



Site Security Survey report

Site Survey

Crime prevention advice is given without the intention of creating a contract. Neither the Home Office or the Police Service accepts any legal responsibility for the advice given

Recommendations included in this report have been considered for a specific site and take into account information available to the Police or supplied by you.

Dear Sir / Madam

With reference to my visit on 12.07.2021 and the survey carried out on The Towers, 39 Dartmouth Park Avenue - Camden, NW5 1JP, I am now able to make the following recommendations. The advice is seen as appropriate in order to address the current level of risk at this site.

The risk level has been based upon information as stated by the representatives of Clarion Housing and police, present during my observations, and statistical data where available.

Any variation to the perceived level of security risk because of a change in working practices, personnel, equipment etc. may render this report ineffective and it is advised that contact is made with the sender at the earliest possible opportunity.

The vast majority of crime is preventable and therefore good crime prevention will reduce your vulnerability to the effects of disruption by way of loss, damage or theft.

Should you require any further advice or information please do not hesitate to contact me

Yours sincerely

PS Cesar Sanguinetti

Crime Prevention Practitioner

Secured by Design (SBD) is a police initiative to guide and encourage those engaged within the specification, design and build of new homes, and those undertaking major or minor property refurbishment, to adopt crime prevention measures.

The environmental benefits of SBD are supported by independent academic research consistently proving that SBD housing developments experience up to 87% less burglary, 25% less vehicle crime and 25% less criminal damage

It also has a significant impact on anti-social behaviour. Therefore there are substantial carbon cost savings associated with building new homes and refurbishing existing homes to the SBD standard i.e. less replacement of poor quality doors, windows and the stolen property from within the home as a result of criminal acts. This has been achieved through adherence to well researched and effective design solutions, innovative and creative product design coupled with robust manufacturing standards.

Secured by Design has three differing levels of security award, starting at the highest level (SBD Gold) which incorporates the security of the external environment together with the physical security specification of the home. SBD Silver offers those involved in new developments, major refurbishment and the individual the opportunity to gain an award for the level of physical security provided. In addition, SBD Bronze offers a route to achieve a reasonable level of physical security for bespoke or refurbished properties where a traditional enhanced security product is not available, or cannot be utilised due to the listed building or other conservation status.

Site information	
Date of survey	12.07.2021
Premises	The Towers
Address	39 Dartmouth Park Avenue Camden, NW5 1JP
Telephone, email & web	07591947217 Ben.obrien@clarionhg.com
Site contact details	Ben O'Brien – Caretaking team

Organisation details	
Name	Clarion Housing
Address	1 - 7 Corsica Street Islington, N5 1JG
Telephone & email	Alex Johnson – Surveyor Alex.Johnson@potterpaper.co.uk Abul Zahangir – Housing Team Abul.zahangir@clarionhg.com

Summary of main findings and recommendations

Map of layout attached to survey

The boundary of the estate benefits from heavy footfall from two roads, providing natural and informal surveillance, boundary lighting appears adequate but void areas and building lighting is not, ASB in venue is mostly due to nearby hotspots.

Perimeter of estate is very unsecure because despite there being a boundary fence there are no means of security installed controlling access.

This seems the main reason why ASB finds its way onto The Towers, because of its location, ready access and because wrongdoers feel they can easily conceal at venue.

Access control along the perimeter will be achieved with gates and upgrading of the boundary fence; however, before any improvement works take place, ensuring access needs for all those parties requiring access must be planned.

The void areas would be securer when perimeter access is controlled. Additionally, the narrow car park would benefit from markings, lighting and demarcation from the main garden area. At the same time, the main garden would benefit from controlled access, investment and interaction from the partnership between stakeholders, local authority and residents with the installation of a small play area. The use of the tenants' association building can also benefit the community highlighting problems in the estate and a place for police to visit.

The refuse outbuilding has seen ASB and is impractical to use, leading to refused being dumped everywhere, despite having a secure lockable door. Instead of this bin shed, the recommendation is to install and refuse bin roofed shed next to the current bin shed. By doing this, all refused problems can be solved and visibility increased, at a lower cost than other alternatives.

