

# SAVILLE THEATRE 135 SHAFTESBURY AVENUE

Crime Impact Assessment (CIA) QCIC-03692-07001d

QCIC





# Opera PM Former Saville Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue

Crime Impact Assessment (CIA)

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# 1.0 Introduction

This Crime Impact Assessment (CIA) is provided in support of the planning application for the former Saville Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue development.

Where the development exceeds the physical limits of the building demise and extends into the public realm the contents of this assessment shall include crime prevention strategies for all areas considered to be under the stewardship of the operator / owner of the planned development.

Notwithstanding the legal limitations that would restrict the use of personnel or systems or exceed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation or interventions within the security operators limits of authority.

A Security Needs Assessment (SNA) report as referenced below has been prepared and issued to provide guidance to the design team on the areas requiring greater focus for hardening and technical systems in support of the overall security design.

▶ QCIC-03692-01001b - Saville Theatre SNA Report

The above document helps to identify appropriate security mitigations to reduce the impacts of identified risks.

### 1.1 Objective

In keeping with the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), London Plan and Camden Planning Policy, the following Crime Impact Assessment provides an outline approach to how the project will take steps to deter crime by:

- Reduce the ease of identification of vulnerable assets or material
- Make it harder to commit a crime without detection
- Make it easier to identify a criminal act
- Reduce the likelihood of escape without detection
- Increase the likelihood of being successfully prosecuted
- Reduce the impacts of terrorism and unlawful acts of violence

During the delivery of the RIBA Stage 2 development pre & post planning, the introduction of information from risk assessments or Security Needs Assessments and their recommendations shall be used to determine the most actionable risks and vulnerabilities of the proposed development.

The recommendations will provide measurable implementation opportunities for physical, technical, and operational overlays to improve the security profile of the completed development which will in turn reduce the opportunity and fear of crime or antisocial behaviours.

Where terrorism is indicated to be a potential direct or indirect threat to the development appropriate improvements to vehicle management, façade glazing systems, hostile vehicle mitigation, and lockdown incident management strategies will be developed.

### 1.1.1 National Planning Policy Framework

In conjunction with Section 8 (Clause 102a & Clause 102b) of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) the Crime Impact Assessment (CIA) and Security Needs Assessment (SNA) will identify threats that could have a detrimental effect on the development and its associated users.

These threats (as outlined within Section 3 of the SNA) will be derived using online statistical crime data published on behalf of the Metropolitan Police (Police UK - <u>Home | Police.uk (www.police.uk)</u>).

Upon review, appropriate and proportionate security recommendations will be outlined for incorporation (per Section 5 of the SNA) that if implemented will aim to reduce the threats and vulnerabilities identified, increase resilience, and ensure that public safety and security is maintained overall.



# 1.2 Reference Material

Plan details referenced within this report has been based around the design freeze information published by SPARRC on 24<sup>th</sup> January 2025.



# 2.0 Project overview and development description

# 2.1 Development Description

The former Saville Theatre at 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue is a grade II listed building. It was built in 1930-1931 as a three-level theatre and opened in 1931. The building was designed by architect T.P Bennett & Son. The building was damaged during the blitz in 1941 but later restored.

In the 1960's, the Theatre was bought by Brian Epstein and opened as a music venue in 1966, hosting artists such as The Who, Jimmi Hendrix and Elton John. After Brian Epstein's death in 1967, The Saville hosted shows created by Cameron Mackintosh.

In 1970, the Building opened as a two-screen ABC Cinema. It was subsequently acquired by Cannon Cinemas as part of a takeover in 1986, which then folded into the MGM chain in 1992. The Site was taken over by Odeon in 2001 as a four-screen cinema, and the layout that is visible today.

The Site is an island site, bordered by Shaftesbury Avenue to the south, St Giles Passage to the east, Stacey Street to the west, and New Compton Street to the south.

The Site is not located within a Conservation Area but abuts the Denmark Street Conservation Area to the north, and the Seven Dials Conservation Area to the south.

The Site has excellent connectivity with a Public Transport Accessibility Level ("PTAL") of 6b, which is the highest possible PTAL score and is defined as 'excellent'. Key transport facilities in the vicinity of the Site include Tottenham Court Road Underground Station, Covent Garden Station and many bus routes.

