

SAVILLE THEATRE

135 SHAFTESBURY AVENUE

CRIME IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIA)

QCIC

QCIC

SECURITY ASSURED

CAPE TOWN / HONG KONG / LONDON / NEW YORK

Opera PM
Former Saville Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue

Crime Impact Assessment (CIA)

QCIC - 03692 – 07001c
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
17-JAN-24

Document issue / revision record

VERSION	DESCRIPTION	DATE	ORIGINATOR	CHECKED	APPROVED
A	Document Created	17-JAN-24	SG	FL	MR
B	Updated to suit Montagu-Evans Comments	22-JAN-24	SG	FL	MR
C	Updated to suit Maple Teesdale Comments	30-JAN-24	SG	FL	MR
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Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction

This Crime Impact Assessment (CIA) is provided in support of the planning application for the former Saville Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue development.

Where the development exceeds the physical limits of the building demise and extends into the public realm the contents of this assessment shall include crime prevention strategies for all areas considered to be under the stewardship of the operator / owner of the planned development.

Notwithstanding the legal limitations that would restrict the use of personnel or systems or exceed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation or interventions within the security operators limits of authority.

A Security Needs Assessment (SNA) report as referenced below has been prepared and issued to provide guidance to the design team on the areas requiring greater focus for hardening and technical systems in support of the overall security design.

- QCIC - 03692 - 01001a- Saville Theatre SNA Report

The above document helps to identify appropriate security mitigations to reduce the impacts of identified risks.

1.1 Objective

In keeping with the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), London Plan and Camden Planning Policy, the following Crime Impact Assessment provides an outline approach to how the project will take steps to deter crime by:

- Reduce the ease of identification of vulnerable assets or material
- Make it harder to commit a crime without detection
- Make it easier to identify a criminal act
- Reduce the likelihood of escape without detection
- Increase the likelihood of being successfully prosecuted
- Reduce the impacts of terrorism and unlawful acts of violence

During the delivery of the RIBA Stage 2 development pre & post planning, the introduction of information from risk assessments or Security Needs Assessments and their recommendations shall be used to determine the most actionable risks and vulnerabilities of the proposed development.

The recommendations will provide measurable implementation opportunities for physical, technical, and operational overlays to improve the security profile of the completed development which will in turn reduce the opportunity and fear of crime or antisocial behaviours.

Where terrorism is indicated to be a potential direct or indirect threat to the development appropriate improvements to vehicle management, façade glazing systems, hostile vehicle mitigation, and lockdown incident management strategies will be developed.

1.1.1 National Planning Policy Framework

In conjunction with Section 8 (Clause 101a & Clause 101b) of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) the Crime Impact Assessment (CIA) and Security Needs Assessment (SNA) will identify threats that could have a detrimental effect on the development and its associated users.

These threats (as outlined within Section 3 of the SNA) will be derived using online statistical crime data published on behalf of the Metropolitan Police (Police UK - Home | Police.uk (www.police.uk)).

Upon review, appropriate and proportionate security recommendations will be outlined for incorporation (per Section 5 of the SNA) that if implemented will aim to reduce the threats and vulnerabilities identified, increase resilience, and ensure that public safety and security is maintained overall.

1.2 Reference Material

Plan details referenced within this report has been based around the design freeze information published by SPARRC on 8th January 2024.

2.0 Project overview and development description

2.1 Development Description

The former Saville Theatre at 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue is a grade II listed building. It was built in 1930-1931 as a three-level theatre and opened in 1931. The building was designed by architect T.P Bennett & Son. The building was damaged during the blitz in 1941 but later restored.

In the 1960's, the Theatre was bought by Brian Epstein and opened as a music venue in 1966, hosting artists such as The Who, Jimmi Hendrix and Elton John. After Brian Epstein's death in 1967, The Saville hosted shows created by Cameron Mackintosh.

In 1970, the Building opened as a two-screen ABC Cinema. It was subsequently acquired by Cannon Cinemas as part of a takeover in 1986, which then folded into the MGM chain in 1992. The Site was taken over by Odeon in 2001 as a four-screen cinema, and the layout that is visible today.

The Site is an island site, bordered by Shaftesbury Avenue to the south, St Giles Passage to the east, Stacey Street to the west, and New Compton Street to the south.

The Site is not located within a Conservation Area but abuts the Denmark Street Conservation Area to the north, and the Seven Dials Conservation Area to the south.