There are issues around keys management, and all shed would benefit from a coded entry lock. It is expected any issues would reduce too once main perimeter access issues are solved.

There is no CCTV and installation of CCTV in this block appears impractical and would provide low value for money, instead the recommendation is to support residents to install their own individual remotely monitored CCTV systems.

Allegedly there are issues along the staircase and lift areas. They can benefit from target hardening improvements, but they could be excessive and bring unwanted H & S complications considering that the main issue is along controlling perimeter access and investment in the void areas. These improvements need to make provision for adequate dusk to dawn lighting.

Doorsets appear to meet the recommended security standards, but locks do not, windows do. There are simple and cheap short term fixes such as securer locks and security glass films for windows achieve this. Also interaction from police and local authority raising crime prevention awareness and enabling the formation of a neighbourhood watch will help the community.

Suppliers of suitably accredited products can be obtained by visiting: www.securedbydesign.com or www.soldsecure.com or the Master Locksmiths Association.

Where recommendations have been made for additional physical security, it is assumed that competent installers will carry out the installation as per manufacturer guidelines.

Overview

Location of the site –

The Towers, 39 Dartmouth Park Avenue - Camden, NW5 1JP is a social housing estate located off Dartmouth Park Avenue Camden NW5.

There are two roads on the perimeter of the venue as per map, the lengthiest is on Dartmouth Park Hill and the shorter alongside Dartmouth Park Avenue, and both roads meet at the corner, giving the outer perimeter an L shape.

Estate has around 28 flats.

Crime profile for the site/area

As mentioned by the attendees –

- ASB from unknown youths causing criminal damage with graffiti.
- ASB from unknown persons on the estate, suspected of engaging in drug taking.
- Consider a hotspot area by the local Police SNT
- Graffiti incident linked to youths who committed extensive criminal damage in many places of the estate.
- There are suspicions that residents from a nearby hostel are coming onto the estate to engage on drug-related ASB, this is also the case with persons from nearby Whittington Hospital and Highgate Mental Health premises.

Previous incidents/crimes

No known gang activity but some reports indicate tensions –

- 2 incidents of violence with injury in April 2021
- 1 GBH in July, linked with stairs in the middle of the estate.

Reason for the survey

Designing out crime aimed to tackling ASB

Improve community safety

Introduce the principles of crime prevention

Environment observations –**Traversable routes to the site**

No traversable routes, but two roads with substantial footfall are around the perimeter of the estate.

Ground features – ditches, banks, topography, trees, tunnels, drains etc.

Trees on the pavement alongside estate.

Surveillance (natural/formal/informal)

- Natural:

Estate has several flats in the estate overlooking both roads.

During daytime EVA, there was pedestrian and motor vehicle traffic alongside both roads, especially Dartmouth Park Avenue.

Fence alongside estate's boundaries with Dartmouth Park Avenue (DPA) is about 1.2 m tall made from metal, offering reasonable visibility, one corner section is a 5 foot tall brick wall.

Fence alongside estate's boundaries with Dartmouth Park Hill (DPH) is about 1.2 m tall made from metal, offering reasonable visibility, several section are in disrepair.

EVA undertaken during morning hours, but attendees ensured there is reasonably good artificial lighting alongside both lanes.

- Informal:

There is not a tenants' association.

Both roads see heavy footfall from residents of the many houses and blocks, also there is public transport.

Formal: Not available apart from sporadic patrols/management/caretaking from Housing officers and police.

Boundaries with co-located properties

As per attached map, beyond flats 1 – 7 and green areas to the north: private properties with dividing walls.

Perimeter observations –**Fences, gates, toppings, walls, etc.**

The estate is separated from Dartmouth Park Avenue by a 4 ft tall metal fence, this fence has one metal gate of same height, in disrepair, which cannot be locked. At the corner with neighbouring properties there is a 6 ft tall brick wall.

The estate is separated from Dartmouth Park Hill by a 4 ft tall metal fence which is in disrepair in several sections, broken or coming loose, this fence has 2 metal gates of same height and none of them can be locked. At the furthest end the fence ends on a gate, which can be locked. This gate leads onto a narrow car park.

