# Crime Impact Assessment

# Prepared by HDR | Hurley Plamer Flatt Submitted on behalf of Lab Selkirk House Ltd

Selkirk House, 166 High Holborn and 1 Museum Street, 10-12 Museum Street, 35-41 New Oxford Street and 16A-18 West Central Street, London, WC1A 1JR

# **June 2023**





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# 1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared in support of the detailed planning application being submitted by Lab Selkirk House Ltd ('the Applicant') to the London Borough of Camden ('the Council') for the redevelopment of the land at Selkirk House, 166 High Holborn and **1 Museum Street**, 10-12 Museum Street, 35-41 New Oxford Street and 16A-18 West Central Street, London, WC1A 1JR ('the site').

The detailed planning application seeks planning permission for the following description of development:

"Redevelopment of Selkirk House, 166 High Holborn and 1 Museum Street following the substantial demolition of the existing NCP car park and former Travelodge Hotel to provide a mixed-use scheme, providing office, residential, and town centre uses at ground floor level. Works of part-demolition and refurbishment to 10-12 Museum Street, 35-41 New Oxford Street, and 16A-18 West Central Street to provide further town centre ground floor uses and residential floorspace, including affordable housing provision. Provision of new public realm including a new pedestrian route through the site to link West Central Street with High Holborn. Relocation of cycle hire docking stations on High Holborn (Phased Development)."

The proposed development has evolved through an extensive pre-application and wider stakeholder consultation process, which has included collaborative discussions with the Council, Greater London Authority ('GLA'), Transport for London ('TfL'), Historic England ('HE'), and several other key stakeholders.

The proposed development provides the opportunity to regenerate this strategically important site through the demolition and refurbishment of the existing poor-quality buildings and replacement with a highly sustainable mixed-use development. The proposed development will deliver all the key master planning requirements and uses specified by the Local Plan (2017), the Holborn Vision and Urban Strategy (2019), and the Draft Site Allocations Plan (2020), providing the opportunity to deliver a wide range of planning and public benefits.

This document provides a Crime Impact Assessment for the proposed development, building on the RIBA Stage 2 security concept reports dated September 2020 for 1 Museum Street and West Central Street and taking in to account the recommendations of the Security Needs Assessment prepared for the site, also dated September 2020.

The report addresses the key messages from the Camden Planning Guidance document dated March 2019, which are:

- The Council requires that developments demonstrate that they have been designed to contribute to community safety and security.
- Security features must be fully considered and incorporated at an early stage in the design process.
- Designing-against crime features, safe access and security measures must complement other design considerations and be considered as part of a holistic approach to designing and maintaining safer environments for all.
- Better designed environments support safer and healthier communities.
- Consideration will be given to the impact of measures on the surrounding area to ensure that there is not displacement of activity into surrounding neighbourhoods.
- Safer environments support healthier communities.



### 2.0 SITE DESCRIPTION

### 2.1 Location

The site is located within the Holborn and Covent Garden Ward of the London Borough of Camden ('the Council'). The site comprises several individual different buildings within the red line area, which includes:

- Selkirk House (166 High Holborn and 1 Museum Street),
- 10-12 Museum Street, •
- 35-41 New Oxford Street, and
- 16A-18 West Central Street.

The site is bounded by High Holborn to the south, Museum Street to the east and New Oxford Street to the north, with the rear of the properties fronting Grape Street forming the western boundary. West Central Street dissects the site and separates out Selkirk House from the New Oxford Street and West Central Street block (known as the West Central Street component of the site).



Figure 1 – The Site

# **Museum Street and West Central Street Redevelopment Crime Impact Assessment**

### 2.2 Adjacencies

The site is near several well-known, large-scale developments including, Centre Point, Central St Giles, and the Post Office Building development directly adjacent. Notably, further to the north of the site lies the British Museum.

The site is close to three underground stations, namely Holborn to the east, Tottenham Court Road to the south-west and Covent Garden to the south. This area of London is very well served by bus routes on High Holborn and New Oxford Street. High Holborn and New Oxford Street are also on the London Cycle Network and experience high levels of commuter cycling.

There are high levels of pedestrian movements in the area surrounding the site. The site is situated within an urban island bounded and fragmented by a busy multi-lane road system.

Public realm improvements are being brought forward as part of the West End Project, which will link in with the popular tourist routes from either Leicester Square or Covent Garden to the British Museum. Works are currently under way on the West End Project and this will make significant improvements, easing congestion and rebalancing the priority of public realm towards the pedestrian and cyclist.

# Planning Policy

The site lies within the Tottenham Court Road Growth Area, Tottenham Court Road Opportunity Area and within the Central Activities Zone ('CAZ').

The site is identified as a development site within the Council's Draft Site Allocations Plan (2020) under Policy HCG3 ('1 Museum Street'). The draft allocation supports the comprehensive redevelopment of the site with a mix of commercial and residential uses, emphasising the requirement for enhancing the public realm, permeability through the site and ground level experience.

The site is identified within the emerging Holborn Vision and Urban Strategy (2019) as a 'Key Project' for potential redevelopment. The guidance within this document supports active frontages ground level, increased residential population, and a through route on an axis with Coptic Street with future potential to connect to Covent Garden.

## 2.4

# **Description of Existing Site**

Selkirk House comprises a 17-storey building, which includes two basement levels, and a further partial basement level. Selkirk House is occupied by the former Travelodge hotel building and NCP car park. The former Travelodge building provided overspill accommodation from the primary Travelodge hotel building on the opposite side of High Holborn, however, the hotel ceased operation in June 2020. At lower levels there is an NCP car park set across basement to second floor level.

The West Central Street buildings are predominantly in retail use at ground floor level fronting New Oxford Street. The basement, first and second floors of No. 39 - 41 are in office use with the upper floors of 35 - 37 being in residential use. No's 16a, 16b and 18 West Central Street were previously in use as a nightclub at basement level with offices above.

The West Central Street component of the site falls within the Bloomsbury Conservation Area. There are no listed buildings on the site, however, Grade II listed buildings adjoin the site boundary at 43-45 New Oxford Street and 16 West Central Street. No. 33-41 New Oxford Street, 10-12 Museum Street and 16A-18 West Central Street are each identified as 'positive contributors' in the Conservation Area Appraisal. The shopfronts at numbers 10 and 11 Museum Street are identified separately as positive contributors to the Conservation Area. Selkirk House sits outside of the Conservation Area boundary which runs along West Central Street.

### 2.5 The Proposed Development

The proposed development falls within a one red line area (see Figure 1 on the previous page) and comprises of the following components:

- Museum Street a single new building rising to 19 storeys, providing office (Class E(g)(i)) accommodation on upper levels and a range of flexible town centre uses (Class E) at ground level.
- High Holborn - a single new building rising to 6 storeys, providing residential (Class C3) accommodation on upper levels and a flexible town centre use (Class E) at ground level.
- Vine Lane a single new building rising to 5 storeys, providing residential accommodation and a • number of retail units at ground level.
- West Central Street a series of new and refurbished buildings rising to 5 storeys, providing • residential accommodation on upper levels (Class C3) and flexible town centre uses (Class E) at ground level.

### 2.6 **Description of Development**

As noted in the introduction, the description of the proposed development is as follows:

"Redevelopment of Selkirk House, 166 High Holborn and 1 Museum Street following the substantial demolition of the existing NCP car park and former Travelodge Hotel to provide a mixed-use scheme, providing office, residential, and town centre uses at ground floor level. Works of part-demolition and refurbishment to 10-12 Museum Street, 35-41 New Oxford Street, and 16A-18 West Central Street to provide further town centre ground floor uses and residential floorspace, including affordable housing provision. Provision of new public realm including a new pedestrian route through the site to link West Central Street with High Holborn. Relocation of cycle hire docking stations on High Holborn (Phased Development).

### 3.0 SECURITY OVERVIEW

### 3.1 Crime Summary

From the Security Needs Assessment carried out in September 2020, the top four crime statistics for the local area around the site are, in order of frequency: Theft Other (Includes theft by an employee, blackmail and making off without payment), Vehicle Crime, Anti-Social Behaviour and Theft from a Person.

The local Design Out Crime Office, PC Jim Pope, made the following statement as part of his Secured By Design Recommendations for the project on 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2019:

The area currently suffers highly from anti-social behaviour and this is as a result of it being in a very busy West End location, with theatres, late license premises, restaurants and also being very close to major transport links which occasionally run 24 hours. The area around Charing Cross Road and Shaftesbury Avenue does suffer from major drugs issues as it is a 24-hour marker compared to other locations within London and there is a transient population that will come into the area solely to purchase drugs. This leads to other crime types such as aggressive begging, theft and violence. Though the removal of the current car park will make a massive difference to the area and will reduce the huge amount of theft from motor vehicle offences it will be wise to ensure that the proposed offices, commercials units, hotel (now office) and residential units are protected as much as possible due to it being a high-risk area.

The full Secured By Design Recommendations Report can be found within Appendix A.