The Applicant acquired the Site in October 2021. After commissioning a survey of its condition, it was discovered that the building is currently in a poor state of repair, having suffered from corrosion-related damage (also known as 'Regent Street Disease').

### 2.2 Development Overview

The security risk profile of the former Saville Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue is aligned to that of similar mixed retail and commercial office development within Holborn And Covent Garden.

The immediate area surrounding the development has been assessed for Crime, Terrorism and any identifiable active groups that may threaten the project directly or general activities that form the ambient safety and security condition of the local environment, although the risk profile of the development will ultimately be influenced by future users, occupants, and tenants (yet to be identified) and as the development evolves over time.

### 2.2.1 Location Profile

The former St. Martin's Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue is located within the area of Holborn and Covent Garden. Surrounded by other developments of a similar nature – such as Phoenix Theatre (100m away), Palace Theatre (143m away), St. Matin's Theatre (160m away) and Cambridge Theatre (130m away).





The area is akin to entertainment hubs and likely to attract a bustling night life crowed.

There are also multiple bars, restaurants, and hotels nearby. Tottenham Court Road station is 245m away and Holborn station slightly further at 650m away, north-west of the development.

During generation of the Security Needs Assessment (SNA) QCIC noted a moderate level of footfall around the immediate area of the development, however, as well as a perceived negative impact it also means that there will be greater passive and natural surveillance by people particularly walking through the area during commercial and office hours.

### 2.2.2 Proposed Development Use

The proposed development will compromise of part demolition, restoration and refurbishment of the existing Grade II listed building, roof extension, and excavation of basement space, to provide a theatre at lower levels, with ancillary restaurant / bar space (Sui Generis) at ground floor level; and hotel (Class C1) at upper levels; provision of ancillary cycle parking, servicing and rooftop plant, and other associated works.



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Figure 1: Proposed ground level floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

The Theatre Foyer (1) is accessible from the main entrance along Shaftesbury Avenue, where a box office space (2) is strategically located to greet theatre visitors which supports natural surveillance. The Theatre basement levels, excluding the Auditorium Technical level, are accessible via a set of stairs (3), two passenger lifts (4) and two cores (5), the cores are likely to be used as the emergency escape route. A sliding door separates the Theatre Bar (6) from the Theatre Foyer. A publicly accessible lavatory (7) and a bar store (8) are accessed from the publicly accessible Theatre Bar.

The CM Entry (9) hotel entrance accessed from New Compton Street leads to the front of house hotel lobby providing access to a luggage store (10), two guest lifts (11) and a stair core (12) which serves hotel guest floors, the core is likely to be used for an emergency escape route.

The hotel loading lobby (13), accessible from New Compton Street, provides access to the hotel bins store (14), a CM office (15), the front of house hotel guest lobby and the service lift (16) for staff and cycle use of the hotel levels.

A theatre bins store (17) is accessible both internally and externally from New Compton Street, providing access to a goods lift (18) which serves the theatre basement levels one, two and three. A goods / cycle lift (19), serving all basement levels, is accessible both internally from the Stage Door (20) and externally from New Compton Street.



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Figure 2: Basement mezzanine level floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

The basement mezzanine level primarily comprises of MEP plant (21), the level also includes a theatre use cycle store (22), changing rooms (23) lobbied off and planned to be accessed from the cycle / goods lift (19). A meeting room (24) and staff welfare (25) is lobbied off. Accessed from the management staff offices (26) are: individual offices spaces (27), Usher + Security break room (28) Artist management office (29) and House management office (30).

The foyer (31) and lift lobby (32), accessible by theatre visitors, provide access to the merchandise space, cloak room and circulation lobby.



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Figure 3: Auditorium technical level floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

The Auditorium Technical Level is accessible from the cycle / goods lift and adjacent core, the space is assumed to be back of house. A technical room (33), auditorium Catwalks (34) and Winch rooms (35) are accessible on this level.





Figure 4: Basement level 1 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

The basement level one features the entrance to the highest level of seating of the auditorium and includes a technical auditorium viewing area (36), amenities, including a bar (37) and a quiet/faith room (38) accessible from the foyer staircase (3) or passenger lifts (4). A crew room (39), back of house spaces (40) are accessible back of house circulation.





