at the site, which is likely a response to past incidents. Accordingly, the applicant has undertaken a review of the crime and anti-social behaviour profile for the site using the Police UK Crime Database for the site and immediately surrounding area (see Figure 2.1 which identifies the area reviewed).

The site falls within the area covered by the King's Cross Neighbourhood Policing Team.

The database sets out that between April 2012 and February 2013 there were 31 incidents of reported crime within the area indicated in Figure 2.1. It should be highlighted that these figures include crimes along the entirety of Sandwich Street, and not simply that within the site red line boundary<sup>2</sup>. Actual criminal activity at the site itself could therefore be lower.

The crimes recorded for the area comprised the following:

- Anti-social behaviour – 4;
- Burglary – 8;
- Other crime – 2;
- Other theft – 12;
- Robbery – 3;
- Vehicle crime – 1;
- Violent crime – 1.

74% of crimes at the site were classified as burglary, robbery and other types of theft (74% of all crimes). In addition, four instances of anti-social behaviour were reported.

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<sup>2</sup> The UK Crime Database mapping methodology does not allow users to obtain only those crimes which took place on the site and maps crime for each street as a whole.




Figure 2.1: Crime Map for site and immediately surrounding area

In January 2013, there were three crimes reported at the site. The crime in the wider area is shown in Figure 2.2. In proportion to the level of population at the site (at present circa. 1000 residents) and the level of crime in the wider surrounding area the crime levels at the site are not considered high. This is despite the abovementioned statistic that students are more likely to be victims of crime.




Figure 2.2: Crime map for the wider Bloomsbury area (January 2013)

### **Camden's Crime Prevention Design Advisor**

An initial meeting was held with Camden's Crime Prevention Design Advisor in October 2012, following which initial feedback was issued for the design team to explore in their design evolution (See Table 2.1 below).

*Table 2.1: Feedback from Adam Lindsay (provided by LB Camden on 21<sup>st</sup> October 2012)*

1. Doors - All communal and residential doors will be to BS PAS 23/24 2012. I further require control within the building to be controlled with these doors. This may be off a foyer to restrict further entry into the building and at each floor to achieve the same control.
2. Windows - All accessible and opening windows will also be to BS PAS 23/24 2012.
3. Will there be individual access control for visitors ? If so this should be audio and video.
4. Avoid recess. Dead ground should be controlled. This can be achieved with fencing gating or planters.
5. I was informed that there would be vehicle gating. This should be as close to the building line as possible to reduce the recess. A height of 2.5m in height to the full width of the opening is required. A fob control would be appropriate.
6. Lighting of the site should be to a uniform level and BS 5489.
7. Routes within the building should be controlled with fob activated doors. Two mag lock (if used) should be fitted.
8. I was informed that there would be parking for 200 bicycles. This should be separated out to a lesser number to prevent access and theft to all 200 bikes.

A follow-up meeting was held on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2013 to examine how the proposed design has progressed in respect to crime and security issues. A Design Development Update document was issued to the Council in advance of this meeting which provided annotated drawings of how the design had sought to incorporate the previous comments and secure by design principles. Following this second meeting, LB Camden responded with a number of further considerations set out in Table 2.2.

*Table 2.2: Further Feedback from Adam Lindsay (provided by LB Camden on 4<sup>th</sup> April 2013)*

1. Status of perimeter fencing in park – requires clarity over whether this would be repaired/refurbished and remain;
2. Street furniture in the park should be easily removable in the event they are abused;
3. Planting in park should be low to maintain surveillance;

4. Location of access control doors to be fitted to limit access within the building;
5. Extent of removal of existing exterior security features (Security vanes, metal cages on lightwell windows, perimeter fencing etc) and what will be installed in its place (including standards of security products);
6. Each bedroom door and each communal door to be to BS PAS 23/24 2012.

A third meeting was held on 10<sup>th</sup> April 2013 with the Crime Prevention Design Advisor and Camden Case Officer to further review the approach and confirm the level of detail required to accompany the planning submission. Following this meeting, the Crime Prevention Design Advisor advised he continued to have concern with:

- Bedroom doors not being BS PAS 24-2012 compliant, and suggested to the applicant that the door chosen should be tested;
- The number of bedrooms that a person has access to under the proposed hierarchical fob control arrangement and called for this to be reduced from 65;
- The number of cycles that a person should have access to, however, acknowledged that basement doors will be BS PAS 24-2012, self-closing and locked and that CCTV will be fitted to identify a person entering the store;
- Asked for confirmation as to how post will be delivered to students and controlled. The applicant has proposed that all mail will be delivered to the 24-hour manned reception desk and distributed into lockable post boxes placed on the secure side of the pedestrian security lanes. A dedicated secure parcel room managed by security staff has been included behind the reception desk.