The Site has excellent connectivity with a Public Transport Accessibility Level ("PTAL") of 6b, which is the highest possible PTAL score and is defined as 'excellent'. Key transport facilities in the vicinity of the Site include Tottenham Court Road Underground Station, Covent Garden Station and many bus routes.

The Applicant acquired the Site in October 2021. After commissioning a survey of its condition, it was discovered that the Building is currently in a poor state of repair, having suffered from corrosion-related damage (also known as 'Regent Street Disease').

2.2 Development Overview

The security risk profile of the former Saville Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue is aligned to that of similar mixed retail and commercial office development within Holborn And Covent Garden.

The immediate area surrounding the development has been assessed for Crime, Terrorism and any identifiable active groups that may threaten the project directly or general activities that form the ambient safety and security condition of the local environment, although the risk profile of the development will ultimately be influenced by future users, occupants, and tenants (yet to be identified) and as the development evolves over time.

2.2.1 Location Profile

The former St. Martin's Theatre, 135-149 Shaftesbury Avenue is located within the area of Holborn and Covent Garden. Surrounded by other developments of a similar nature – such as Phoenix Theatre (100m away), Palace Theatre (143m away), St. Matin's Theatre (160m away) and Cambridge Theatre (130m away).

The area is akin to entertainment hubs and likely to attract a bustling night life crowed.

There are also multiple bars, restaurants, and hotels nearby. Tottenham Court Road station is 245m away and Holborn station slightly further at 650m away, north-west of the development.

During generation of the Security Needs Assessment (SNA) QCIC noted a moderate level of footfall around the immediate area of the development, however, as well as a perceived negative impact it also means that there will be greater passive and natural surveillance by people particularly walking through the area during commercial and office hours.

2.2.2 Proposed Development Use

The proposed development will compromise of part demolition, restoration and refurbishment of the existing Grade II listed building, roof extension, and excavation of basement space, to provide a theatre at lower levels, with ancillary restaurant / bar space (Sui Generis) at ground floor level; and hotel (Class C1) at upper levels; provision of ancillary cycle parking, servicing and rooftop plant, and other associated works.



(Ref. SPPARC Ground Floor 2111-SPP-ST-0G-DR-A-20-1004.pdf)

The development is accessible via the Ground Floor main entrance which lies on Shaftesbury Avenue. There is a side entrance on Stacey Street, service entrances along New Compton Street and loading bay entrance also on New Compton Street. Lift entrance is located on St. Giles passage providing direct access to the hotel floors.

There are two shared stair cores, one providing access to the back of house theatre spaces and hotel floors on the north end of the building and the main stair core located on the southwest end of the building, providing access to theatre spaces and hotel floors. These will most likely be used as escape cores for each section of the theatre floors (i.e. back of house areas and the theatre entrance and bar areas) and hotel floors, from either the north or south ends of the building.



(Ref. SPPARC Basement Level 01 2111-SPP-ST-B1-DR-A-20-1003.pdf)

The bar, kitchen, green room, offices, and WCs are on Basement Level 01, accessible via the open staircase or passenger, evacuation, and fire-fighting lifts. The Auditorium cannot be accessed directly from this level. The south and north shared stair cores are accessible from the firefighting lobby area and BOH area, respectively.



(Ref. SPPARC Basement Level 02 2111-SPP-ST-B2-DR-A-20-1002.pdf)

Basement Level 2 provides access to the kitchen and dressing rooms accessible via the open staircase or passenger, evacuation, and fire-fighting lifts.



(Ref. SPPARC Basement Level 03 2111-SPP-ST-B3-DR-A-20-1001.pdf)

Backstage and kitchen areas are located Basement Level 03, accessible via the open staircase or passenger, evacuation, and fire-fighting lifts.



(Ref. SPPARC Basement Level 04 2111-SPP-ST-B4-DR-A-20-1000.pdf)

Shared Back of House MEP Plant and Theatre spaces are located at Basement Level 04, accessible via the circular stair, controlled stair core or passenger, evacuation, and fire-fighting lift.



(Ref. SPPARC First Floor 2111-SPP-ST-01-DR-A-20-1005.pdf)

The bike store, male/female changing facilities and staff breakout spaces are accessible via Level 01. These are segregated from the hotel areas. CM BOH/Staff areas are located at Level 04, with the Pantry located at Level 05.



(Ref. SPPARC Level 06-08 2111-SPP-ST-06-DR-A-20-1010.pdf)

The primary means of access to the proposed hotel space is via the lift in the hotel lobby. Hotel floors are accessible via either of the two shared cores which will most likely be used as the emergency escape route. The fireman's lift is indicated adjacent to the main lift from the hotel lobby. Guest lifts are available on hotel floors but will not access theatre floors below.