### 3.2 Security Risks

New developments can draw crime due to the perception that new buildings have new equipment and opportunities. In this case the addition of a residential and retail elements will likely introduce more crime types, such as: - Burglary, Shoplifting and Cycle theft. And with the car parking element now removed from the development, the vehicle crime risk will reduce significantly.

Opportunist crime exists in many areas both affluent and less affluent, and opportunist crime can be seasonal due to the local environment. This does not necessarily mean that due to this, a higher number of opportunist crimes occur but it does mean that consideration should be given to the possibility that an open environment, such as the pedestrianised component, and the presence of visitors who may be unfamiliar with their surroundings and thus distracted, would present an ideal target to certain individuals.

The security risks to the proposed development are thus determined as: -

- Anti-Social Behaviour,
- Theft (Other)
- Theft from the person •
- Violence and sexual offences. •
- Burglary.
- Shoplifting
- Cycle theft.

The management of security risks is a fundamental requirement of any modern development to ensure residents, office workers, staff and visitors will be provided with a safe, secure, and relaxed environment.

This report outlines a complete holistic security solution consisting of physical security measures and a suite of electronic security systems deployed appropriately to mitigate the identified security risks and to aid with the day-to-day management of the proposed development.

It should be noted that to complete the system, a guard force with sound operational procedures is required to operate the systems and respond to incidents as they arise. This part of the security scope is to be developed by the Operator once engaged.

## **Principal Objectives**

3.3

3.4

The principal objectives of the security measures for the proposed development are as follows:

- Contribute to the safety and security of residents, office workers, staff and visitors
- Aid in the reduction of theft and damage to personal property or the building
- Deter rough sleeping
- Delay any attempt to breach a physical barrier
- Act as a force multiplier to the guard force
- imparting a 'feel good' factor.
- Provide a one 'technology' access card approach to building/area entry.
- control points.
- required.
- Provide anti-tailgating measures and the detection of attempts to tailgate into certain areas of the development.
- accommodate throughput of pedestrians in line with DDA legislation through key entry points.

The proposed systems will be designed to deter would be intruders, thieves, vandals and rough sleepers to committing any crime or form of anti-social behaviour and to provide alarms and evidence to building security staff to aid their management of the development.

The systems will delay and detect intruders through the deployment of an access control system in a layered approach supported by a video surveillance system for live monitoring, response and post incident assessment.

To determine the layered approach and building access strategy, the security zoning plans in the next section (Section 4.0 - Security Zoning) assists in the clear delineation of the space within the proposed development.

## Security System Requirements

For the purpose of this report, the development has been broken down in to the three distinct main elements: -

- Public Realm
- Office Buildings
- Residential Buildings.

The following Section 4.0 provides guidance on the principles of security zoning. Sections 5, 0, 6.0 and 7.0 then provide specific security requirements for each main element listed above.

Security layout drawings are provided in the Appendices B to F covering the overall site plan and public realm together with floor plans for the various blocks. The floor plans show the security zoning applied together with electronic security (access control, CCTV and Intercom).

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• Enhancing the perception of security for the building occupants, making them feel safer and

Provide a means of communication and verification between key building entry points and security

Provide an accurate transaction log of all system activity along with recorded visual evidence where

Ensure physical security controls such as entrance doors and speed lanes can adequately

### 4.0 SECURITY ZONING

### 4.1 Security Zoning Principle

The delineation of the development, how each area is defined and how the ownership and territory of those areas are established, is of paramount importance.

There is a careful balance required when establishing territory between the need for security and the creation of a pleasant environment to live and work within.

The delineation at the development level starts with a high-level zoning plan which breaks down the development and the buildings within to a defined range of broad security zones from publicly accessible up to restricted; -



# Figure 2 - Typical Zoning Plan

The zoning plan reinforces the sense of ownership and will aim to provide a clear definition between the different space types outlined above, particularly between public and private space. Clear boundary demarcation is essential; however, all boundary treatments will be appropriate and in context with the function and the environment.

### 4.2 Security Zones

The following sections describe typical examples of spaces and recommended treatments for the various spaces.

### 4.2.1 Public

The public spaces are unrestricted and readily accessible to the public at all times of the day or night. Typical examples of public zones surrounding the development are: vehicle roadways and pedestrian footpaths.

The primary security measure within a public zone is surveillance. The development will strive to provide good natural 360 degrees surveillance, unrestricted by landscape and foliage, with regular

maintenance to ensure surveillance is unhindered by foliage growth and be well illuminated during the hours of darkness.

### 4.2.2 Semi-Public

The semi-public spaces are easily accessible to the public and are typically attractive to the public thus inviting them to use the space. The differentiator is the space being restricted outside of normal business hours.

Typical examples of semi-public zones are: - office lobbies, cafes, and retail outlets. The semi-public space may be clearly defined using the following measures, or combination thereof: -

- Change in surface finish / colour,
- Clear signage to define areas and provide distinct representation of the perimeter between public and semi-public space,
- Landscaping and low-level defensive planting to maintain the definition and provide a formal border around the buildings and spaces, and
- The building envelope and appropriately rated external doors.

The restricting of access to the semi-public space outside of normal business hours may be achieved in several ways, including: -

- Securing of the area to vehicles (i.e. pedestrian corridor between buildings) via bollards and/or planters.
- Securing of the area to public (i.e. lobbies, retail, etc.) via lockable and appropriately rated external doors / gates.

4.2.3

Semi-Private

Semi-private spaces are defined as accessible to the normal users of the space and their invited guests only. The spaces are generally shared but are restricted to the public with visitors being screened prior to entry.

Typical examples of semi-private spaces are: - lift lobbies, stairwells / lifts, offices, delivery / service yard, service areas, back-of-house areas.

The controlling of access to the semi-private space may be achieved in several ways, Including any of the following, or combination thereof: -

- Securing of the area via door / gate / barrier with key locks,
- Intercom / Intercom system,
- Reception staff and/or manned guarding, and
- Visitor screening.

# Private

4.2.4

Private spaces are accessible to authorised users of the space and their invited guests only.

Typical examples of private spaces are: - offices, apartments, visitor / quest amenities.

The controlling of access to the private space may be achieved in several ways, including any of the following or combination thereof: -

- Securing of the area via door / gate with key locks,
- Intercom / Intercom system,

- Reception staff and/or manned guarding, and
- Escorted access by security guard.

### 4.2.5 Restricted

Restricted spaces contain critical or sensitive assets that are accessible to authorised users of the space and their invited guests only.

Typical examples of restricted spaces are: Cash office, Plantrooms, Utilities (i.e. telecoms intake, UKPN, etc.).

The controlling of access to the restricted space may be achieved in several ways, including any of the following or combination thereof: -

- Securing of the area via attack rated doors,
- High security key locks,
- Intercom / Intercom system, and
- Escorted access by security guard.

### 5.0 PUBLIC REALM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

### 5.1 Overview

The following sections outline the Secured by Design (SbD) and CPTED principles to be adopted and additional specific security measures proposed for the proposed development which have been developed in line with information received from discussions with the client representatives, design team members and engagement with the local Metropolitan Police DOCO (Designing Out Crime Officer).

### 5.2 **Environmental Design**

A major component in the enhancement of a secure community is to instil pride and neighbourly values within the community. In general crime and a fear of crime will flourish in any environment where the local law-abiding citizens feel the need to cocoon themselves within their own dwelling leaving the outside world to deal with any issues external to their comfortable demise.

An airy, open, clean aspect is an essential point from which a confident, neighbourly community can develop. A key part of this environment is to reduce, if not negate, unsightly graffiti. This can be achieved with a combination of high-profile monitoring, reducing surface areas which are accessible and can be subject to defacement, and applying specialist treatments to areas that are unavoidably accessible to perpetrators of such acts.

Deterring crime and disorder on the development, as well as the perception of this occurring, is reassuring to residents, retail staff and the public alike, as well as limiting the prospect of crime and helping to deal with incidents of antisocial behaviour.

# The scheme will:

- Design environments with high levels of natural surveillance to encourage people to observe the • spaces around them.
- Promote informal or natural surveillance opportunities for development users by creating a visual • connection between the street and development facilities.
- Design the environment to clearly delineate public, semi-public, and private space.
- Design roadways to control vehicle speed and access / encroachment on pedestrian space. •
- Physical barriers should be robust with access control to deter potential intruders.
- Design and locate buildings, fencing, pavement, signs, lighting, and landscape elements to • express ownership.
- Design to minimise the opportunity for the discreet placement / concealment of devices.
- Design to avoid or remove blind corners, recesses and other places in which people could hide. (Where transparent materials are used to achieve this, they will include manifestations to make them visible to those with visual impairments.)
- Locate lift lobbies, reception lobbies and information boards in sites with good natural • surveillance or within view of staff locations.
- Locate seating and other features to encourage movement and social interaction, ensuring ٠ facilities such as retail units, public telephones and seating are not positioned in isolated locations.
- Consideration should be given to flat surfaces within the public realm to discourage rough • sleeping.
- Encourage a lively development and consider the use of suitable materials such as glass • frontages to enhance the building's visibility.
- Engage with the local community to achieve safe walking/cycling routes in surrounding areas.
- Design high quality streetscapes with wide footways that encourage community use (walking, cycling, wheelchair, etc.).