Perimeter footpaths, public rights of way, access, shared boundaries

There is ready access for all gates and car park area (including no fence beyond car park gate and end of boundary), this is used by residents, housing staff, emergency services, and other parties external to the estate.

Barriers, bollards, blockers

None

Landscape

Estate has a hostel nearby at Chester road, Highgate MH unit as well as Whittington Park. Across Dartmouth Park Avenue is Dartmouth Hill Park, which has seen drug related ASB. This park belongs to Islington and policed by Junction ward SNT.

Communal areas, problem areas, etc.

Unrestricted access onto estate grounds via all gates and over low boundary fence.

Existing security measures

Low Boundary wall and 3 unsecured gates. Car Park gate can be secured with a padlock but it is commonly kept open to allow access.

Not known perimeter lighting, but estate benefits from public lighting along pavement. The trees on the pavement do not stop impede street lighting from reaching the estate's perimeter.

Perimeter recommendations

Any recommendations that need adaptation of hardware will follow the British / European Standard or similar benchmarks additionally must be adapted / installed by competent and qualified personnel, hence products meeting BS or European standards would have to pass rigorous testing which will normally last several years, they offer guaranteed quality

Furthermore, before making any adaptations / installations ensure to comply with legislation that might apply; such as Occupiers' Liability Act or Health and Safety or Buildings Regs, in case of doubt obtain further advice from local Council or Government.

If a pedestrian path should be well lit, making greater use of natural lighting too, with a clear line of sight. If footpaths are designated as an emergency access route they must be wide enough to allow the passage of emergency and service vehicles and have lockable barriers. Suitable lighting increases natural surveillance.

The need for lighting will be determined by local circumstances. Footpaths that are to include lighting should be lit to the relevant levels as defined in BS 5489:2013. It is important that the landscape architect and lighting engineer co-ordinate their plans to avoid conflict between lighting and trees, which if not planned properly, would impede the sought after incremented natural surveillance effect. Low energy light sources should be utilised and it is recommended dawn to dusk lighting sources.

Trees may restrict the performance of street lighting by blocking light or causing damage through collision with branches and should not be located within 5 metres of a lighting source. Account must be taken of the effects of seasonal variations on planting when designing such schemes.

Any access route onto Estate is through the perimeter, defined by the boundary wall, because of associated costs; there are main medium-term recommendations.

Add secure gates to all access points shown as Gate in attached map; 1 along DPA and 2 along DPH, and adding hostile topping to increment height of metal fence to, this is because fence heights should be of a minimum 1.8m overall and be capable of maintaining height over uneven terrain. The tops/top rail/capping of fencing and gates should be of a design able to accommodate a security topping to deter attempts to scale over the perimeter (e.g. pigeon spikes or mega strip spikes, etc). Alongside the wall there are spaces where hostile planting can be used as a way to discourage climbing, but should not impede the opportunity for natural surveillance and wayfinding, and must avoid the creation of potential hiding places. As a general recommendation, where good visibility is needed, shrubs should be selected to have a mature growth height no higher than 1 metre. Also, give due consideration to the time taken for such areas to become established and therefore additional temporary protection may be required. Alternatively fencing certified to LPS 1175 Security Rating 1 (A1) may be specified. Add fence as per above recommendations to fenceless end of boundary beyond car park gate.

Pedestrian gates should be of a framed design and employ galvanised adjustable hinges and fixings mounted behind the attack face. On outward opening gates, where the hinges/brace is mounted on the attack face, fixings should be of a galvanised coach bolt design. Hinge systems must not allow the gate to be 'lifted off' and therefore should employ a method to restrict the removal of the gate from the fence post or wall. Gates should be fitted with a

galvanised latch and lockable shoot/pad bolt. The gate construction should have the same design and construction attributes as the fence.

For the car park gate there are two main options, mechanical or automated, any kind of perimeter gate complies with the principle of controlling access to site in crime prevention.