(Ref. SPPARC Level 11 2111-SPP-ST-11-DR-A-20-1015.pdf)



(Ref. SPPARC Level 12 2111-SPP-ST-12-DR-A-20-1016.pdf)

Access to the Enclosed Plant/MEP and Roof spaces shall be achieved via the stair core at Level 11/12.

3.0 Security Design Approach

To develop appropriate design modifications to create the crime prevention approach and development profile, appropriate to the threat and vulnerabilities of the development, the following considerations will be implemented during the design development stages. These will include use of police crime prevention, statistical resources, and advisory materials as well as reference to local Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO) and Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA).

A meeting was conducted on 21st June 2022 with the MET Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) representing Physical Security Operations in the Lambeth ward. Minutes noting recommendations have been referenced within supporting documentation (ref. QCIC – 03692 – 09001a – CTSA Engagement for Saville Theatre and Hotel).

This report or associated minutes with the CTSA should not be submitted for planning purposes and should remain out of the public domain.

3.1 Next Steps

In conjunction with the Security Design Consultant the Professional Team will be engaged to target those risks identified which fall above an actionable level. The following techniques and measures will be considered during the Stage 2 Post-Planning Design and Stage 3 Strategic Design Development with the design and cost approval of the Employers Representative or Responsible Person from an informed position of risk and mitigation options.

- Provide greater levels of difficulty in obtaining access to areas beyond the public realm
    - Use of certified intrusion resistant door and window schemes
    - Use of access controls with anti-tailgating features (where possible)
    - Provision of cycle parking schemes providing multiple locking and anchor points
    - Overlay security systems to alert security operations of potential incidents
    - Where appropriate restrict vehicular access to pedestrian or inner building facilities
- Increate deterrents to crime by:-
    - Using clear demarcation techniques indicating demise boundaries
    - Providing greater levels of natural surveillance through liaison with landscaping
    - Reduce areas of concealment and dead space to discourage loitering
    - Improving head level visible or covert night-time lighting if appropriate
    - Increasing the likelihood of failure of an attempted criminal act
    - Reducing the potential profitability of crime
    - Increasing likelihood of being caught and successfully prosecuted.
- Use of Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) to capture:
    - Context and understanding
    - Surveillance for proactive intervention
    - Identification of crime
    - Prosecution of criminals.
- Incident management strategies providing:
    - Operational overlay supported by the physical and technology solutions provisioned
    - Identification of incidents and provision of operational & technical solutions

- Protective glazing measures to reduce injury from flying glass
- Lock down systems and strategies
- Reduction of onward progress to limit damage or injury.

- Reduce crime using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principals

The security design approach above is reliant upon the provision or appropriate commissioning of a suitably experienced security professional with appropriate years of security design and development credentials and in this instance, QCIC are instructed to advise the design team and the Applicant on the security considerations.

4.0 Crime Prevention Strategies

4.1 Operational Management

A well-defined and executed security strategy encompasses the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and where possible utilises the principles of the Secure by Design (SBD) initiative, whilst also acknowledging that security is not only about physical or electronic measures alone, but operational management as well. The combination of physical, electronic, and operational measures helps support the development and encourage the community to have a sense of pride and ownership which in turn strengthens the security regime to deter, delay, detect and respond to potential incidents. A well operated and maintained development with a quality operational management team can be a positive influence on the safety and security of the development.

4.2 Access and Connectivity

The needs of user's movement around a development have been carefully considered and balanced to ensure that security is maintained for everyone using the space.

4.3 Surveillance

Appropriate levels of surveillance, sensitive to the users and intended development function, will be applied to the security design. This will be achieved through a balance of natural and active surveillance (video surveillance systems – VSS). The optimisation of natural surveillance, where space is naturally overlooked by users and occupiers, has the increased benefit of reducing the need for active measures whilst remaining an excellent deterrent to crime within that space.

4.4 Structure and Spatial Arrangements

Conflict between users can occur within a development where there is no clear designated purpose for a space. Access to, and circulation within, the buildings is clearly defined by function and type. Where there are shared back of house areas, these have defined user groups and clear delineation where shared areas become private.

4.5 Ownership and Activity

Safety and security of a development is enhanced where there is a clear understanding of what space is to be used for - its primary activity - and where a sense of ownership is fostered. The development has been designed to be welcoming to legitimate users for the logistics hub.