In addition, the issue of addressing security through design was explored in a number of the eight design workshops held with LB Camden between September 2012 and February 2013. In particular, the issue of access to the Sandwich Street townhouses was discussed. Design Officers have advised that their preference from an urban design perspective, to facilitate natural surveillance, would be for individual accesses to each of the townhouses along Sandwich Street.

However the surrounding community, in particular residents along Sandwich Street have raised concern at any anti-social behaviour which might impact from 24-hour access to the townhouses. In particular as a consequence of students' behaviour at night-time (see below for more details). Consequently the applicant has re-visited the design to provide alternative access to the townhouses through the site, from Cartwright Gardens, during the evening.

### **Public Consultation**

A series of three public exhibitions, a Development Management Forum event and individual meetings with specific amenity groups have been held to identify any issues with the proposals from the surrounding community. A number of these comprised anecdotal evidence and are detailed in full in the Statement of Community Involvement and Planning

Statement. However, those overarching issues specific to crime prevention and anti-social comprised:

- Sandwich Street access, and associated anti-social behaviour impacts from students using the entrances/exits during the night-time;
- General noise concerns associated with use of the site for student accommodation;
- Inactive facades / entrances providing opportunities for criminal behaviour;
- Levels of CCTV – concerns expressed both too much and too little;

A cumulative table of the issues raised and the response to these is set out in the next Section, Section 3.0.

### 3.0 Response to Issues Raised

Table 3.1: Response to Issues raised by LB Camden

<p><i>Doors - All communal and residential doors will be to BS PAS 23/24 2012. I further require control within the building to be controlled with these doors. This may be off a foyer to restrict further entry into the building and at each floor to achieve the same control.</i></p>	<p><b>Communal doors:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>The proposed main entrance from Cartwright Gardens will be manned 24 hours a day. It will be made up of two large circle-slide lobby doors with a DDA compliant automatic pass door to one side. These doors will permit free access during daytime hours and will be secured and subject to electronic fob/card access control beyond these times.</b></li><li>• <b>Beyond this the inner entrance area will also feature dedicated swipe card access pedestrian security lanes (fitted with anti-tailgate sensors and audible alarm) which will prevent unauthorised persons to enter the communal entrance lounge undetected.</b></li><li>• <b>Furthermore the circulation cores (where access to residential floors above is provided) and all other areas that connect directly to the communal amenity spaces will require swipe card access to enter. This will prevent unauthorised visitors to gain access to student rooms and / or other facilities. (Please see further commentary on Routes within Building below).</b></li><li>• <b>Doors into the secure circulation cores will be PAS 24 certified.</b></li><li>• <b>Once onto a residential floor, access into the communal corridors will again be by access card through a PAS 24 certified door (complying with section 24 communal doorset standards).</b></li></ul>
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	<p><b>Student Rooms:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All student rooms will have a solid core laminated timber door fitted with an electronic fob/card access control system.</li> <li>• All bedroom doors will feature an integrated one way spy hole (where necessary a dual height or telescopic variant will be included for accessible rooms). The statutory fire protection requirements and enhanced sound performance criteria (through BREEAM) applied to the student room door design will provide an inherently robust installation.</li> <li>• In response to further feedback from the Crime Prevent Design Advisor the applicant is looking into testing the performance of the bedroom doors to the BS PAS 24-2012 standard.</li> </ul> <p><b>Other External Entrances:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All external entrances and exits around the site will be covered by CCTV and fire escape exits alarmed with local sounders and integral system notifications delivered at the security desk and management office.</li> </ul> <p>Please also see response to comments on routes within the building (below) and the enclosed drawing (Refs: A10417 D1099, A10417 D1100, A10417 D1102).</p>
<p><i>Windows - All accessible and opening windows will also be to BS PAS 23/24 2012.</i></p>	<p><b>All accessible and opening windows at ground, lower ground and within reach of an assisted individual will be attack resistant to BS PAS 23/24 2012.</b></p>
<p><i>Will there be individual access control for visitors? If so this should be audio and video.</i></p>	<p><b>There will not be individual access control for the main block or Hughes Parry Tower. It is anticipated that visitors will contact occupants via mobile phone.</b></p>