 Use visible crime prevention elements, such as posting information on security cameras and providing ample and accessible telephones.



Figures 3 – Application of Selected CPTED Principles

Facilities and spaces in and around developments will be designed to discourage crime throughout the day and night. Crime and the fear of crime can be greatly reduced by removing isolated areas and ensuring locations are well lit and visible to others.

This will ensure factors such as lighting, clear lines of sight and CCTV are included in the context of existing crime factors in the vicinity.

- Engage with transport authorities and agencies to coordinate surveillance and activities in adjoining areas.
- The development has incorporated mixed land use active spaces and frontages will add vitality at different times of the day and into the late evening, fostering a sense of community and wellbeing.
- security and locations of crime. Staff patrol routes and schedules will be devised.
- The design of the development and its surroundings will avoid locations that are poorly lit or not directly visible from parts of the development in which staff are present or other development users are more numerous.
- The development public realm areas will be designed in a way that minimises opportunities for the discrete placement of devices.

CCTV monitoring has been incorporated into the project as it provides numerous benefits, including the recording of criminal activity and crowd management in developments. Used overtly, it can also act as a deterrent to crime and reduce fear of crime in developments, on-street and in vehicles.

- The project team will consider discrete placement of cameras within the design, but ensure they remain noticeable, to provide the user with a feeling of safety and allow for maximum surveillance.
- The architecture has allowed for clear, uninterrupted views of all public areas, both internal and • external to the development.

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Development Staff duty locations can be varied across the day and night to reflect concerns over

### 5.3 Area Demarcation

To reinforce a sense of ownership, a simple change of surface type, colour or height can have a beneficial effect to the site's security. If a detail is added on the demarcation point of an access road via say a colour change to the surface this will signify a marked perimeter and does present a psychological barrier to potential intruders for very little cost.

The demarcation highlights a point to people where the public domain finishes and a semi-public domain starts, therefore highlighting to undesirable characters the point after which they may be challenged for being there.



Illustrative View from Museum St Public Realm toward the entrance (Courtesy of DSDHA)

### 5.4 **Boundaries**

Boundaries will offer a deterrent to offenders and they may take several different forms, dependent on risk, including:

- Hedge or dense shrubbery.
- Walls, low retaining or otherwise.
- Fencing or railings consideration will be given to installations meeting BS 1722.
- Barriers / bollards.
- Grass verge of suitable gradient e.g. bunds, mounds etc.
- Flower bed / planter. •
- Other buildings.

When deciding which type of boundary to use reference will be made to the Surveillance section below for advice on the height of the boundary, so ensuring that it does not reduce the opportunity for natural surveillance.

It will also be noted that adjacent street furniture and landscaping will not provide opportunities to easily gain access to and from a secure area e.g. the positioning of a bench or bins that could be used as a climbing aid.

# Street Furniture

Lighting

The public realm works will include seating, bins, planters and trees. Additionally, where required, some street furniture maybe adapted to incorporate HVM requirements in an aesthetic and functional way, such as seating or planters.

The development faces a minimal risk as a terrorist target, however the street furniture in conjunction with landscaping can play an important role in breaking up a space to discourage unwanted or anti-social use of the space, such as: football, moped gangs and skateboarding.

5.6

5.5

The public realm around the development will be in use outside daylight hours therefore general lighting will be required to illuminate the areas around the development.

The design of external lighting for the development will be primarily based on the Secured by Design (SBD) design guide published by the Association of Chief Police Officers. Other documents such as the CIBSE Lighting Guides will also be referred to. For commercial offices, the British Council of Offices Guide to Specification will be used as the basis of standards and good practice.

Lighting has a great effect on the commission of a crime. Increased lighting levels in dark areas can reduce the public's fear of crime and reduce the opportunity for an offender to commit a crime.

Good and adequate lighting that promotes feeling of safety, security and a desire to return will be the main objective of designing the external lighting along the main spine road, the pedestrianised walkways and communal amenity space. This will be achieved by employing the following design principles:

- Mounting height will be as high as possible to reduce the total number of luminaires required.
- be easily switched or controlled by photo electric cell.
- Low level lighting will minimal and low lux, and generally for accent purposes only in order to avoid bloom effect on CCTV images during the hours of darkness.
- ability to reproduce the colour of object being illuminated will also be considered.
- The use of PIRs is not acceptable except for areas that require additional courtesy lighting such as bin stores. PIR tends to emit harsh lights which can be intrusive and causes a serious roads.
- Appropriate lighting values will be selected to achieve the recommended illumination levels.
- The luminaires will be selected based on the above design principles.
- Only areas that require illumination will be considered in the external lighting design. In this way, light pollution is prevented. Design Criteria
- Uniformity (Uo)

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Long life and energy efficient lamps will be proposed suitable for dusk to dawn lighting that can

In addition to the lumen output life expectancy of the lamp, guality in terms of its colour rendering

nuisance to neighbours. Also, PIR if poorly directed, can cause hazard to motorists using nearby

25 to 40 (%)

- Colour Rendering Index (CRI)
- Lux Levels:

60 Ra or greater

Leve						
0	Development Offices	500 Lux				
0	Back-of-House	100 – 300 Lux				
0	Development Front Canopy area	20 Lux				
0	Development Square	20 Lux				
0	Planter Box	20 Lux				
0	Bench Seating Area	20 Lux				
0	Drop Off & Pick-Up areas	30 Lux				
0	Development Refuse Collection Point	20 Lux				
0	Exterior Lighting (General)	10 Lux				
0	Walkways	30 Lux				
0	Loading Bays / Service Areas	150 Lux				
0	CCTV (Colour) covered areas	15 Lux				

Maximum use will be made of daylight or artificial light from surrounding properties, where this may be from a reliable source. To improve this opportunity, consideration will be given to the surrounding landscaping and maintenance of foliage.



Illustrative view of Lighting looking West along West Central Street (Courtesy of DSDHA)

Consideration will be required in the next stage of design of the CCTV system and general recommendations in BS5489. An essential element of the overall lighting scheme is to ensure lighting uniformity is maintained (therefore avoiding dark spots) and that the lighting provides high colour rendition around the development. This ensures that if a person or persons are detected in the development (by either a local resident, passer-by or by the CCTV system) an accurate description of the offender(s) can be made.

The position of lighting columns will, where possible, not assist unauthorised access into secured areas e.g. used as a climbing aid. Consideration is also required to ensure they have no or little impact on surveillance whether electronic or natural.

Cables, fixtures and wiring serving the lighting system will be protected to restrict accidental damage or criminal attacks. Vulnerable service boxes will be secured to resist attack and, where possible, positioned where they are well overlooked.

5.7

# Management Systems and Procedures

Within SbD it notes management will regularly review systems and procedures in place for the safe operation and control of the development facilities and communicate any changes required to their employees.

Management will ensure that there is a system in place where information on any incidents that have occurred earlier, or on a previous shift etc. are communicated to the on-going staff, again this could be verbally.

Management will ensure that all staff are provided with the necessary training skills and knowledge to enable them to undertake the tasks required of them.

Areas for staff training could include:

- The owners/operator's security policy.
- Evacuation procedures.
- Customer service.
- Training on equipment installed.
- Training on dealing with and recording incidents.
- Avoiding confrontation.

The staff and guard force will be contactable and be readily available to tenants within a reasonable timescale during operating hours.

A clean and well-kept development provides a more reassuring environment for users and can contribute to reducing the fear of and perception of crime. Quick removal of graffiti can deter further incidents of criminal damage.

Operating procedures will identify regular monitoring for cleanliness, with an effective policy established for the removal of graffiti within an agreed time scale.

6.0

### 6.1 **Building Perimeter**

All ground and first floor glazing will be laminated and will be a minimum thickness of 6.8mm; the laminate glazing will extend to all glazing that is installed up to 2.4m, and any glazing modules that span the 2.4m limited will be laminated in total.

Glazing to doors will be avoided if possible. However, where required, the glazing will be a minimum of 7.5mm laminate glazing.

### 6.2 **Doors & Fire Doors**

In-line with SbD Guidance, all ground floor external doors will be certified to LPS1175 SR2. Fire exit doors will have no external door furniture.

Internal doors will generally be at least 44mm thick solid doors, have a BS 3621 five lever mortise deadlock installed and be mounted on three heavy duty hinges.

### 6.3 Signage

Bold signage should be applied to the main entrances, cycle entrances and reception areas; signage should also be applied to areas where access is restricted to staff only.

Service deliveries should have signage indicating where the loading bay is and that the area is restricted. Clear and concise instructions should be posted in a prominent position for delivery drivers.

### 6.4 Lighting

The development will be in use outside daylight hours therefore general lighting will be required to illuminate the areas around the development including the loading bay access.

All emergency egress routes will require illumination in line with BS 5266 Pt 1 2005; however, this will only provide a mean lux level at floor of 1 lux which is inadequate for security purposes.