Figure 5: Basement level 2 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

Basement level 2 is similar in design to the previous level, providing access to the lower auditorium level, bar & store (41) adjacent to the kitchen (42), green room / breakroom (43), warm up (44) and physio spaces (45) are via the back of house areas.





Figure 6: Basement level 3 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

Basement level 3 is similar in design to the previous level, providing access to the lowest theatre level facilities via the back of house areas. It is noted that theatre space and BOH spaces are separated on all theatre levels apart from this level where BOH is accessible via the backstage area (46).





Figure 7: Basement level 4 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

Basement level 4 provides access to utilities and storage space for both the theatre and hotel. There are multiple points of entry and exit which are from passenger lifts (4) BOH theatre stairs (47), stair cores (5) and a cycle / goods lift (19). Back of house corridors allow the under-stage area (48) and dressing rooms (49) to be access for the theatre use.





Figure 8: Level 01 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

The primary means of access to the hotel space is via the hotel lifts (11) for guests and the service lift (50) for staff. Hotel floors are also accessible via either of the two shared cores (12) which will most likely be used as the emergency escape route. The hotel lifts (11) has a dual function, the one as a fireman's lift and the adjacent an evacuation lift. The hotel lifts (11) are available on hotel floors but does not have access theatre floors below. Office Space (51) and hotel long stay cycle storage (52) are available on this level.





Figure 9: Level 03 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

Level 3 hotel floor is similar in design to the previous levels with a difference of having a back of house hotel operator space (53) which has been lobbied off.





Figure 10: Level 05 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

The level 5 hotel floor provides hotel guests hotel front of house (54) and food & beverage accommodations (55) proposed to be fit out by others.





Figure 11: Typical Hotel Level floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

The Typical hotel levels 6-9 primarily consist of hotel bedroom accommodation and are accessed as previously mentioned.



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Figure 12: Level 10 floor plan (Source: SPPARC)

Level 10 primarily comprises of roof plant and services, accessible from the stair central core (5).



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Figure 13: Roof level floor plan (Source: SPPARC)



# 3.0 Security Design Approach

To develop appropriate design modifications to create the crime prevention approach and development profile, appropriate to the threat and vulnerabilities of the development, the following considerations will be implemented during the design development stages. These will include use of police crime prevention, statistical resources, and advisory materials as well as reference to local Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO) and Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA).

A meeting was conducted on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2022 with the MET Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) representing Physical Security Operations in the Lambeth ward. Minutes noting recommendations have been referenced within supporting documentation (ref. QCIC – 03692 – 09001a – CTSA Engagement for Saville Theatre and Hotel).

This report or associated minutes with the CTSA should not be submitted for planning purposes and should remain out of the public domain.

### 3.1 Next Steps

In conjunction with the Security Design Consultant the Professional Team will be engaged to target those risks identified which fall above an actionable level. The following techniques and measures will be considered during the Stage 2 Post-Planning Design and Stage 3 Strategic Design Development with the design and cost approval of the Employers Representative or Responsible Person from an informed position of risk and mitigation options.

- > Provide greater levels of difficulty in obtaining access to areas beyond the public realm
  - $\circ$   $\quad$  Use of certified intrusion resistant door and window schemes
  - Use of access controls with anti-tailgating features (where possible)
  - Provision of cycle parking schemes providing multiple locking and anchor points
  - o Overlay security systems to alert security operations of potential incidents
  - Where appropriate restrict vehicular access to pedestrian or inner building facilities
- Increate deterrents to crime by:-
  - Using clear demarcation techniques indicating demise boundaries
  - Providing greater levels of natural surveillance through liaison with landscaping
  - Reduce areas of concealment and dead space to discourage loitering
  - o Improving head level visible or covert night-time lighting if appropriate
  - o Increasing the likelihood of failure of an attempted criminal act
  - Reducing the potential profitability of crime
  - o Increasing likelihood of being caught and successfully prosecuted.
- ► Use of Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) to capture:
  - Context and understanding
  - o Surveillance for proactive intervention
  - o Identification of crime
  - $\circ$  Prosecution of criminals.
- Incident management strategies providing:
  - Operational overlay supported by the physical and technology solutions provisioned
  - o Identification of incidents and provision of operational & technical solutions



- o Protective glazing measures to reduce injury from flying glass
- Lock down systems and strategies
- Reduction of onward progress to limit damage or injury.
- ► Reduce crime using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principals

The security design approach above is reliant upon the provision or appropriate commissioning of a suitably experienced security professional with appropriate years of security design and development credentials and in this instance, QCIC are instructed to advise the design team and the Applicant on the security considerations.