	<p>Any visitors would not be allowed to proceed beyond the security barrier without being signed in by a student.</p> <p>All bedroom doors will be fitted with a peephole.</p> <p>The townhouses to Sandwich street will be fitted with a communal intercom with peephole to the front door.</p>
<p><i>Avoid recess. Dead ground should be controlled. This can be achieved with fencing gating or planters.</i></p>	<p>The proposals seek to replace the broken perimeter of the existing buildings on site with a consistent and uninterrupted perimeter that increases the level of natural surveillance and active frontages.</p> <p>Around the perimeter of the building the lightwell railings will be reinstated.</p> <p>Dead ground will be minimised, and only occurs at the service road access. Secure fencing and gating will be provided.</p>
<p><i>I was informed that there would be vehicle gating. This should be as close to the building line as possible to reduce the recess. A height of 2.5m in height to the full width of the opening is required. A fob control would be appropriate.</i></p>	<p>The gating is proposed on the building line and to a height of 2.5m above ground. The gates will be controlled by audio / visual intercom linked to the main security desk for control.</p>
<p><i>Lighting of the site should be to a uniform level and BS 5489.</i></p>	<p>The lighting will be uniform and will meet <b>BS5489</b></p>
<p><i>Routes within the building should be controlled with fob activated doors. Two mag lock (if used) should be fitted.</i></p>	<p>It is proposed that fobs will be issued to building users. The fobs will be hierarchically programmed to allow movement within the building to a designated route. Each fob can be individually programmed to restrict access to different parts of the building (communal, back of house and residential floors) as required.</p> <p>Entrance Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As abovementioned, the main Cartwright Gardens entrance will be 24 hour manned. These doors will permit free access during daytime hours and will be secured</li> </ul>

and subject to electronic fob/card access control beyond these times.

- The inner entrance area will also feature dedicated swipe card access pedestrian security lanes (fitted with anti-tailgate sensors and audible alarm) preventing unauthorised persons to enter the communal entrance lounge undetected.
- Inside the main entrance, the security desk will have unimpeded views of the street immediately outside the building, the entrance doors, the reception area and the communal amenity lounges at ground floor level. It will have access into the entrance lounge to ensure ease of management.
- The entrances and adjacent lounges will all be monitored by recorded CCTV.
- All external entrances and exits around the site will be covered by CCTV and fire escape exits alarmed with local sounders and integral system notifications delivered at the security desk and management office.

**Circulation cores:**

- The circulation cores (where access to residential floors above is provided) and all other areas that connect directly to the communal amenity spaces will require swipe card access to enter. This will mitigate the opportunity for unauthorised visitors to gain access to student rooms and / or other facilities.
- Doors into the secure circulation

**cores will be PAS 24 certified. Once onto a residential floor, access into the communal corridors will again be by access card through a PAS 24 certified door (complying with section 24 communal doorset standards).**

- **Lifts will be controlled by fob activated locks on doors to gain entry to the lift.**

**Residential Floors:**

- **All student rooms will have a solid core laminated timber door fitted with an electronic fob/card access control system.**
- **In response further feedback from the Crime Prevent Design Advisor the applicant is investigating subdividing residential corridors on each floor to further restrict the number of bedrooms a person potentially has access to on each floor.**
- **All bedroom doors will feature an integrated one way spy hole (where necessary a dual height or telescopic variant will be included for accessible rooms).**
- **The statutory fire protection requirements and enhanced sound performance criteria (through BREEAM) applied to the student room door design will provide an inherently robust installation.**
- **These measures combined with the metal kickplate at low level and the high level of natural surveillance (high density of student rooms per floor) create a very low likelihood of a sustained and successful attack on a student room door.**