Consideration will be made in the next stage of design to the CCTV system and general recommendations in BS5489. An essential element of the overall lighting scheme is to ensure lighting uniformity is maintained (therefore avoiding dark spots) and that the lighting provides high colour rendition around the development (refer to lighting design criteria in section 5.2.5)

There are various options available to the design team regarding the lighting proposals, but the light absorption of the surrounding surfaces should be considered. For instance, dark charcoal-coloured surfaces will absorb light to a higher degree than say lighter reflective surfaces.

A further consideration that must be made is the impact any additional lighting may have on the environment; careful consideration is required as to what luminaires to use and the light output to energy consumption balance.

Historically, white LED or metal halide type luminaires are the preferred option for light output to colour rendition, but they are not deemed as efficient from energy or maintenance cost perspective than say a LED based floodlight, although the capital costs of LED based floodlighting is considerably higher. LED lights have, however, a long-life expectancy. A factor that needs to be considered when the external lighting design is carried out is the light output depreciation which occurs in all types of lighting.

Careful consideration is required when positioning luminaires to ensure they have no or little impact on surveillance whether electronic or natural.

### 6.5 Video Surveillance Systems

Surveillance can be a considerable deterrent to would be criminals from committing offences and it may also assist in reducing the fear of crime.

The system will be provided comprising of a solution designed to monitor the external and internal areas of the building 24/7.

Cameras will be located strategically to provide coverage within entry lobbies, post boxes, lift lobbies, stairwells, cycle stores, bin/refuse stores, basement corridors, loading bay, critical/restricted rooms, building entry/exit points and building perimeter / external facades.

Generally, cameras will provide visual confirmation of any alarms from the access control system. Cameras will provide a minimum level of 'recognition' quality images and 'identification' quality images at demise entry points.

The cameras will be discreet in appearance and, where required, the cameras will be equipped with built-in infrared (IR) lighting for low-light level areas, i.e. typically basement corridors, stairwells and external areas.

There will be two types of camera as follows:

- General Monitoring: IP based, PoE cameras, fixed dome cameras that will provide colour images in HD (1080p) resolution, ONVIF (S profile) and IR illumination.
- Motion Detection: IP based, PoE cameras, fixed 360 panoramic cameras that will provide colour images in HD (1080p) resolution, ONVIF (S profile).



Figure 4 - Schematic of an Integrated System



The camera images will be recorded 24/7 to Network Video Recorders (NVR) located within the main equipment room (MER) in a 19" rack. The NVR storage capacity will be sufficient to store all connected cameras at HD (1080p) quality, at 12.5 fps for a retention period of not less than 31 days.

The NVR's shall be configured to enable viewing and play back of recorded footage on any of the operator workstations and monitor wall.

Video Motion Detection (VMD) will be used to detect movement and raise an alarm and flag the activity on the recording.

### 6.6 **Building Access**

The office buildings will have an electronic access control system providing control of all key building entry and exit points together with certain internal doors to manage access to various areas based on the security zoning plans.

The system will be integrated with the video surveillance system and provide centralised control and monitoring of the access to the development and to other restricted spaces within the demise.

Generally, the Access Control System will require presentation of a valid proximity access card to enter the space and a 'touch-free' request-to-exit button to egress. Where required, green emergency break glass units will be provided to directly override the lock in an emergency.

Access will also be authorised subject to predetermined time schedules, thus further controlling access outside of normal working hours for certain levels of staff and/or office tenant.



Certain building entry point doors may also be controlled via integration with the intercom system (see section 6.8 below).

Access control will be provided to tenant floors at the core doors only and managed by the Landlord system (i.e. stairwells and lift lobbies). Any other security systems within the tenant floor space will be provided by the office tenant.

The systems credential will be based on proximity smart card technology, MIFARE DESfire EV3 and will also be capable of using smart phones as alternative credentials using Bluetooth and NFC.

Typical security zoning and equipment layouts are provided in Appendix A and B.

### 6.7 **Minimising Touch Points**

The system emphasis will be on minimising touch points. This will include the use of the proximity fobs which are already touch-free, bar code readers in conjunction with smartphones, and IR based request-to-exit buttons.

Consideration should be given to antimicrobial solutions, such as silver ionbased technology for the unavoidable door ironmongery touchpoints: lever handles, push plates and pull handles.



### 6.8 Intercom System

Out-of-hours access, for visitors and unauthorised staff / tenants, will be controlled by an audio / video intercom system. The system will provide full duplex audio / visual colour images to the security control room and reception desks and an electronic door lock release to the respective entry door.

Office building entry points with this intercom facility will be:

- Museum St Offices, Lobby 1 Bypass door
- Museum St Offices, Lobby 2 Bypass door
- Museum St Offices, Cycle entrance

The Intercom system will have the facility to operate via proximity access card or fob, via time schedules and be overridden by the control mechanisms applied to the intercom system.

The equipment will comply with the requirements of the Equality Act 2010 and will be vandal resistant.

The electric locking mechanisms will incorporate a battery back-up facility, in the event of a power failure, to enable system operation for a minimum period of 6 hours. In the event of an initial power failure door locks will remain in the secure mode, however, once the battery back-up ceases to operate the system will revert to a safe (unlocked) mode.

Vandal resistant stainless steel self-resetting emergency exit systems are to be installed. The installation and system type will be in full compliance to achieve final 'sign-off' by Building Control.

Reception

6.9

The reception points in each building will provide good, unobstructed natural surveillance of the entrance areas, the access to the lift / stair lobbies, and the bottom of the stairs to the first floor.

The reception will be resourced to facilitate the greeting of all visitors. In the office building, once a visitor has been logged, the visitor will be received by their host and will be accompanied to the area of development that they are visiting.

In addition to the reception staff, the development will have the benefit of security personnel available to attend to both visitors, tenants and office personnel needs and will constantly monitor all areas of the development.

For the commercial office tower, antitailgating entry control would be provided by an access control system coupled with low level speed-gates with one lane being a DDA compliant wide aisle.

Access to the stairwell from the reception lobby will also be access controlled and monitored by an anti-tailgating detector to raise an alarm to the security control room. Signage will be required to inform building users of the need to present their access card at each of the door card readers even if the door is open.



A reception desk will provide control of visitors via a Visitor Management System (VMS). The speedgates will be under joint control by the access control system and the receptionist desk via desk mounted push-buttons.



In addition to the VMS Workstation, Reception staff will have a CCTV Workstation and Access Control Workstation.

Compliance to Equality Act requirements will be afforded by various provisions including: a drop section of script height on reception desks for wheelchair users, assisted opening external doors and a wide aisle access gate in the speed-gates. Induction loops will provide audio assistance for the hard of hearing.

The desk and speed-gates will form a separation barrier of the semi-public space from the semiprivate space of the lift and stair lobby.

Impact resistant glazing will be used within in revolving doors, speed-gates and barriers.

A 'Lockdown' button will be provided at the reception desk and security control room which will secure external doors in the event of any trouble arising outside of the building. Personal Attack Buttons on reception desks will also be provided to raise an alarm for assistance.

### 6.10 Internal Area Control

Areas within the development should be strategically controlled in line with a security zoning plan. The plan will enable the development management to set time schedules for particular areas, so they may be controlled using appropriate methods at various times to suit different scenarios.

### 6.11 Cycle Storage

The cycle storage facilities will be incorporated into the building as a dedicated room and will meet the following minimum requirements for construction and security are as follows:

- No window to be present
- The bicycle security anchor must also be certificated to 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard or LPS • 1175 Issue 7:2010 SR1 and securely fixed to the concrete foundation in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications
- Proprietary wall-mounted anchoring systems certificated to Sold Secure Silver standard and • installed according to the manufacturer's specifications are acceptable
- Space requirements for bicycle parking will comply with Code for Sustainable Homes
- The store must be lit at night using vandal resistant, dedicated energy efficient light fittings and energy efficient lamps.

Research by the 'Design against Crime' Centre suggests that cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and therefore a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking to be used is recommended. Minimum requirements for such equipment:

- Galvanised steel bar construction (minimum thickness 3mm)
- Minimum foundation depth of 300mm with welded 'anchor bar' •

Compliance can be demonstrated by products certificated to LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1 or 2.

### Security Control Room 6.12

A Security Control Room monitoring facility will be provided in and will accommodate two security staff members to monitor the security systems. The provision will include a console and monitor wall where it will be possible for the system to be monitored on a 24/7 basis.

The security system will be an integrated solution designed to monitor the external and internal public, semi-public and semi-private areas of the development and control access into the new development at all times.

A security control room will act as the central command and control point for the commercial offices. The room is to be located with easy access to building core on ground floor level.

Control of all access-controlled doors will be provided by an Access Control workstation with communications provided via intercoms at key access points and guarding locations as follows:

- Service vehicle entry
- Cycle entry door
- Out-of-hours lobby pass doors
- Reception desks

A CCTV evidence viewing station will be provided equipped with a desk, two chairs, a dedicated CCTV viewing Workstation and media copying capability will provide a means for Metropolitan Police review and copying of CCTV recorded footage.

### 6.13 Loading Bay

All delivery vehicles will access the development via the loading bay vehicle lift off High Holborn.

Control of vehicles to the lift will be via intercoms at the lift entry point which will provide two-way communications with the Security Control. The lifts will also have intercoms at each level and within the lift car itself.