# 4.0 Crime Prevention Strategies

# 4.1 Operational Management

A well-defined and executed security strategy encompasses the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and where possible utilises the principles of the Secure by Design (SBD) initiative, whilst also acknowledging that security is not only about physical or electronic measures alone, but operational management as well. The combination of physical, electronic, and operational measures helps support the development and encourage the community to have a sense of pride and ownership which in turn strengthens the security regime to deter, delay, detect and respond to potential incidents. A well operated and maintained development with a quality operational management team can be a positive influence on the safety and security of the development.

# 4.2 Access and Connectivity

The needs of user's movement around a development have been carefully considered and balanced to ensure that security is maintained for everyone using the space.

# 4.3 Surveillance

Appropriate levels of surveillance, sensitive to the users and intended development function, will be applied to the security design. This will be achieved through a balance of natural and active surveillance (video surveillance systems – VSS). The optimisation of natural surveillance, where space is naturally overlooked by users and occupiers, has the increased benefit of reducing the need for active measures whilst remaining an excellent deterrent to crime within that space.

# 4.4 Structure and Spatial Arrangements

Conflict between users can occur within a development where there is no clear designated purpose for a space. Access to, and circulation within, the buildings is clearly defined by function and type. Where there are shared back of house areas, these have defined user groups and clear delineation where shared areas become private.

# 4.5 Ownership and Activity

Safety and security of a development is enhanced where there is a clear understanding of what space is to be used for - its primary activity - and where a sense of ownership is fostered. The development has been designed to be welcoming to legitimate users for the logistics hub.

# 4.6 Physical Protection

Physical protection of assets within the development will be as identified through the security needs assessment or in accordance with any other pertinent planning principles (i.e. Secured by Design (SbD).

### 4.7 Adaptability

Safety and security of a development is enhanced where there is adaptability within the space to manage changes in security needs. In the case of this development, a layered approach has been adopted by using multiple layers of security measures coupled with a programmable access control solution that can be modified to suit future requirements whether monitored off/off the development.



# 5.0 Security Design Components

The crime prevention strategies outlined in section 4, require the architectural design to be developed alongside specific physical, electronic, and operational security measures. These will be specified in accordance with local and International design standards and best practice, and where justifiable and proportionate, include relevant security ratings.

The development of the designs will take place alongside ongoing stakeholder engagement to ensure the risks are suitably managed and within risk tolerance levels of these different parties.

The security design has considered the use of the following where appropriate:

Electronic Security Systems

- Electronic access control systems, inclusive of the ability to dynamically lockdown parts of the development should the requirement arise
- ► Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) to the control room
- Intruder Detection Systems (IHAS)
- Communications systems (i.e. intercoms) for operators or users to generate an alarm or communicate with security personnel or to key points within the development
- ▶ Lighting to support surveillance (natural and active) as well as illuminate secluded spaces

**Physical Security** 

- Use of laminate glazing as primary and secondary glazing (depending upon location) to mitigate against injury from flying glass shards and fragments in the event of a blast nearby.
- Measures to mitigate anti-social behaviour and support electronic security systems such as VSS
- Access points rated to appropriate physical attack standards
- ▶ Vehicle control measures using a combination of active and passive measures where required.

Operational Management (infrastructure)

Ensure that operational management spaces (i.e. Security Control Room (SCR)) are designed and equipped to accommodate the proposed equipment and operators to meet the operational security needs of the development.



# 6.0 Conclusion

By applying international best practice security design principles such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) the development seeks to achieve the creation of a safe and secure environment. In so doing it aims to meet the requirements for National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), London Plan and Westminster Plan Policy 38.

The provision of a Security Needs Assessment (SNA) report, evidence of engagement with security stakeholders as outlined in BREEAM HEA06 will assist the development achieve the BREEAM credit required.

There are no significant risk issues or threats associated with the development which cannot be mitigated to a residual level of acceptable risk and crime reduction will result in the use of those recommendations to follow.