4.6 Physical Protection

Physical protection of assets within the development will be as identified through the security needs assessment or in accordance with any other pertinent planning principles (i.e. Secured by Design (SbD).

4.7 Adaptability

Safety and security of a development is enhanced where there is adaptability within the space to manage changes in security needs. In the case of this development, a layered approach has been adopted by using multiple layers of security measures coupled with a programmable access control solution that can be modified to suit future requirements whether monitored off/off the development.

5.0 Security Design Components

The crime prevention strategies outlined in section 4, require the architectural design to be developed alongside specific physical, electronic, and operational security measures. These will be specified in accordance with local and International design standards and best practice, and where justifiable and proportionate, include relevant security ratings.

The development of the designs will take place alongside ongoing stakeholder engagement to ensure the risks are suitably managed and within risk tolerance levels of these different parties.

The security design has considered the use of the following where appropriate:

Electronic Security Systems

- Electronic access control systems, inclusive of the ability to dynamically lockdown parts of the development should the requirement arise
- Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) to the control room
- Intruder Detection Systems (IHAS)
- Communications systems (i.e. intercoms) for operators or users to generate an alarm or communicate with security personnel or to key points within the development
- Lighting to support surveillance (natural and active) as well as illuminate secluded spaces

Physical Security

- Use of laminate glazing as primary and secondary glazing (depending upon location) to mitigate against injury from flying glass shards and fragments in the event of a blast nearby.
- Measures to mitigate anti-social behaviour and support electronic security systems such as VSS
- Access points rated to appropriate physical attack standards
- Vehicle control measures using a combination of active and passive measures where required.

Operational Management (infrastructure)

- Ensure that operational management spaces (i.e. Security Control Room (SCR)) are designed and equipped to accommodate the proposed equipment and operators to meet the operational security needs of the development.

6.0 Conclusion

By applying international best practice security design principles such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) the development seeks to achieve the creation of a safe and secure environment. In so doing it aims to meet the requirements for National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), London Plan and Westminster Plan Policy 38.

The provision of a Security Needs Assessment (SNA) report, evidence of engagement with security stakeholders as outlined in BREEAM HEA06 will assist the development achieve the BREEAM credit required.

There are no significant risk issues or threats associated with the development which cannot be mitigated to a residual level of acceptable risk and crime reduction will result in the use of those recommendations to follow.

7.0 Appendix - Suitably Qualified Security Specialists (SQSS)

Fergal Ludlow
M.ISRM, Dip. CSMP® M.ISMI
Associate Director

Direct: 44 (0)7425 820764
Fergal.Ludlow@qcic-group.com

CREDENTIALS	▶ Certified Security Management Professional ▶ Member – International Security Management Institute ▶ Member – Institute of Strategic Risk Management ▶
QUALIFICATIONS	▶ SABRE Assessor ▶ CSMP Level 6 Accredited Diploma ▶ C&G NVQ Electronic Security and Emergency Systems Level 2 ▶ C&G NVQ Electrotechnical Technology Level 2 ▶ Open University Science, Technology & Mathematics Access Course
CAREER HISTORY	▶ Associate Director (Risk) – QCIC Group ▶ Principal Security Consultant – Norman Disney and Young ▶ Security Consultant – CornerStone GRG ▶ Principal Security Consultant – AECOM ▶ Security Design Consultant/Lead Surveyor – CornerStone GRG ▶ Design Surveyor – Johnson Controls International (JCI) ▶ Engineer – Detect Fire & Security
SPECIALISATION/S	▶ Threat and Risk assessment ▶ Security Strategy ▶ Operational Requirements ▶ Security Audit and Review ▶ Electronic Security Systems Design ▶ Physical Security System Design ▶ Security Control Room Design ▶ Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) ▶ Security Master planning ▶ Access Policy Development ▶ Search and Transaction Planning ▶ SABRE – Project Auditing ▶ Data Protection Impact Assessment ▶ Project Management
KEY SKILLS & EXPERIENCE	Fergal has over 10 years of experience working across a broad range of sectors in the security industry. He is passionate about delivering outstanding security projects and mitigating the security risks faced by businesses of today. Fergal uses a risk-based approach to security consulting and has experience in providing security solutions in every stage of a