CCTV monitoring of the lift at each level and within the lift car will be provided to allow remote control of the lift from the security control room.

A traffic light system and vehicle loops will ensure vehicle safety, prevent tailgating and inhibit the intercoms when no vehicle is detected.

Vehicle lifts to the basement levels will be as described in the vertical transportation report.

### **Guard Patrols** 6.13.1

The presence of staff offers a valuable form of surveillance. The overall objective, however, will be to provide an effective level of surveillance capable of reducing opportunities for crime and the fear of crime together with the ability to identify and respond to problems within a reasonable timescale.

Patrolling staff numbers and routes will vary dependent on the premises; however, patrols will be random, cover vulnerable areas of the site and provide a highly consistent visible presence. If necessary, electronic devices could be utilised to maintain patrolling standards, and where this is the case there will be a sufficient number of check points installed to ensure that all necessary areas of the building are regularly patrolled.



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All staff conducting a patrol will wear high visibility clothing to enable them to be easily identifiable to a member of the public who may need their assistance. In addition, they will carry a personal radio, or other means, to enable them to summon colleagues or other parties to their aid.

# 6.14 Retail Units

All doors are to PAS24:2016 rated as a minimum, however, higher security ratings may be required depending on the type of business and value of goods on sale. High value goods on display may require additional security.

Retail space security systems will be part of the retail tenant fit-out.

The use of internal LPS1175 SR1 rated shutters may also be required depending on the retailer's security requirements.



Illustrative view looking North on the New Pedestrian Route Cut Through the Site (Courtesy of DSDHA)

### 7.0 **RESIDENTIAL BUILDING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS**

### 7.1 **Building Perimeter**

All ground and first floor glazing will be laminated and will be a minimum thickness of 6.8mm; the laminate glazing will extend to all glazing that is installed up to 2.4m, and any glazing modules that span the 2.4m limited will be laminated in total.

Glazing to doors will be avoided if possible. However, where required, the glazing will be a minimum of 7.5mm laminate glazing.



Illustrative view of One Museum Street toward Loading Bay Entrance (Courtesy of DSDHA)

### 7.2 **Doors & Fire Doors**

In-line with SbD Guidance, all ground floor external doors will be certified to LPS1175 SR2. Fire exit doors will have no external door furniture.

The entrances on New Oxford Street, West Central Street and the Vine Lane block should have doors rated to LPS 1175 SR2 and shall incorporate two magnetic locks (or multi-point lock) to secure the doors. These doors should not be recessed more than 600mm to remove the opportunity for use as cover and concealment.

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An 'airlock' type arrangement with the use of an additional internal door creates a secondary security line forming a secure lobby for post boxes. These doors should incorporate two magnetic locks (or multi-point lock) to secure the doors. Each door should be rated to PAS24:2016.

Internal doors will generally be at least 44mm thick solid doors, have a BS 3621 five lever mortise deadlock installed and be mounted on three heavy duty hinges.

All residential main apartment entrance doors shall meet the requirements of PAS24:2016. Consideration should be given to reinforcing the walls either side of each door to remove any potential vulnerability of circumventing the door locks.

# Signage

Lighting

Bold signage will be applied to the main building entrances and reception lobbies; signage will also be applied to areas where access is restricted to staff only.

Way-finding signage will be applied to the development, surrounding buildings and walkways to aid the residents and visitors alike. Signage will provide the following: -

- A map of the development in relation to the surrounding locality, located at entry points, retail and communal amenity.
- The display of information about local taxi services, and signs towards a rank if there is one Crime prevention advice posters and leaflets relating to specific local crime problems, such as
- pickpocketing or car theft
- Crimestoppers advertisements, giving a freephone number for anyone wanting to report an incident.

The public realm to the front of the Residential Buildings will be in use outside daylight hours therefore general lighting will be required to illuminate the areas around the development including the roads and pedestrianised spaces.

The design of external lighting for the development will be primarily based on the Secured by Design (SBD) design guide published by the Association of Chief Police Officers. Other documents such as the CIBSE Lighting Guides will also be referred to.

Lighting has a great effect on the commission of a crime. Increased lighting levels in dark areas can reduce the public's fear of crime and reduce the opportunity for an offender to commit a crime.

- Good and adequate lighting that promotes feeling of safety and security will be achieved by employing the following design principles:
- Mounting height will be as high as possible to reduce the total number of luminaires required.
- Long life and energy efficient lamps will be proposed suitable for dusk to dawn lighting that can be easily switched or controlled by photo electric cell.
- In addition to the lumen output life expectancy of the lamp, guality in terms of its colour rendering ability to reproduce the colour of object being illuminated will also be considered.
- Appropriate lighting values will be selected to achieve the recommended illumination levels.
- The luminaires will be selected based on the above design principles.
- Only areas that require illumination will be considered in the external lighting design. In this way, light pollution is prevented.

# 7.4.1 Design Criteria

•	Uniformity (Uo)		25 to 40 (%)	
•	Colour Rendering Index (CRI)		60 Ra or greater	
•	Lux L	evels:		
	0	Exterior Lighting (General)	10 Lux	
	0	Walkways	30 Lux	
	0	Refuse Collection Point	20 Lux	
	0	Loading Bays / Service Areas	150 Lux	
	0	CCTV (Colour) covered areas	15 Lux	

Maximum use will be made of daylight or artificial light from surrounding properties, where this may be from a reliable source. To improve this opportunity, consideration will be given to the surrounding landscaping and maintenance of foliage.

Any artificial illumination provided will, where possible, provide high colour recognition e.g. white LED or metal halide. Care will be taken to ensure that the correct luminaries are incorporated within the lighting scheme to reduce the likelihood of any contribution to light pollution.

Where lighting is required it will conform to British Standard 5489 Part 9. It will be noted that light coloured reflective surface treatments applied to floors, ceilings, columns, and walls can substantially reduce the number of luminaries required to meet the standard.



Example of External Lighting

All emergency egress routes will require illumination in line with BS 5266 Pt 1; however, the lux provision will meet with the requirements of the CCTV systems.

Consideration will be required in the next stage of design of the CCTV system and general recommendations in BS5489. An essential element of the overall lighting scheme is to ensure lighting uniformity is maintained (therefore avoiding dark spots) and that the lighting provides high colour

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rendition around the development. This ensures that if a person or persons are detected in the development (by either a local resident or passer-by or by the CCTV system) an accurate description can be established of the offender(s) can be made.

The position of lighting columns will, where possible, not assist unauthorised access into the residential apartments or parking facilities e.g. used as a climbing aid. Consideration is also required to ensure they have no or little impact on surveillance whether electronic or natural.

Cables, fixtures and wiring serving the lighting system will be protected to restrict accidental damage or criminal attacks. Vulnerable service boxes will be secured to resist attack and, where possible, positioned where they are well overlooked.

# Video Surveillance Systems

Video surveillance can be a considerable deterrent to would be criminals from committing offences and it may also assist in reducing the resident's and general public's fear of crime.

A VSS will be provided comprising of a solution designed to monitor the external and internal areas of the residential areas at all times.

Cameras will be located strategically to provide coverage within entry lobbies, post boxes, lift lobbies, cycle stores, bin/refuse stores, basement corridors, critical/restricted rooms, building entry/exit points and building perimeter / external facades.

Generally, cameras will provide visual confirmation of any alarms from the access control system. Cameras will provide a minimum level of 'recognition' quality images and 'identification' quality images at demise entry points.

The cameras will be discreet in appearance and, where required, the cameras will be equipped with built-in infrared (IR) lighting for low-light level areas, i.e. typically basement corridors, stairwells and external areas.

The cameras will be IP type. CCTV recording will use network video recorder (NVR) units providing 31 days storage. The NVR's will provide flexibility and multiple controlled viewing locations within the building. The NVR's will be configured to enable viewing and play back of recorded footage on an NVR playback workstation.

7.6

7.5

# Building Access

The residential buildings will have an electronic access control system providing control of all key building entry and exit points together with certain internal doors to manage access to various areas based on the security zoning plans.

The access control system will be a credential-based system with credential readers placed adjacent to the controlled doors and the doors controlled by an appropriate electric lock.

The systems credential will be based on an RFID fob and will also be capable of using smart phones as alternative credentials using Bluetooth and NFC.

The main entry point doors will also be controlled via integration with the intercom system (see section 7.4).

Retail space security systems will be part of the retail tenant fit-out.



The shape and footprint of the buildings provides pedestrianised walkways where public access is encouraged in and along to the retail units at ground level and the residential lobbies. This access will help maintain an active space with good natural surveillance by the public.

A secure lobby will provide the opportunity for the provision of communal post boxes within the lobby whilst preventing further access into the building by the postal service / couriers.

In-line with SbD Residential Guidance, communal doors will be required to be LPS 1175 Security Rating 2 (SR2). Access controls need to be installed on doors with latches before testing. All products should be provided with Loss Prevention Certification Board (LPCB) test certificate.

Typical security zoning and equipment layouts are provided in Appendix A and B.