# 7.0 Appendix - Suitably Qualified Security Specialists (SQSS)





	<b>Pierre Burger</b> B.Eng, PrCert, CEng, MSyl, RISC, MIET <b>Associate Director</b> Direct: 44 (0) 7553 707 763 Pierre.Burger@qcic-group.com
CREDENTIALS	<ul> <li>Chartered Engineer (CEng)</li> <li>Member of the Security Institute (MSyl)</li> <li>Member of the Institution of Engineering and Technology (MIET)</li> <li>Register Independent Security Consultant (RISC)</li> </ul>
QUALIFICATIONS	<ul> <li>Bachelor's Degree in Engineering (University of Pretoria, South Africa)</li> <li>Postgraduate Certificate in Security and Risk Management (University of Leicester, UK)</li> <li>Certificate in Terrorism Studies (University of St Andrews, UK)</li> <li>Various training courses, including hostile vehicle mitigation, counter unmanned aerial systems, blast and ballistic resistance, bioterrorism and cybersecurity</li> </ul>
CAREER HISTORY	<ul> <li>Associate Director (Design) – QCIC Group</li> <li>Director, Security Consultancy – Capita/WSP</li> <li>Security Principal – Hoare Lea and Partners</li> <li>Head of Building Services – Africon Engineering International</li> <li>Founder and Managing Director – AREA Consulting Engineers</li> <li>Founder and Managing Member – Praxis Engineering</li> <li>Junior Engineer – De Beers Consolidated Mines</li> </ul>
SPECIALISATIONS	<ul> <li>Threat and Risk Assessment</li> <li>Security Strategy</li> <li>Operational Requirements</li> <li>Security Audit and Review</li> <li>Security Master Planning</li> <li>Electronic Security Systems Design</li> <li>Physical Security System Design</li> <li>Security Control Room Design</li> <li>Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM)</li> <li>Counter Marauding Attack Design</li> <li>Project Management</li> </ul>
KEY SKILLS & EXPERIENCE	Pierre is a specialist Security Consultant with 33 years' experience in security and counter terrorism consulting, design and project management. He advised private and public sector clients on strategy, risk management, design, project procurement and delivery, and security and emergency operations.







	Gatwick Airport North Terminal Expansion and Interchange
PROJECT 5	Lead Security Consultant
	This group of projects form an integral part of the development of Gatwick Airport to meet passenger and airline growth forecasts and to comply with recent changes to official security standards as instructed by the Department for Transport. It includes the creation of a new landside passenger interchange hub at the North Terminal, parking and drop-off areas, and expansion and modification of the terminal building. Pierre advised on electronic security systems and integration with existing systems.
	UK Government Security Control Centre and PSIM
PROJECT 6	Project Director
	Feasibility study and complete multi-disciplinary design and project supervision of the security control centre, which operates 24/7/365 to monitor several hundred video surveillance cameras, security systems and alarms in the public realm and government buildings.
	Design and specification of the physical security information management (PSIM) system that integrates all surveillance feeds with a wide range of alarms, alerts and system notifications into a single command and control interface.
	British Military Barracks
PROJECT 7	Counter Terrorism Subject Matter Expert
	Review, assess and advise on the existing counter terrorism measures at an existing Army barracks to inform the further development of site. The site comprises a large campus of multiple security areas and a diverse perimeter, including close proximity to publicly accessible spaces, roads and waterways.
PROJECT 8	World Renowned Facility Counter Marauding Attack Mitigation
	Lead Security Consultant
	Operational procedures, design and specification of the counter- marauding attack measures, hostile vehicle mitigation, screening, video surveillance, intruder alarms and access management for the protection of pupils and staff at the visitor centre. The iconic facility in the UK is visited by millions of visitors from all over the world.
	Metropolitan Police CCTV Survey and Compliance Audit
PROJECT 9	Project Director
	Detailed site surveys of the video surveillance installations across more than 200 police stations, custody suites and operational sites across London. The survey included an assessment of the physical infrastructure as well as a formal Data Protection Impact