	<p><b>Overall, a person entering a student room will be required to pass through up to five levels of electronic access control, in addition to the management security presence at the reception desk.</b></p>
<p><i>I was informed that there would be parking for 200 bicycles. This should be separated out to a lesser number to prevent access and theft to all 200 bikes.</i></p> <p><i>Further comments following 10<sup>th</sup> April – the number of cycles a person has access to should be limited.</i></p>	<p><b>There will be parking for 600 cycles on site. This will be provided in a secure lower-ground storage facility.</b></p> <p><b>Access into the store is by single entrance from Cartwright Gardens that will be controlled by student swipe card. The number of entrances has been reduced during the design evolution in response to previous comments from the Crime Prevention Design Advisor.</b></p> <p><b>The entrance door will be to BS PAS 24-2012, self-closing and locking. It will be bolstered by CCTV monitoring that leads back to the main 24 hour reception / security desk.</b></p> <p><b>The storage will be provided by double height Josta racks complete with integrated locking loops for individual cycle locks to be fitted (by the cycle owner).</b></p> <p><b>It is currently proposed that the store will be subdivided into clusters of 50-100 bikes. The subdivision will be via lockable security cages that run floor to ceiling and operated by student swipe cards.</b></p> <p><b>In response to further feedback from the Crime Prevent Design Advisor the applicant is investigating the feasibility of further sub-dividing the bike access. However, the feasibility is compromised by the policy requirement to provide 600 bicycle spaces in the available space.</b></p>
<p><i>Status of perimeter fencing in park – requires clarity over whether this would be repaired/refurbished and remain;</i></p>	<p><b>The fencing around the park will be refurbished and where new gates are to be included these will feature mechanical locking mechanisms</b></p>
<p><i>Street furniture in the park should be easily</i></p>	<p><b>The benches to the park will be fixed with</b></p>

<p><i>removable in the event they are abused;</i></p>	<p><b>security release bolts to allow them to be removed by the halls management team / local authority in conjunction</b></p>
<p><i>Planting in park should be low to maintain surveillance;</i></p>	<p><b>The general landscaping proposals are for low level grasses and small scale flora. Views across the park and through the space are key to the design intent.</b></p>
<p><i>Location of access control doors to be fitted to limit access within the building;</i></p>	<p><b>Please also see response to comments above and the enclosed drawing (Refs: A10417 D1099, A10417 D1100, A10417 D1102).</b></p>
<p><i>Extent of removal of existing exterior security features (Security vanes, metal cages on lightwell windows, perimeter fencing etc) and what will be installed in its place (including standards of security products);</i></p>	<p><b>The proposals comprise the demolition of the existing Canterbury (including York) and Commonwealth Halls, and the demolition of Hughes Parry Hall podium element. The existing features on these buildings will therefore be removed with the building.</b></p> <p><b>The existing lightwells will be retained around the new built form. It is proposed that railings around the perimeter of the building will be reinstated. Moreover, the lightwells will be monitored by motion sensitive CCTV (monitored at the security desk 24/7) around the entirety of the perimeter.</b></p> <p><b>As such any unauthorised entry into the lightwells will be recognised and acted on quickly.</b></p> <p><b>In addition, as abovementioned, all windows will be attack resistant to BS PAS 23/24 2012. This will provide resistance for up to 30 mins sustained attack.</b></p>
<p><i>Each bedroom door and each communal door to be to BS PAS 23/24 2012.</i></p>	<p><b>Please also see response to comments above and the enclosed drawing (Refs: A10417 D1099, A10417 D1100, A10417 D1102).</b></p> <p><b>Following the meeting of 10 April 2013 the applicant is investigating the potential to test the proposed door to the BS PAS 24-</b></p>

	<b>2012 standard.</b>
<i>Delivery of Student Post and Mail.</i>	<p><b>It is proposed that all mail will be delivered to the 24 hour manned reception desk and distributed into lockable post boxes placed on the secure side of the pedestrian security lanes.</b></p> <p><b>A dedicated secure parcel room managed by security staff has been included behind the reception desk.</b></p>

### ***Sandwich Street Townhouse Access***

As set out above, access arrangements to the Sandwich Street townhouses has been an area of concern raised by the surrounding community, and ward councillors who represent them. The applicant has sought to negotiate a design solution which balances the concerns of residents and Camden's design officers, whom have advised that their preference from an urban design and to facilitate natural surveillance would be for individual accesses to each of the townhouses along Sandwich Street.

Consequently, the proposals provide for restricted Sandwich Street access during night-time hours, with alternative access through the site, from Cartwright Gardens.

Discussions in respect to the proposed entrances are ongoing and the applicant is in the process of setting up a meeting with LB Camden Officers and ward councillors to determine a fixed position on entrance arrangements.