Where lifts are provided, consideration will be given to the following:

- A vision panel will be installed to allow both internal and external surveillance to and from the landings.
- The fitting of mirrored interiors to enhance customer visibility.
- Vandal resistant buttons/panels will be used with an alarm button, connected via a link to a remote monitoring point to enable hands free voice communication.
- In the event of a power failure, a suitable back up facility will be available to assist any persons trapped.
- Stairways will incorporate, where possible, open balustrades allowing good visibility on approach to and from landing areas. Stairwell and landing openings will be glazed for enhanced natural light and surveillance.

The residential blocks will have a Management Suite which will consist of: a workstation and an encoding unit for the configuration of RFID access fobs.

### 7.7 **Minimising Touch Points**

The system emphasis will be on minimising touch points. This will include the use of the proximity fobs which are already touch-free, bar code readers in conjunction with smartphones, and IR based request-to-exit buttons.

Consideration should be given to antimicrobial solutions, such as silver ionbased technology for the unavoidable door ironmongery touchpoints: lever handles, push plates and pull handles.

### 7.8 Intercom System

Visitor access into residential lobbies will be controlled by an audio / video intercom system featuring an alpha-numeric keypad, providing colour images to the resident and an electronic door lock release to the main entrance door to the building. The system will provide video and duplex audio communications from the entry door to each of the individual apartments. The system will also be capable of inter-apartment calling.

The intercom system will have the facility to operate via proximity access card or fob, via time schedules and be overridden by the control mechanisms applied to the intercom system.

The equipment will comply with the requirements of the Equality Act 2010 and will be vandal resistant.

Residential building entry points with this intercom facility will be:

- Market Apartments, Resi. Lobby (New Oxford St.) •
- Affordable Apartments, Resi. Lobby (West Central St.)

The electric locking mechanisms will incorporate a battery back-up facility, in the event of a power failure, to enable system operation for a minimum period of 6 hours. In the event of an initial power failure door locks will remain in the secure mode, however, once the battery back-up ceases to operate the system will revert to a safe (unlocked) mode.

Vandal resistant stainless steel self-resetting emergency exit systems are to be installed. The installation and system type will be in full compliance and achieve final 'sign-off' by Building Control.

# **Communal Post Box**

7.9

7.10

Communal post-delivery facilities within building entrances serving multiple flats or rooms will be designed to incorporate the following:

- Located at the primary entrance/exit point of the building within view, within an internal area covered by CCTV or located within an 'airlock' access-controlled entrance hall, or externally at the front of the building within view of those using the building
- Be of a robust construction
- The individual letter boxes will have a maximum aperture size of 260mm x 40mm
- Have anti-fishing properties
- Fire retardation where considered necessary
- Installed in accordance with the manufacturer' specifications

Letter boxes certificated to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 008 (TS 008) as a minimum standard.

# Cycle Storage

The cycle storage facilities will be incorporated into the building as a dedicated room and will meet the following minimum requirements for construction and security are as follows:

- No window to be present
- The bicycle security anchor must also be certificated to 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard or LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 SR1 and securely fixed to the concrete foundation in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications
- Proprietary wall-mounted anchoring systems certificated to Sold Secure Silver standard and installed according to the manufacturer's specifications are acceptable
- Space requirements for bicycle parking will comply with Code for Sustainable Homes
- The store must be lit at night using vandal resistant, dedicated energy efficient light fittings and energy efficient lamps.

Research by the 'Design against Crime' Centre suggests that cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and therefore a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking to be used is recommended. Minimum requirements for such equipment:

- Galvanised steel bar construction (minimum thickness 3mm)
- Minimum foundation depth of 300mm with welded 'anchor bar'

Compliance can be demonstrated by products certificated to LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1 or 2.



### 7.11 **Utility Metering**

In-line with SbD Residential Guidance, to reduce the opportunities for theft by 'bogus officials' the utility meters will, where possible, be located to the outside of the apartments at a point where they can be overlooked. This will negate the need for an official to enter the building to read a meter, which will in turn reduce the opportunity for distraction burglary.

Where possible utility meters will be located on the ground floor between access-controlled doors (secure lobby) so that access can be controlled and restricted to the meters only.

### 7.12 **Courtyard Area**

The communal courtyard area and any seating areas will be designed to allow supervision from overlooking dwellings with safe routes for users of the space to come and go.

Boundaries between public and the semi-private space of the courtyard will be clearly defined with an access-controlled gate to prevent unauthorised access to the courtyard and the residential block entrances beyond.

### 7.13 **Apartment Future-Proofing**

Spatial allowance and the installation of a 13A unswitched fused spur should be considered within each apartment for the future installation of an intruder alarm system by the resident.

### 7.14 **Retail Units**

All doors are to PAS24:2016 rated as a minimum, however, higher security ratings may be required depending on the type of business and value of goods on sale. High value goods on display may require additional security.

Retail space security systems will be part of the retail tenant fit-out.

The use of internal LPS1175 SR1 rated shutters may also be required depending on the retailer's security requirements

### 8.0 SECURITY DESIGN STANDARDS

The security systems and measures to be applied to the development are to be designed in accordance with the relevant British Standards and Publicly Available Specifications as detailed below.

### 8.1 Standards

Standard Ref.	Standard Title
BS 7411	CoP for Static site guarding and mobile patrol services.
BS 7799	Information Access Control Systems
BS 7807	CoP for the Design, Installation and Servicing of Integrated Systems.
BS 7958 2009	CoP for CCTV Management and Operations
BS 8220	Security of Buildings Against Crime
BS 8300 2001	CoP for the Design of buildings and their approaches to meet the needs of disabled people
BS 8418 2010	CoP for Installation and remote monitoring of detector activated CCTV systems
BS 8495 2007	CoP for Digital CCTV Recording Systems for the Purpose of Image Export to be Used as Evidence
HOSDB (Pub 28 09)	CCTV Operational Requirements 2009
PAS 38 2000	CoP for the Installation and remote monitoring of detector activated CCTV systems
BS EN ISO 11064	Ergonomic Design of Control Centres
BS EN 50132-1: 2010	Alarm systems – CCTV Surveillance systems for use in security applications - System requirements
BS EN 50132-7: 1996	Alarm systems – CCTV Surveillance systems for use in security applications - Application guidelines
BS EN 50133-5: 1997	Alarm systems - Access control systems for use in security applications - System requirements
BS EN 50133-7: 1999	Alarm systems - Access control systems for use in security applications - Application guidelines
BS EN 50173	Information technology. Generic cabling systems. General requirements and office areas
BS EN 50174	Information Technology – Cabling Installation
BS 4737 Part 4.1 1987	Intruder Alarm Systems - CoP for Planning and Installation
BS 4737 Part 4.3 1988	Intruder Alarm Systems - CoP for Exterior Alarm Systems
DD 243 2004	CoP for the Installation and configuration of intruder detection system designed to generate confirmation alarm conditions
BS EN 12453	Garage Doors and Gates - Safety in use of power operated doors
BS 5357-2007	CoP for the Installation and application of security glazing
PAS 97 2009	A specification for mail screening and security
NFPA 75 2003	Standard for the protection of IT equipment 2003
H&SE	Display Screen Equipment Regulations

Standard Title

# Standard Ref.

HOSDB publication 02-02 HOSDB publication 14/98 HOSDB publication 28/09 HOSDB publication 13/98 NSI/NACOSS

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Detection

Other Standards and Guidelines

- Equality Act 2010
- Home Office Safer Places, Planning System and Crime Prevention
- Home Office Safer Places, Counter Terrorism Supplement
- BS 8220-1 Guide for security of buildings against crime Dwellings
- BS 8220-2 Guide for security of buildings against crime Offices and shops
- BS 7807 Code of Practice for the Design, Installation and Servicing of Integrated Systems.
- BS 7671 Requirements for Electrical Installations (IEE Wiring Regulations).

- **Digital Imaging Procedure CCTV** Control Room Ergonomics **CCTV** Operational Requirements Manual CCTV Time and Date Displays Code of practice for CCTV, Access Control and Intruder
- **GDPR General Data Protection Regulations** Secured by Design, Homes 2019 - Version 2
- Secured by Design, Commercial 2015 Version 2

APPENDIX A

DOCO CONSULTATION - SECURED BY DESIGN

From:	Jim.Cope@met.police.uk
To:	Nick Grant; Iredda@dsdha.co.uk
Subject:	Secured by Design Recommendations - 1 Museum Street, WC1
Date:	22 October 2019 12:10:18
Attachments:	image002.png
	image003.png

Afternoon Nick/Lemma,

Please find below the comments and recommendations I have in relation to the proposed project at 1 Museum Street. The area currently suffers highly from anti-social behaviour and this is as a result of it being in a very busy West End location, with theatres, late licence premises, restaurants and also being very close to major transport links which occasionally run for 24 hours. The area around Charing Cross Road and Shaftesbury Avenue does suffer from major drugs issues as it is a 24 hour marker compared to other locations within London and there is a transient population that will come into the area solely to purchase drugs. This leads to other crime types such as aggressive begging, theft and violence. Though the removal of the current car park will make a massive difference to the area and will reduce the huge amount of theft from motor vehicle offences it will be wise to ensure that the proposed offices, commercial units, hotel and residential units are protected as much as possible due to it being a high risk area.