	Assessment of each of the more than 4,000 video surveillance cameras.
	London-wide CCTV Review and Strategy
PROJECT 10	Project Director
	Detailed review of the video surveillance installations and control rooms across all 32 London boroughs for the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC). Production of a comprehensive set of strategic options for London-wide technical integration, interoperability, monitoring and the use of advanced video surveillance technologies.
	Maritime Defence System
PROJECT 11	Lead Security Consultant
	Design and specification of a marine defence system for the protection of a mission-critical facility against hostile vessel and marauding attacks. Located in a busy international waterway in the UK, the system is required to maintain a secure stand-off distance while minimising the impact on legitimate water traffic.
	Network Rail Counter Terrorism Audit
PROJECT 12	Counter Terrorism Subject Matter Expert
	An internal audit of counter terrorism measures, through site inspections, stakeholder interviews, document reviews and process verification to produce a detailed audit report with clear findings and recommendations.
	East West Rail Solutions Development
PROJECT 13	Physical Security Lead Consultant
	Physical Security Lead within the Solutions Development team, responsible for ensuring the overall aims of the East West Rail project is met and that all processes and designs across the entire railway is coordinated. East West Rail is a major new railway to be constructed between Oxford and Cambridge, linking East Anglia with central, southern and western England.
	Tottenham Hale Station Blast Consultancy
PROJECT 14	Lead Security Consultant
	Blast assessment and mitigation design for the London Underground concourse extension and integration with a parallel project to redevelop the Network Rail facility adjacent to the London Underground station.



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	North East Lincolnshire CCTV Survey
PROJECT 15	Project Director
	Comprehensive site audit and review of the public space video surveillance installation, including communication networks and control facilities across the entire county. Development of a range of costed options for migration to a fully digital system with wireless technology, integration of disparate legacy systems and upgrade of command-and-control facilities.
PROJECT 16	UK Government Office Building Counter Terrorism and Crime Prevention Measures
	Lead Security Consultant
	The project is the refurbishment of the physical and electronic security measures of a government office building, which provides office accommodation to senior office holders and their support staff. Pierre is leading a team of security specialists and designers to establish the Client's operational requirements and to deliver designs of all physical security mitigation measures, including blast protection, intruder resistant façade, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) protection and electronic security systems.
	101 George Street Hostile Vehicle Mitigation
PROJECT 17	Lead Security Consultant
	The project comprises the construction of two modular residential tower buildings of 44 and 38 storeys respectively. It will contain and art gallery, café, business incubator hub, a gym and club rooms.
	Pierre led a team of specialist security consultants to undertake hostile vehicle dynamics assessments to calculate the potential impact characteristics of threat vehicles in order to discharge planning conditions for the scheme.
	College Road Development Hostile Vehicle Mitigation
PROJECT 18	Lead Security Consultant
	The construction of the two modular residential towers will provide 817 co-living units and 120 residential flats in the heart of Croydon in London. The 49-storey co-living tower will include 241 square meters of co-working space, and the entire 34-storey building will be designated for affordable shared ownership. When completed, these will be the tallest modular buildings in the world.
	Pierre led a team of security consultants delivering a threat, vulnerability and risk assessment, hostile vehicle dynamics assessments and the design of vehicle security barriers to



	University City Hostile Vehicle Mitigation		
PROJECT 19	Lead Security Consultant		
	The Local Authority has identified part of the city centre comprising several streets as a pedestrian shopping area which requires vehicle access to be limited to authorised vehicles only.		
	Pierre was appointed to undertake a feasibility study, hostile vehicle dynamics assessments and vehicle security barrier concept design to protect pedestrians against vehicle as a weapon attacks.		
PROJECT 20	Canterbury Combined Court Centre Construction Methodology Review		
	Lead Security Consultant		
	As part of the planning conditions for a new residential development, the secure perimeter of the court complex will be demolished and realigned to allow for the widening of the adjacent public road.		
	Pierre was appointed to review the contractor's construction methodology on behalf of the Ministry of Justice to ensure that the perimeter security remain unaffected, and the courts can operate without interruption throughout the construction process.		
	Public Realm Hostile Vehicle Mitigation		
PROJECT 21	Lead Security Consultant		
	Pierre was appointed by a local authority to develop a hostile vehicle mitigation strategy and design for one of the top regional tourist attractions in England. The public realm space is a crowded waterside promenade popular with international tourists, British holidaymakers and day visitors. Pierre was responsible for undertaking vehicle dynamics assessments and designing a bespoke hostile vehicle mitigation solution that aligns with the landscape and streetscape architecture of the space and enhances the public appeal of the promenade. The design scheme comprises in excess of 100 bollards and a number of different bespoke vehicle security barriers.		
PRO JECT 22	Tottenham Hale Station Blast Consultancy		
	Lead Security Consultant		
	London Underground embarked on a major upgrade of Tottenham Hale station to include a large station concourse extension and integration with a parallel project to redevelop the Network Rail facility adjacent to the London Underground station. Pierre was responsible for client and stakeholder liaison and led the Capita team to deliver specialist blast consultancy, blast assessment and		