### ***Student Management Plan***

Alongside the design based principles set out within this Crime Impact Assessment there will be a commitment from the University to an enhanced pastoral care team with clear responsibilities for the welfare and the behaviour of students, supported by increased levels of experienced and trained staff from URSL. Full details of the partnership approach to student management and community liaison is set out within the draft Student Management Plan, submitted as part of the package of application requirements and to be secured in its final form through a Section 106.

## 4.0 Secure by Design Principles

Access and Movement	
Have the consequences and nature of all connections been considered?	The underlying architectural principle for the redevelopment of the Garden Halls is to repair the urban block that makes up the halls site. By establishing a continuous and defensible line located close to the site boundary, the proposed buildings will physically restrict access onto and across the site. Connections to the wider area have been considered and entrances / exits located appropriately.
Do all routes lead to somewhere people want to go? Are all routes necessary?	There are no proposed alterations to the existing pedestrian and cycle routes to the site from the main transport hubs that lead people safely to the proposed main entrance or Townhouse entrances on Sandwich Street.
Do routes provide potential offenders with ready and unnoticed access to potential targets?	No. The proposals deliberately set out to avoid niches, alleyways and other potential hiding places for potential offenders. Where the service road bisects the proposals secure gating on the building line has been introduced to avoid the opportunity for loitering. A defined, well lit, clearly visible and manned main entrance enhances the safety of the site as well as increasing the opportunity for natural surveillance.
Are routes for different users segregated when they could be integrated?	All routes around the development are outside the site boundary. A new cycle lane is being proposed as part of the public realm improvement works; this has been designed to be strategically integrated.
Will pedestrians, cyclists and drivers be able to understand which routes they should use?	As mentioned above there are no proposed alterations to the existing pedestrian / cycle routes to the site. The proposals reduce on-site vehicular parking to zero.
Is it easy to understand how to travel through an area?	The pedestrian routes into the site are legible and clearly defined by the site's setting as well as being emphasised by the mass, scale and orientation of the buildings proposed



**Structure**

Have the types of building been selected and designed with security in mind?	As mentioned above, the overriding principle for the regeneration of the site is to provide a safe and secure perimeter to the site with buildings that front onto the street in order to maximise natural surveillance of all sides of the site.
Is the layout of the development appropriate for the identified crime risk, as well as to meet wider planning objectives?	The development layout has been designed to provide a single communal safe point of entry for the vast majority of the occupants. Several smaller townhouses along Sandwich Street reflect the more domestic nature of this street and include entrances to provide 'active frontages' in line with the wider planning objectives set out in LBC Planning Guidance (CPG1) section 9.7.
Will all uses in an area be compatible and have potential conflicts been thoroughly thought through?	The site as existing is used for Student Accommodation and ancillary University Activities. These are not proposed to be altered, however the position of the non-residential facilities have been designed to enhance the wider context and increase natural surveillance where necessary
Does all public space serve a purpose and support an appropriate level of legitimate activity?	The refurbished park is the only publically accessible area of the proposals. It is intended to provide an area of open green space that includes sporting facilities as well as open lawned areas for relaxation. The park will be monitored by the facilities management of the halls as well as being locked between dusk and dawn. The benches proposed within the landscape will be removable to discourage unwanted loitering (in line with advise from LBC parks and gardens department)
Has the remodelling, removal or re-use of buildings and spaces that are vulnerable to crime been considered?	Yes. The area to the east of Hughes Parry Hall has been deliberately re-developed to provide a physical boundary to the site extents in order to minimise the opportunity for anti-social behaviour.
Have the potential benefits for crime prevention of restoring historic environments been considered?	The proposals seek to return the site to a complete perimeter block, which re-establishes the Georgian design intent that was evident prior to the inclusion of the mid-century university buildings