# **Comments and Recommendations**

- <u>Residential</u> •
- Main communal entrances to be security rated to LPS1175 SR2, minimum of two (2) magnetic locks integral to the frame with video/audio communication to each residential unit to allow visitors entry and encrypted FOB access control for each resident. These doors should be recessed to no more than 600mm to prevent a location for cover and concealment.
- The creation of an 'airlock' lobby with a secondary door security rated to PAS24:2016 prior to the lifts and stair core should be created to create a 2<sup>nd</sup> line of defence. This door should also have a minimum of two (2) magnetic locks, audio communication to each residential unit to allow visitors entry and once again encrypted FOB access for residents.
- I would certainly recommend that if a Fire Brigade 'drop key' is positioned on the main entrance door then should be protected by a Gerda Access Control Box to prevent unlawful entry.
- Postal Strategy Ideally a 'through the wall' delivery is considered the best practice as it reduces the need for services to have to enter the building. As long as the letter plates meet security standard TS008 this will reduce the risk of theft of the mail. If 'through the wall' cannot be achieved then the air lock lobby is the ideal location for the placement of internal letter boxes. Once again the letter plates should meet security standard TS008 and the locking mechanism should be a 5 pin cylinder. This will reduce the risk of a master key being used or copies being easily made. CCTV positioned covering the main lobby and the all the post boxes will also be a benefit.
- All residential units to have a PAS24:2016 door. Consideration to reinforcing the party walls either side of each door must be made to ensure these are not a vulnerable point

which can exploited to reach the internal locks by forced entry.

- Utility Meters Either to be in a central location which can be easily accessed by the appropriate services or the use of SMART meters. No meters to be installed within a residential unit.
- Cycle Storage Entry door to be security rated to PAS24:2016 with a minimum of two (2) magnetic locks and controlled with encrypted FOB access. Cycles should be allowed to have both wheels and the frame secured to a fixed object - for example a 'Sheffield Stand' or other suitable security rated product. The positioning of CCTV in this area will support the physical security in place.
- Bin Stores If doors lead out onto the public realm then they should be security rated to misuse and fly tipping is extremely high within this location so added protection is required. If internal or links into the main core of the building then a door security rated to PAS24:2016 will be required. CCTV here will also provide extra support for the physical security.
- Alarms The consideration for a 13A spur to be installed within the main entrance of each residential unit to allow for residents to choose whether they wish to install a burglar alarm at some point.
- Windows If applicable, then any openable windows on the ground floor or ones that are easily accessible should be PAS24:2016.

### **Commercial** .

- The use of security rated products on any doors to a minimum standard of PAS24:2016 is advisable to reduce the risk of burglary... but higher security ratings may be required depending on who the end user will be and what they are selling. High value items being on display may require additional security.
- The use of internal security shuttering rated to LPS 1175 SR1 to provide another layer of security may be required.
- Links between shared access ways should have encrypted FOB access control so that movement between each commercial unit is controlled. Certainly the case in the basement area where links between deliveries and services will be guite frequent.
- Staff changing facilities should have access control and options to store valuables in secure lockers should be given.
- Cycle Storage The main door should be security rated to PAS24:2016 and cycles should have the options of being able to be locked by both wheels and the frame.
- Delivery Vehicle lift Will be required to be monitored when in use to prevent people unlawfully gaining access to it.

# • Office

• Office lobby – This is main entry point to the office space and has a reception that covers the main entrance doors and positioned between the stirs and lift lobbies. The reception desk should always be the first thing a person sees when they enter the building and is the 1<sup>st</sup> line of defence. The reception staff themselves should have clear lines of site to the main entrance doors to allow for early identification of potential intruders. Doors should ideally be security rated to LPS 1175 SR2 and have the ability to be 'lock down' from the reception desk if there is a an incident outside the location that

LPS1175 SR2 with a minimum of two (2) magnetic locks. The risk of rough sleeping, drugs

would warrant such a security measure.

- Access control should be installed on the main entrance to the stair core. •
- Destination control on the lifts could be considered or an alternative would be to have access control to each office floor to control the access and movement within the building.
- Once again where potential 'cross over' between building uses is apparent for example between hotel and office additional security will be required. It is not ideal to have such potential links as it does leave both extremely vulnerable especially if there is a door that leads from a hotel bar into the office space... this door would have to be at the least alarmed to notify members of staff of a breach and covered by CCTV linked to monitored station in either reception of the hotel or office.
- Cycle storage area should be protected with a PAS24:2016 and accessed via encrypted FOB... cycles to be able to be locked by three points of locking.

# Hotel

- Multiple entrance and exit points to the hotel is not advisable as this allow people to enter the building easily and to bypass the reception area. This is certainly the case when the lifts are centrally located and can easily be access from what appears to be a door from the extension of West Central Street.
- The main issue with hotels in the Holborn area is walk in theft of luggage and high value technical items. There is a greater opportunity and less risk for a criminal to be able to walk through a premises looking for a vulnerable victim or unattended items and then leave via an alternative exit point. So reducing the entry/exit points to locations which are supervised by staff will increase the risk for the criminal and provide less opportunity.
- Access control on the stair cores is a must and also destination control on the lifts is highly recommended.
- Compartmentalisation of each floor is also a way to control the access and movement throughout the hotel and restricting users to their own floors.
- I would recommend that staff receive training in identifying 'Child Sexual Exploitation' which can be given by the Met Police as 'Operation Makesafe' ... this can be given to all staff within the hotel and alert them to the dangers and signs of a potential child or vulnerable person who is at risk.
- Evident links to the office space have been addressed in the 'Office' comments.
- Fire exits onto the street should be protected with alarms direct to reception and covered with CCTV to reduce the risk of people using them as a way to enter the building and using rooms booked legally for illegal activity.
- The link between the hotel bar and reception is a vulnerable point as non-hotel users need to walk past the lifts to use the toilets and this reinforces the need for the destination control to be installed.
- A change in interior design schemes between the two locations may assist in helping to create a demarcation between the two spaces and to give the impression of a security line.

## **Landscaping**

• West Central Street – The extension of this public right of way between Shaftesbury

Avenue and High Holborn is a concern due to the fact there will be two (2) large under crofts being created at either end of the pedestrian route. Unfortunately any covered location within the Holborn area has a high chance of being used for anti-social behaviour as it provides cover from security and inclement weather. During the day light hours there may be less risk if there is a high pedestrian footfall but it may become a place which is favourable to aggressive and persistent begging. At night I can foresee these locations being used for a higher form of anti-social behaviour in form of either public urination and drugs misuse. The only solution would be to control the access to this right of way by the installation of gates at either end to prevent this kind of behaviour from occurring. Ideally the gates should be secured at a certain time point when the commercial units are not in operation and the pedestrian footfall has decreased.

Further information can be found on the following link https://www.securedbydesign.com/images/downloads/HOMES\_BROCHURE\_2019.pdf

I appreciate that this project is at an early stage and I certainly appreciate you involving me so I can provide comments and recommendations. If you have nay questions or queries about what I have written then please do not hesitate to get in contact... especially if I have made any errors with interpreting the plans or the building strategy.

Kind regards

Jim



Jim Cope Police Constable – Design Out Crime Officer Metropolitan Police Service Continuous Policing Improvement Command (CPIC)

0208 733 3703 Ruislip Police Station, 5 The Oaks, Ruislip, HA4 7LF <u>www.met.police.uk</u> e: <u>Jim.Cope@met.pnn.police.uk</u>

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APPENDIX B

SCHEDULE OF DRAWINGS – SITE WIDE

# APPENDIX B

# SCHEDULE OF DRAWINGS

Drawing No.	Title	Scale
295A-HDR-SITE-00-DR-A-20-098	Security GA, Site Wide, Basement 2	1:100
295A-HDR-SITE-00-DR-A-20-099	Security GA, Site Wide, Basement 1	1:100
295A-HDR-SITE-00-DR-A-20-100	Security GA, Site Wide, Ground Floor	1:100