	Iconic Performing Arts Venue Hostile Vehicle Mitigation
PROJECT 23	Lead Security Consultant
	The venue is one of the largest performing arts centres in Europe and home to a number of world-famous performing arts companies. It offers a range of performance spaces and cultural events and draws millions of visitors and members of the public every year. Its active programme of performances and events attracts artists and students from across the world. The venue is housed in a complex of iconic buildings and has been identified as a potential target for terrorist attacks, particularly through the use of vehicle borne explosive devices. Pierre and his security team were responsible for developing the hostile vehicle mitigation measures to protect the facility against such attacks while maintaining full operational functionality.
	Willesden Market Hostile Vehicle Mitigation
PROJECT 24	Lead Security Consultant
	Brent Council has commissioned the construction of 99 residential units a new market square with space for 44 market stalls on the site where Willesden outdoor market operates. The market is therefore being relocated in two phases, with the final phase being located in Church Road. Brent Council requires appropriate security to be provided for the market and the public during each phase.
	Brent Council has appointed Pierre and his team to undertake threat, vulnerability and risk assessments, vehicle dynamics assessments and hostile vehicle designs for both phases. Our designs include both temporary and permanent measures designed in accordance with NPSA standards to protect against hostile vehicle attacks.
	Brent Cross Station Risk Assessment and Security Strategy
PROJECT 25	Lead Security Consultant
	Brent Cross Cricklewood development is part of a large mixed use regeneration project in the London Borough of Barnet. The 250- acre site will incorporate the existing Brent Cross shopping centre, improved road, bus, pedestrian, cycle and rail infrastructure, and the provision of 7,500 new homes. As part of the development, a new railway station will be constructed and the existing railway sidings facilities on that location will be relocated. Pierre was responsible for developing a threat, vulnerability and risk assessment for both the new Brent Cross Thameslink station and the extended Cricklewood Sidings. He also developed detailed security strategies and operational requirements for both sites.
PROJECT 26	Major Urban Police Service Smart City Vision and Concept Lead Security Consultant



	Pierre was asked by a major urban police service in the United Kingdom to assist in the development of a vision and create a sophisticated security design for a smarter and safer city, that brings together a number of technologies into a single vision for future deployment.
	Pierre and his team liaised closely with senior command, officers of all ranks, police specialists and the wider local authority stakeholder groups. Pierre facilitated multi-stakeholder meetings, consultations and workshops to elicit key user priorities, resolve conflicting requirements from diverse stakeholders and achieve consensus and agreement on the outcome. He also led the team of technical specialists in developing a concept of a flexible and scalable technology platform and that creates a data rich environment, to allow the police to make full use of both current and future technologies in order to constantly meet the challenges of maintaining and improving the security and wellbeing of the city. The result was a clear vision of the future and an innovative technical and operational solution that fully integrates technology- enabled policing and smart city technologies to achieve greater efficiency across multiple aspects of the policing and urban services functions.
	Stone Towers, Cairo
PROJECT 27	Lead Security Consultant
	A Zaha Hadid-designed mixed-use scheme comprising 18 tower buildings with 450,000m <sup>2</sup> of office space, 20,000m <sup>2</sup> of retail and a 500-key five-star hotel.
	Security threat and risk assessment, design of the perimeter security, hostile vehicle mitigation, vehicle, object and people scanning, traffic and parking management, electronic security systems, campus-wide systems integration, security control room, and monitoring and control systems.
	National Defence College, Abu Dhabi
PROJECT 28	Lead Security Consultant
	Development of the security strategy and design of the VVIP security measures, perimeter security, hostile vehicle mitigation, access control, video surveillance, and command and control facilities for college, which is designed to accommodate national and visiting armed forces.
	Family Development Foundation Headquarters, Abu Dhabi
PROJECT 29	Lead Security Consultant
	Pierre led a team responsible for the design and specification of the security systems at the new headquarters for the Family Development Foundation in Abu Dhabi. The scheme consists of VVIP accommodation as well as office accommodation, an auditorium, a cafeteria, a crèche and exhibition space, with both surface and underground parking. Security measures include