Where entrance/driveway gates are required they should ideally be inward opening, of substantial framed construction and employ galvanised adjustable hinges and fixings mounted behind the attack face. Hinge systems must not allow the gate to be 'lifted off' and therefore should employ a method to restrict the removal of the gate from the adjoining fence post or wall. Gates should be fitted with a galvanised drop bolts and facility for padlocking (manual gates) or electro-mechanical locking (automated gates) and employ mechanical/electro-mechanical devices as applicable to hold gate leaves in the open position.

Automated gates supplied and installed must meet the relevant statutory safety standards and meet British or European standards and marked accordingly. Specifiers may consider the safety and operational good practice guidance established by gate-safe.org

Powered door and gate safety is not just about the individual components making up the product, but about the way they are combined together to fit a particular set of circumstances, and what is done over time to maintain safety.

At all times a powered gate must respond in a safe way when any person interacts with it. It's design must take into account that foreseeable interactions may go well beyond normal use (e.g. children playing around or with / on the powered gate), as well as normal wear and tear, and adverse environmental influences, particular wind and rain / snow and other debris that can impair function.

Safety is usually delivered by a combination of methods, including design to eliminate hazards such as: the gate running away down a slope, speed control, including deceleration when nearing the end of travel / rotational movement where crushing hazards may arise, non-contact sensors: many of these are only designed to prevent a gate closing on a vehicle, avoid over-sensitive tripping from rain or leaves, etc.

There are a number of current standards which are relevant to powered gates;

- BS EN 13241-1 the Product Standard for powered doors and gates
- BS EN 12604 & BS EN 12605 on mechanical requirements and tests
- BS EN 12453 & BS EN 12445 on requirements and test for powered gates
- BS EN 12635 on installation and use
- BS EN 12978 on safety devices for power operated doors and gates

Lastly, physical barriers may also have to be put in place where 'desire' lines (unsanctioned direct routes) place pedestrians in danger.

Local police, and council / housing services can raise awareness of the importance of reporting ASB/suspected crime incidents affecting the perimeter of the estate; ideally via a

designated local tenants association / neighbourhood watch coordinator. The fact that residents and stakeholders pay attention and report incidents, ensures that the increasing surveillance principle directly interacts with the target hardening factors, thus increasing the chances of wrongdoers getting caught and diminishing any wrongdoing pay off.

Access control system - A proximity access control system provides electronic access through communal entrance doorsets. This is generally by use of a card or key fob issued to an occupant or person such as staff member, contractor or postal delivery service. It grants access to required areas via locked doors when the valid card or key fob is presented to a proximity reader fitted to the communal entrance doorset. Authorised access can be restricted to certain times of the day for some users.

The access control system will have the facility to record and identify the location, user, type, time and date of every system event. Sufficient memory storage must be available for a period of not less than 30 days. The system will be fully programmable

Electronic keys must be security encrypted to protect against unauthorised copying, and be sufficiently robust to avoid constant replacement during everyday use by the residents.

Developments with more than two floors are required to have a visitor door entry system and access control system (regardless of the number of flats/ apartments, bedsits or bedrooms)

In order to address problems delivering post when a secure access has been installed and to prevent crime Secure by Design strongly recommends, where possible, mail delivery via a secure external letter box meeting the requirements of the Door and Hardware Federation standard Technical Standard 009 (TS 009) or delivery 'through the wall' into a secure area of the dwelling. These should be easily accessible i.e. at a suitable height for a range of users.

Where a surface mounted letter box is to be used it must be robust in construction. TS 009 letter boxes offer reassurance that all of the above attributes have been met. In high crime areas TS 009 provides the safest means by which mail can be delivered whilst eliminating the risks associated with letter plate apertures. The letter box must be securely fixed to the face of the building in accordance with the manufacturers specifications and be located in a position that benefits from natural surveillance. Anti-arson design features may also be advised if such crime risks are present. In order to guarantee access to emergency services all gates must have a drop key system.

Area between the perimeter and the shell security observations (void area and outbuildings)**Outbuildings**

3 outbuildings –

Tenants' association (TA) outbuilding which seems very secure and with no visible climbing points, shown on map as Store. This is being used by one unknown resident to store musical equipment. No key control practices introduced.