## Surveillance

Are opportunities for surveillance from the subject and adjacent buildings maximised?	As mentioned above the proposals seek to provide an outward facing perimeter block that provides natural surveillance to all the surrounding streets as well as the internal courtyards. The close proximity and predominant residential nature of the area mean that the site will also benefit from surveillance from adjacent buildings
Will those most likely to observe any criminal or anti-social behaviour respond appropriately?	The site will be monitored by roving 24 hour security as well as CCTV in any non-publically accessible areas. The neighbouring residents will also be provided with contact details for the management staff at the halls of residence.
Are both of the above true at all times of the day, week and year?	Yes. These conditions apply at all times.
Have efforts been made to eliminate 'inactive' frontages and corners?	Yes. The perimeter is predominantly active at ground level and above. Where there is a break in the perimeter (to provide service access into the site) a gate on the building line prevents unauthorised access. This area also benefits from fenestration allowing natural surveillance of the inactive frontage.
Where appropriate, such as in public buildings, does the design allow for high visibility into the building or site?	The main entrance, the ground floor flexible university space (to Leigh Street) and the student amenity space (to Sandwich Street) all have high intervisibility with the street. The ground floor bedrooms are at a raised level along Cartwright Gardens (the main thoroughfare) in order to provide an increased level of privacy.
Are cars highly visible but secure?	The proposals do not allow for cars to be parked on site or within close proximity. There is no alteration in the proposed on-street car parking which benefits from heightened natural surveillance as a result of the proposals
Has lighting been a primary consideration in designing out crime?	Yes. The lighting responds to British standards and will be low maintenance and where publically accessible fittings will also be resistant to vandalism
Is CCTV the best way to solve the particular problem and is it the most effective use of resources?	CCTV will be introduced in the lightwells that surround the proposals. This the most appropriate way of monitoring these spaces (that will only have access for maintenance). The CCTV will be monitored 24/7 at the main security / reception desk. Any unauthorised access will be readily recognised and responded to.
Is the CCTV part of a wider package of crime prevention measures?	It is envisaged that the windows / metal panelled openings within the lower ground and ground floor will be attack resistant to physically bolster the security provided by the CCTV monitoring. This item requires further discussion with the crime prevention officer
Will the resources be in place to maintain the CCTV system, including staff to monitor and respond to the pictures in future years?	The manned security desk and facilities management procedures / agreements are set out in the student management plan which will be submitted alongside the application.

### Ownership

Will it be clear to users - including potential offenders and capable guardians which space is public, communal, semi private and private?	The perimeter block will readily define the difference between public and private spaces. Secure access controls at the main entrances will define the transition from public to communal private areas and further security measures at floor entrances / corridor doors will define private areas. The publically accessible park will clearly be signposted as for public use only and will be locked so as to restrict access between dusk and dawn.
Are the boundaries between public, communal and private space signified in the most appropriate manner, be it a physical barrier or psychological barrier such as changes in paving, surface texture/ colour, landscaping and signage?	Yes. In the majority of instances railings that match the predominant Georgian railings that define the conservation area are used.
Will the place have an identity of its own?	Yes. The garden halls will provide a strong and unified identity to Cartwright Gardens and its surrounds.
Will barriers be of a high quality design in their detailing and appropriate to their context?	The barriers will be sympathetic to the surrounding examples of Georgian railings

### Physical Protection

Have the target hardening principles of secure by design been addressed?	Yes the target hardening principles of secure by design have been addressed.
Has the potentially negative visual impact of crime prevention measures been addressed and, where these cannot be ameliorated by good design, have the advantages been weighed against their adverse impacts?	Yes the design has been developed to incorporate robust security measures whilst retaining architectural and visual quality.

**Activity**


Will as many law abiding people as possible be attracted to use the public realm??	Yes. Providing public access to a new sports facility and a refurbished urban green space in close proximity to an international transit hub will ensure public attraction as well as a heightened level of natural surveillance
Is there a strategy for encouraging residential population in town centres?	This does not form part of the proposals.
Should the evening economy be nurtured and if so is it diverse and inclusive?	This does not form part of the proposals.
Will what attracts people to the public realm uphold its attractiveness?	The newly accessible gardens will be maintained as part of the halls redevelopment and day to day maintenance.
Are all uses in an area compatible and have potential conflicts been thoroughly addressed?	Yes. All proposed uses in the site and the public realm improvements are compatible with not only student-centric activities but also the local community
Are mixed uses successfully integrated with one another?	Yes. The proposed mix of uses are integrated and will be managed by the university

**Management and Maintenance**

Has care been taken to create a good quality public realm?	Yes. The proposals have been developed through extensive consultation of the relevant statutory bodies, residents groups and key stakeholders.
Are appropriate facilities management systems in place? Does the design and layout support these?	Yes. The proposals have been developed alongside the end-user (facilities management service provider) and are outlined in the student management plan.
Are users, businesses and residents involved in management?	Yes. As part of the proposed Student Management Plan there will be a forum for local residents / interested parties and key stakeholders to provide feedback to the facilities management and university.