	perimeter security, vehicle management, reception and visitor management, electronic security systems, integration with non-
	security systems, and monitoring and control systems.
	Abu Dhabi Cruise Terminal
PROJECT 30	Lead Security Consultant
	Detailed design of the security systems to comply with the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) code, including passenger and luggage security screening, video surveillance, access control, alarm systems, and monitoring and control systems.
	Caprice Gold Palace, Istanbul
PROJECT 31	Lead Security Consultant
	Detailed design of the VVIP security, perimeter security, hostile vehicle mitigation, luggage and people scanning, electronic security systems, high value asset storage, security systems integration, the security control and incident management suite, and monitoring and control systems for the 1,600-room hotel in Istanbul. A 140,000m <sup>2</sup> building of 16 storeys above ground and nine basement levels, containing more than 20 pools, numerous restaurants and retail outlets and extensive leisure, wellness and spa treatment facilities.



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	Mark Rowan BEng (Hons) CEng MIET MCIBSE MSyl Director Direct: 44 (0)7900 552 242	
	mark.rowan@qcic-group.com	
QUALIFICATIONS	<ul> <li>C.Eng Chartered Engineer –Standard for Professional Engineering Competence (UK-SPEC)</li> <li>BEng (Hons) Building Services Engineering</li> <li>Member of Chartered Institute of Building Services Engineers</li> <li>Member of Institute of Engineering &amp; Technology</li> <li>HNC – Building Services Engineering</li> <li>ONC – Electrical Engineering</li> <li>MSyl – Member of Security Institute</li> </ul>	
CAREER HISTORY	<ul> <li>Director – QCIC Group</li> <li>Practice Leader – Security Engineering – Control Risks</li> <li>Country Manager – HMA Consulting</li> <li>Consultant – Arup</li> <li>UMIST - University of Manchester Science &amp; Technology</li> </ul>	
SPECIALISATION/S	<ul> <li>Security Risk Management</li> <li>Engineering Design</li> <li>Project Management</li> <li>Threat Analysis</li> <li>SABRE Assessor</li> </ul>	
KEY SKILLS & EXPERIENCE	<ul> <li>Mark's experience includes over 20 years with low voltage systems. His responsibilities include overseeing the design and implementation of building security systems and integrated 'intelligent' building systems for a wide variety of projects.</li> <li>He co-ordinates all design activities and provides planning, analysis, budget estimating, specification and drawing preparation, detailed coordination, construction administration and final testing services.</li> <li>Mark has provided designs on a wide range of projects including the General London Assembly, the security master plan and 11 towers within the Canary Wharf Estate, Bur Juman Centre in Dubai, and the Treasury in London. Mark has a full honours degree in Building Services Engineering from UMIST.</li> <li>He has an ONC in Electronic engineering and an HNC in Building</li> </ul>	
	apprenticeship with Satchwell Controls Systems.	
PROJECT 1	Rothschild HQ, London Full detailed design of 16 Floors, Grade A office space	



	Mark was the Director in charge of the design for full security systems design, throughout the various design stages of the building. These include access control, VSS, intruder, intercom, turnstiles and HVM measures.
PROJECT 2	State Street Bank, London Full detailed design of 600,00 Sq. ft. Office Mark was the Director in charge of the design for fully integrated electronic security solution, spanning 35 countries. The integration consisted of access control, IP VSS, intercom, fire, lifts, BMS, radio, telephone, evacuation management systems.
PROJECT 3	<b>Canary Wharf, London</b> <i>Director, responsible for the design of all LV Systems</i> Mark was the Director in charge of all the low voltage systems design for the majority of the buildings at the Wharf, including Clifford Chance, HQ3, HQ4, Retail, DS1, DS3, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, McGraw Hill, State Street Bank, Bear Stearns, Estate Security Centre

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