Refuse shed, shown in map as Bins. This outbuilding is narrow and generates health and issue issues due to this as one bin is overfull and the other is left empty; this shed benefits from locks but they are not being used, many residents leave their rubbish outside. During survey, there was discarded refused outside outbuilding. Next to it there is a medium-sized patch of land which has not real purpose.

Unsecure storage marked on map as Roofless storage, outbuilding has no roof and has a padlock and key. This outbuilding was full of discarded refuse during survey.

Gardens

As per shown on map, there are substantial green areas between boundary fence and block of flats. In addition, next to the TA building there are small staircase which leads to a community garden.

Carparks

Ready access to narrow car park at the bottom of DPH boundary car park gate. No markings. No signage or refuge for pedestrians.

Car park has the potential of being used by residents and others; such as council workers or emergency services.

No CCTV covering this area.

Access control, guarding, emergency routes

None

Lighting

EVA carried out during morning hours, but attendees confirmed lighting is poor.

Void area recommendations

The parking area is overlooked by some residents' properties.

Communal parking facilities must be lit to the relevant levels as recommended by BS 5489:2013 and a certificate of compliance provided.

External public lighting must be switched using a photo electric cell (dusk to dawn) with a manual override or via a Central Management System (CMS) for large scale developments. If LED light sources are used then shorter burning hours can be programmed as no warm up time is required for the lamp.

The car park and all void areas that see pedestrian traffic would benefit from grounds markings for safety, especially around car parking. If motorcycle parking is to be provided ground anchors and/or metal support stands provide a primary point for securing motorcycles, around which other secondary measures can be added by the rider, such as disc locks, grip locks, bike covers to one of the following security standards, such as sold Secure Gold.

Where rear parking courtyards are considered absolutely necessary, they must be protected by a gate, where gardens about the parking area an appropriate boundary treatment e.g. a 1.5m fence supplemented by trellis to a height of 1.8m.

Once perimeter access is secured, ASB will be greatly reduced. Despite this, it is recommended that the key and lock security is replaced by a BS or ES combination lock or Gold or above Sold secure standard for all storage / bin sheds. This will further reduced the possibility of the door being left open leading to subsequent ASB. Good lighting in any shed is also recommended.

The narrow bin shed shown in map as Bins should be replaced by a roofed bin shelter, thus delivering a solution to all refused problems and visibility increased, at a lower cost than other alternatives.

There is no CCTV in void areas. Housing staff confirmed there is no one to monitor it in case it gets installed, hence is not being recommended as it would prove ineffective.

The existence of a TA room and communal garden with additional green spaces with two benches opens the possibility of informal surveillance by residents using facilities.

For instance, Housing could install a small play area in the larger green area for the general stakeholder community, with access controlled by a BS or ES combination lock or Gold or above Sold secure standard. The aim of this is in line with the crime prevention principles of control if access, change the environment and by handing the management of this to a future residents association, the community will increment informal surveillance enhancing the natural surveillance of both areas. Fencing at a minimum height of 1200mm can often discourage casual entry, provide a safe clean play area and reduce damage to the equipment.

The provision of inclusively designed public open amenity space, as an integral part of residential developments, should make a valuable contribution towards the quality of the development and the character of the neighbourhood.

Shell/external security observations

Building design

Main building has 2 entrances to communal areas and the 3 floors; 1 staircase located next to the lift.

Staircase are not gated. In July there was a reported GBH and the victim makes mention of the staircase as a point of ready access. Staircase leads to all floors above and one basement.

Lift is free entry with no restrictions.

The basement has a metal gate secured with a lock. It appears the lock does not comply with British or European standard. As per caretaker, there has been access to this basement and evidence of ASB (e.g. urine)

Residents benefit from individual storage facilities secured with a wooden door and a lock, it also appears the lock does not comply with British or European standard.

Doors and windows

All doors are PVC multi point locking mechanism. It appears the lock does not comply with British or European standard.

Windows are double glazed, wooden double hung.

Other entry points (shutters, garage doors etc.)

N/A

Access control, guarding, emergency routes

N/A

Lighting

EVA carried out in daylight, but attendees confirmed lighting is poor.

Existing security measures (CCTV/alarms etc.)