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GEN The i	ERAL NOTES: nternal layouts within residential apartments and ancillary areas of
SECURITY	ZONE LEGEND
	ZONE 1 - PUBLIC
	ZONE 2 - SEMI-PUBLIC
	ZONE 3 - SEMI-PRIVATE
	ZONE 4 - PRIVATE
	ZONE 5 - RESTRICTED
SECURITY L	EGEND
$A \Rightarrow$	ACCESS CONTROL c/w; ENTRY - Reader
	EXIT - Request to Exit (RTE) Button - Break Glass Unit (BGU) LOCK - Maglock/Electromech Lock
	MONITOR - Balanced Magnetic Switch
	ACCESS CONTROL c/w; ENTRY - Reader EXIT - Reader
	- Break Glass Unit (BGU) LOCK - Maglock/Electromech Lock
	MUNITOR - Balanced Magnetic Switch
	ACCESS CONTROL c/w; ENTRY - Reader & PIN EXIT - Reader & PIN
	- Break Glass Unit (BGU) LOCK - Maglock/Electromech Lock MONITOR - Balanced Magnetic Switch
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	(IP Type, PoE)
180	CCTV CAMERA, EXTERNAL 180 DOME (IP Type, PoE)
360	CCTV CAMERA, EXTERNAL 360 DOME (IP Type, PoE)
	CCTV CAMERA, INTERNAL FIXED DOME
180 -	(IP Type, PoE)
	CCTV CAMERA, INTERNAL 180 DOME (IP Type, PoE)
360	CCTV CAMERA, INTERNAL 360 DOME (IP Type, PoE)
8	DOOR MONITORING
Õ	BALANCED MAGNETIC SWITCH (BMS) PERSONAL ATTACK BUTTON (PAB)
(IS)	VIDEO INTERCOM, SLAVE UNIT
IM	(Wail/Post Mount) VIDEO INTERCOM, MASTER UNIT
DAU	(Desk Mount) DOOR ALARM UNIT (Wall Mount)
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Gi Tř	ENERAL NOTES:	apartments and ancillary areas of
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	ZONE 1 - PUBLIC	
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	ZONE 3 - SEMI-PRIVA	IE
	ZONE 5 - RESTRICTE	D
ECURITY	LEGEND	
$ \rightarrow$	ACCESS CONTROL c/w ENTRY - Read EXIT - Reg	<u>;</u> der uest to Exit (RTE) Button
	- Brea LOCK - Mag MONITOR - Bala	ak Glass Unit (BGÚ) lock/Electromech Lock unced Magnetic Switch
	ACCESS CONTROL c/w	1
' V N	ENTRY - Read EXIT - Read - Bread	der der ak Glass Unit (BGU)
	LOCK - Mag MONITOR - Bala	lock/Electromech Lock Inced Magnetic Switch
	ACCESS CONTROL c/w ENTRY - Read EXIT - Read	der & PIN der & PIN
	- Brea LOCK - Mag MONITOR - Bala	ak Glass Unit (BGU) lock/Electromech Lock anced Magnetic Switch
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	CCTV CAMERA, INTE (IP Type, PoE)	ERNAL PTZ DOME
$\otimes$	DOOR MONITORING BALANCED MAGNET	IC SWITCH (BMS)
	PERSONAL ATTACK	BUTTON (PAB) SLAVE UNIT
IM	(Wall/Post Mount) VIDEO INTERCOM, M	IASTER UNIT
DAU	DOOR ALARM UNIT (	Wall Mount)
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	4	SECURITY	Y LEGEND	
		$A \Rightarrow$	ACCESS CONTRO ENTRY EXIT	<u>OL c/w;</u> - Reader - Request to Exit (RTE) Button
			LOCK	- Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock
			MONITOR	- Balanced Magnetic Switch
		B +	ACCESS CONTRO	<u>OL c/w;</u> - Reader - Reader
				- Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock Beleneed Magnetic Switch
			ENTRY EXIT	<u>- Reader &amp; PIN</u> - Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN
			LOCK MONITOR	- Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch
			(IP Type, PoE)	A, EXTERNAL FIXED DOME
		180	CCTV CAMERA (IP Type, PoE)	A, EXTERNAL 180 DOME
		360	CCTV CAMERA	A, EXTERNAL 360 DOME
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			CCTV CAMERA (IP Type, PoE)	A, INTERNAL FIXED DOME
			CCTV CAMERA (IP Type, PoE)	A, INTERNAL 180 DOME
		360	CCTV CAMERA	A, INTERNAL 360 DOME
			(IP Type, PoE)	
		(F)	CCTV CAMERA (IP Type, PoE)	A, INTERNAL PTZ DOME
		$\otimes$	DOOR MONITO BALANCED MA	DRING GNETIC SWITCH (BMS)
			PERSONAL AT	TACK BUTTON (PAB)
		IS	VIDEO INTERC (Wall/Post Mou	COM, SLAVE UNIT ht)
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		DAU	DOOR ALARM	UNIT (Wall Mount)
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APPENDIX C

SCHEDULE OF DRAWINGS – MUSEUM STREET BLOCK

# APPENDIX C

# SCHEDULE OF DRAWINGS

Drawing No.	Title	Scale
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-098	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Basement 2	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-099	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Basement 1	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-100	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Ground Floor	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-101	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 01	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-102	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 02-03-04	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-103	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 05-06-07	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-104	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 08	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-105	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 09-10	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-106	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 11	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-107	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 12-13-14-15-16-17	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-108	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Level 18	1:100
295A-HDR-1MS-00-DR-A-20-113	Security GA, 1 Museum Street, Roof	1:100









ACCESS CONT	ROL c/w;
ENTRY	- Reader & PIN
EXIT	- Reader & PIN
	- Break Glass Unit (BGU)
LOCK	- Maglock/Electromech Lock
MONITOR	- Balanced Magnetic Switch















LOCK MONITOR	- Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch
ACCESS CONT ENTRY EXIT	<u>ROL c/w;</u> - Reader - Reader - Break Glass Unit (BGU)
LOCK MONITOR	<ul> <li>Maglock/Electromech Lock</li> <li>Balanced Magnetic Switch</li> </ul>
ACCESS CONT	ROL c/w;
ENTRY EXIT	- Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN
LOCK MONITOR	<ul> <li>Break Glass Unit (BGU)</li> <li>Maglock/Electromech Lock</li> <li>Balanced Magnetic Switch</li> </ul>
CCTV CAME	RA, EXTERNAL FIXED DOME











ACCESS CONT	ROL c/w;
ENTRY	- Reader & PIN
EXIT	- Reader & PIN
	- Break Glass Unit (BGU)
LOCK	- Maglock/Electromech Lock
MONITOR	- Balanced Magnetic Switch
	-









·	ENTRY EXIT LOCK MONITOR	- Request to Exit (RTE) Button - Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch
	ACCESS CONT ENTRY EXIT LOCK MONITOR	ROL c/w; - Reader - Reader - Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch
	ACCESS CONT ENTRY EXIT LOCK MONITOR	<u>ROL c/w;</u> - Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN - Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch
	CCTV CAMER	RA, EXTERNAL FIXED DOME











100200 00111	<u>i (0 E 0/11,</u>
ENTRY	- Reader & PIN
EXIT	- Reader & PIN
	- Break Glass Unit (BGU)
LOCK	<ul> <li>Maglock/Electromech Lock</li> </ul>
MONITOR	- Balanced Magnetic Switch
	-



![](_page_39_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_39_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_39_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_39_Figure_4.jpeg)

ACCESS CONT	ROL c/w;
ENTRY	- Reader & PIN
EXIT	- Reader & PIN
	- Break Glass Unit (BGU)
LOCK	- Maglock/Electromech Lock
MONITOR	- Balanced Magnetic Switch
	-

![](_page_39_Figure_7.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_5.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Figure_4.jpeg)

ACCESS CONT	ROL c/w;
ENTRY	- Reader
EXIT	- Reader
	- Break Glass Unit (BGU)
LOCK	- Maglock/Electromech Lock
MONITOR	- Balanced Magnetic Switch
ACCESS CONT	ROL c/w;
	Deeder 9 DIN
EXIT	- Reader & PIN
EXIT	- Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN - Break Glass Unit (BGU)
EXIT	- Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN - Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock
EXIT LOCK MONITOR	- Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN - Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch
EXIT LOCK MONITOR	- Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN - Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch
EXIT LOCK MONITOR	- Reader & PIN - Reader & PIN - Break Glass Unit (BGU) - Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch

![](_page_41_Figure_6.jpeg)

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![](_page_44_Picture_2.jpeg)

# SECURITY ZONE LEGEND

ZONE 1 - PUBLIC
ZONE 2 - SEMI-PUBLIC
ZONE 3 - SEMI-PRIVATE
ZONE 4 - PRIVATE
ZONE 5 - RESTRICTED

# SECURITY LEGEND

A 🛋	ACCESS CONTROL c/w;						
	EXIT	- Reader - Request to Exit (RTE) Button					
		- Break Glass Unit (BGU)					
	MONITOR	- Maglock/Electromech Lock - Balanced Magnetic Switch					
		·					
	ACCESS CONTROL c/w;						
		- Reader					
	EXII	- Break Glass Unit (BGU)					
		- Maglock/Electromech Lock Balanced Magnetic Switch					
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	ENTRY	- Reader & PIN					
	EAII	- Break Glass Unit (BGU)					
	LOCK	- Maglock/Electromech Lock					
	MONITOR	- Balanced Magnetic Switch					
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	(IP Type, PoE)	)					
180 —							
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360		RA, EXTERNAL 360 DOME					
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Ŭ							
		RA, INTERNAL 360 DOME					
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	CCTV CAMER	RA, INTERNAL PTZ DOME					
	(IP Type, PoE)						
~	DOOR MONIT	ORING					
Ø	BALANCED M	AGNETIC SWITCH (BMS)					
	PERSONAL A	TTACK BUTTON (PAB)					
<u> </u>							
IS	(Wall/Post Mor	UUNI, SLAVE UNI I unt)					
		COM. MASTER UNIT					
	(Desk Mount)	,					
DAU	DOOR ALARM	I UNIT (Wall Mount)					

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