**LEGEND**

- - - RAILINGS AROUND PERIMETER. GENERALLY BETWEEN 1.5 & 2M
- BARBED OR RAZOR WIRE OR SIMILAR TO WALLS / TOP OF RAILINGS
- RAILINGS WITH CURVED / TURNED TOPS TO PREVENT CLIMBING (GENERALLY WITH BRICK PLINTH BELOW)
- RAILINGS WITH ANTI-CLIMB PAINT (WHERE SIGNPOSTED)
- WINDOWS AT LOWERGROUND BARRED
- C CCTV CAMERA VISIBLE FROM STREET
- MD MANNED SECURITY DESK
- AC ACCESS CONTROL POINT REQUIRING SWIPE CARD / CODE / CALL BUTTON (AUDIO ONLY)
- F SECURE FIRE ESCAPE
- S SECURE SERVICE ROUTE
- POTENTIAL AREA OF SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL INTEREST (SEE ANNOTATION)
- ⊙ PHOTOGRAPH REFERENCE AND DIRECTION REFER TO DRAWING A10417C1002

CLIENT  
 STRUCTURAL ENGINEER  
 SERVICES ENGINEER  
 CONSULTANT  
 KEY PLAN

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P1 10.04.13 -First Issue	EG NM
No.   Date   Comment	Drawn   Check

Issue Status  
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**University of London**  
 Cartwright Gardens, London

Drawing Title  
**Existing Plans**  
**Ground Floor Plan**  
**Existing Security Measures**

Drawn 09.04.13	Date 09.04.13	Scale @ A1/A3 1:500 / 1000
tp bennett Project No. <b>A10417</b>		Drawing Number <b>C 1001</b>
Rev <b>P1</b>		





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
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
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P1	10.04.13	First Issue	EG	NM
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
Drawing Title

Existing Plans  
Ground Floor Plan  
Existing Security Measures: Photo


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A10417	C 1002	P1	



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SANDWICH STREET



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- ▨ AREA MONITORED BY CCTV (ACTIVATED BY MOVEMENT SENSORS). CCTV TO BE FED BACK TO 24 HOUR RECEPTION / SECURITY DESK
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- ▨ WINDOWS / PANELS / OPENINGS TO BE ATTACK RESISTANT TO BS PAS 23/24 STANDARD
- - - RAILINGS AROUND PERIMETER. GENERALLY 1.2M (EXCEPT AT HPT PERIMETER. 1.5M & GARDENS 1.5M)

RAILINGS TO GARDENS TO BE REFURBISHED WITH ADDITIONAL GATES ADDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LANDSCAPE PLANS. GATES WILL INCLUDE MECHANICAL LOCKING MECHANISM

CARTWRIGHT GARDENS

CLEAR PEDESTRIAN ROUTE ALONG PROPOSED NEW PATHWAY

PLANTING WITHIN GARDENS TO BE DELIBERATELY LOW LEVEL IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLEAR SIGHT LINES INTO AND OUT OF THE GARDENS AS PART OF DESIGN INTENT / SECURE BY DESIGN PRINCIPLES

P1	10.04.13	FIRST ISSUE	EG	NM
No.	Date	Comment	Drawn	Chk'd
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
Project  
**Proposed**  
**University of London**  
**Cartwright Gardens, London**

Drawing Title  
**Proposed Security Plans**  
**Ground Floor Plan**

Drawn	Date	Scale @ A1/A3	Alt. Ref.
EHG	nov 2012	1:200/1:400	--
tp bennett Project No.	Drawing Number	Rev	
<b>A10417</b>	<b>D 1100</b>	<b>P1</b>	



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
Drawing Title  
**Proposed Security Plans**  
**Lower Ground Floor Plan**

Drawn	Date	Scale @ A1/A3	Alt. Ref.
EHG	nov 2012	1:200/1:400	--

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**Second & Third Floor Plan**

Drawn	Date	Scale @ A1/A3	Alt. Ref.
EHG	nov 2012	1:200/1:400	--

tp bennett Project No.	Drawing Number	Rev
<b>A10417</b>	<b>D 1102</b>	<b>P1</b>