	project including early-stage security risk and strategy, security design, project management and handover. Fergal has carried out these services for a number of sectors including commercial, mission critical, public sector, defence, sport and entertainment and media. Fergal is passionate about professional development and keeping up to date with industry developments and standards; he is a Certified Security Management Professional and regularly attends CPDs
PROJECT 1	**Network Building (Derwent)** *Security Design Lead from RIBA Stage 2* Fergal was responsible as security design lead for the technical security design. The design was completed on the back of a Security Needs Assessment with a focus on integration of smart building technology and sustainability.
PROJECT 2	**EMEA Data Centre Security Upgrade (Equinix)** *Security Lead from RIBA Stage 2* The security upgrade was a major project covering over 50 data centres across the EMEA region. Fergal was firstly a lead surveyor carrying out on-site vulnerability assessments and audits for each before leading security design stages into implementation. Fergal was also involved with completing threat and risk assessments, operational requirements and updating global corporate physical security standards for the client.
PROJECT 3	**2022 Commonwealth Games** *Security Design and Project lead* Fergal was responsible for leading project and design teams to deliver venue security for the 2022 Commonwealth Games at all venues used across multiple locations in the UK. Fergal produced operational requirements, physical security designs, data protection impact assessments and provided project management services.
PROJECT 4	**Government Headquarters TVRA & Access Policy & Procedures (BEIS)** *Risk Lead* Fergal was responsible for delivering a Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to the headquarters of BEIS in London, UK. Using ISO: 31000 Risk Management methodologies to identify, analyse and evaluate the security risk to the building; subsequently providing risk mitigation for implementation. In addition to this Fergal produced an access policy and procedures to manage how building users would access the site and provide procedures for the management of this process

PROJECT 5	**Security Operations Centre APAC (Walt Disney)** *Security Design lead* Fergal was responsible for the design of a Security Operations Centre to be located in Singapore that would manage sites across the Asia-Pacific region. The project presented varying types of challenges such as ensuing compliance with multiple countries data protection laws, ergonomic considerations, alarm management, and dedicating roles and responsibilities to security operators. As part of the project Fergal produced operational requirements, full technical designs, and project management.

Mark Rowan
BEng (Hons) CEng MIET MCIBSE MSyI
Director

Direct: 44 (0)7900 552 242
mark.rowan@qcic-group.com

QUALIFICATIONS	▸ C.Eng Chartered Engineer –Standard for Professional Engineering Competence (UK-SPEC) ▸ BEng (Hons) Building Services Engineering ▸ Member of Chartered Institute of Building Services Engineers ▸ Member of Institute of Engineering & Technology ▸ HNC – Building Services Engineering ▸ ONC – Electrical Engineering ▸ MSyI – Member of Security Institute
CAREER HISTORY	▸ Director – QCIC Group ▸ Practice Leader – Security Engineering – Control Risks ▸ Country Manager – HMA Consulting ▸ Consultant – Arup ▸ UMIST - University of Manchester Science & Technology
SPECIALISATION/S	▸ Security Risk Management ▸ Engineering Design ▸ Project Management ▸ Threat Analysis ▸ SABRE Assessor
KEY SKILLS & EXPERIENCE	Mark's experience includes over 20 years with low voltage systems. His responsibilities include overseeing the design and implementation of building security systems and integrated 'intelligent' building systems for a wide variety of projects. He co-ordinates all design activities and provides planning, analysis, budget estimating, specification and drawing preparation, detailed coordination, construction administration and final testing services. Mark has provided designs on a wide range of projects including the General London Assembly, the security master plan and 11 towers within the Canary Wharf Estate, Bur Juman Centre in Dubai, and the Treasury in London. Mark has a full honours degree in Building Services Engineering from UMIST. He has an ONC in Electronic engineering and an HNC in Building Services Engineering. Mark also served a full four-year apprenticeship with Satchwell Controls Systems.
PROJECT 1	**Rothschild HQ, London** *Full detailed design of 16 Floors, Grade A office space*

	Mark was the Director in charge of the design for full security systems design, throughout the various design stages of the building. These include access control, VSS, intruder, intercom, turnstiles and HVM measures.
PROJECT 2	**State Street Bank, London** *Full detailed design of 600,00 Sq. ft. Office* Mark was the Director in charge of the design for fully integrated electronic security solution, spanning 35 countries. The integration consisted of access control, IP VSS, intercom, fire, lifts, BMS, radio, telephone, evacuation management systems.
PROJECT 3	**Canary Wharf, London** *Director, responsible for the design of all LV Systems* Mark was the Director in charge of all the low voltage systems design for the majority of the buildings at the Wharf, including Clifford Chance, HQ3, HQ4, Retail, DS1, DS3, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, McGraw Hill, State Street Bank, Bear Stearns, Estate Security Centre



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