N/A

Shell recommendations

The term “doorset” refers to a door, frame, locks, fittings and glazing as one combined unit. Door frames must be securely fixed to the building fabric in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and specifications and shall be certificated to one of the following standards:

PAS 24:2016

STS 201 Issue 7:2015

LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 2+

LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating A3+;

STS 202 Issue 6:2015 Burglary Rating 2

LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating B

Door locks minimum recommended; multi-point locking system which should incorporate a DHF TS 007 Kitemarked 3-star cylinder.

Alternatively, a DHF TS 007 Kitemarked 1-star cylinder plus a pair of DHF TS 007 Kitemarked 2-star handles can be fitted which is equivalent to the 3-star rating.

This doorset advice is also applicable to the individual storage provided to all tenants which can be found between the staircase and the bin shed, found in the map as storage marked with numbers from 1 to 4.

An easy and cheap way to prevent intruders in the property is to install internal letterbox hoods, so to avoid fishing for keys or other valuables.

LPS 1175, LPS 2081 and STS 202 are unique to the respective certification bodies and incorporate a physical attack on the glazed areas within doors and windows. There is a requirement for a doorset to be both fire and security rated, e.g. flat or apartment entrance doorset.

All easily accessible windows (including easily accessible roof lights and roof windows) shall be certificated to one of the following standards:

PAS 24:2016

STS 204 Issue 6:2016

LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1

LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating 1/A1

STS 202 Issue 7:2016 Burglary Rating 1

LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating A

All easily accessible windows should incorporate key lockable hardware unless designated as emergency egress routes within the Building Regulations.

Laminated glass meeting the requirements of BS EN 356:2000 class P1A is required in the following areas; any window located within 400mm of a doorset

Glass panels in or adjacent to doors can be especially vulnerable when facing outside, so ideally should be replaced with laminated glass that meets the minimum requirements of BS EN 356:2000 class P1A.

Alternatives are LPS 1175 SR1 or STS 202 BR2 internal fixed grilles or LPS1270 security film, the latter is more affordable and very effective. This security film can also be used for the front door's glass part. Several ground floor properties have already installed grills outside their entry doors but not their windows.

Staircases and lift could benefit from controlled access.

If staircase gates are to be installed they should follow the external short gate in conjunction with the outbuilding code lock recommendations with the further requirements for all pedestrian doorsets BS 6510: 2010 (Steel) in case steel gates are installed.

For the lift, if entrance is to be secured via a fob; electronic keys must be security encrypted to protect against unauthorised copying, and be sufficiently robust to avoid constant replacement during everyday use by the residents.

Lighting is required to each elevation that contains a doorset where the public, visitors or occupants of the building are expected to use

No recommendation made on visitor door entry system as it is not applicable to venue.

To avoid expensive business-like equipment that demands 24/7 monitoring; the residents can install the cheaper alternative of motion sensor CCTV with audio that feeds onto their mobile phones. They can be installed by the doors, close to a source of light. They need to be installed according to manufacturers' guidelines and cannot overlook neighbouring windows. Police and Housing can support the formation of a residents' association or neighbourhood watch, this would improve informal surveillance and with housing support, these individual doorset CCTV devices can deliver the formal surveillance normally provided by a centrally controlled system of CCTV.

There are no alarms in the dwellings. There are Alarm systems. Intrusion and hold-up systems meeting the BS EN 50131 standard, they range from communication to detection. It is suggested totting up these formal methods of surveillance, with the formalisation of a NHW. It is advisable any alarms are installed by NSI or SSAIB.

Internal security observations & internal security recommendations**Risk targets****Views from exterior (especially of potential targets)****Key control procedures****Personnel/visitor procedures****Internal doors security****Existing security measures**

No member of the public was spoken to during survey as there was no one available. No properties were visited.

The main recommendation is the establishment of a tenants association / Neighbourhood Watch as well as crime prevention flyers against burglary, motor vehicle crime and ASB reporting by the local safer neighbour police and local housing / council.

Moreover, local SNT, housing and tenants can work together towards the use of the TA outbuilding, thus allowing police to conduct surgeries from this venue.